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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1958 Congress enacted a wide range of legislative changes
designed to encourage the growth of small businesses. 1 That
legislative package included a variety of amendments to the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") designed to reduce the burden
of taxation on new or relatively small business units. 2 Perhaps the
most widely known of these provisions was Subchapter S. 3 Congress' primary objective in passing Subchapter S was to eliminate
the double tax burden on closely held corporations on an elective
basis. 4 Secondarily, some of the attributes of partnership taxation
were to be applied to a Subchapter S corporation, including the
ability of its shareholders to claim corporate losses directly on their
individual returns and the ability to make distributions to shareholders without the imposition of tax.
Although a substantial number of corporations elected to be
taxed under these new provisions, 5 Subchapter S could not be
regarded as an unmitigated success. The pattern of taxing SubchapterS corporations fell somewhere between the taxation of corporations and the taxation of partnerships, creating a third system
for the taxation of business enterprises that in many respects was
more confusing than either. Furthermore, both Congress and the
Treasury Department remained somewhat suspicious of their new
creation. In order to prevent an undue extension of the relief pro1. For non-tax legislation, see, e.g., Small Business Investment Act of 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-699, 72 Stat. 689; Act of July 18, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat.
384 (amending the Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, tit. II 67 Stat.
232); and Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-800, 72 Stat. 966.
2. The Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, tit.
II, 72 Stat. 1676, added to the Code the following sections, among others: § 1244
(losses on small business stock), § 179 (first year depreciation) and § 6166 (extension of estate tax). The Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866,
tit. I, 72 Stat. 1606, added I.R.C. §§ 1242-43 and 341(e) as well as Subchapter S.
3. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat.
1606, 1650.
4. See text accompanying notes 153-67 infra.
5. In 1980, 545,389 corporations filed tax returns as Subchapter S corporations. U.S. TREAS. DEPT., STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATION INCOME TAX
RETURNS 63 (1980).
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vided by Subchapter S, Congress and the Treasury Department
enacted a series of statutory and regulatory provisions which tightly restricted the definition of a Subchapter S corporation and its
operation. In practice, however, these provisions made it enormously complex, and thus expensive, to operate a business under Subchapter S. Indeed, Subchapter S became a virtual minefield, and
an unacceptably large number of taxpayers encountered disaster
in attempting to negotiate its boundaries. It was not at all uncommon for businesses, even acting with the advice of tax professionals,
to emerge from an encounter with Subchapter S having paid more
tax than would have been imposed had the election not been made.
Over the last decade, the definitional sections of Subchapter
Shave been repeatedly amended in order to expand the availability
of its provisions and to eliminate several of the more pointless
"traps for the unwary." 6 At the same time, Congress began to study
the operational provisions of Subchapter S with a view towards
simplifying their application.7 All of this activity has now culminated
in the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982 (the "Revision A_ct"). 8
All aspects of Subchapter S corporations have been completely
changed under the Revision Act. It has expanded and liberalized
the definitional requirements of a Subchapter S corporation, thus
making it far more desirable for a large number of small businesses.
In addition, the Revision Act has brought the taxing of Subchapter
S corporations far closer to the pattern of taxing partnerships and
has eliminated many of the needless traps and restrictions. Without
question, the normal operation of a Subchapter S corporation will
be far simpler than under prior law. On the other hand, the Revision Act retained some of the most significant differences that existed under prior law between partnerships and Subchapter S corporations, thus perpetuating, albeit in diminished form, its hybrid
character. Moreover, the substantive simplification achieved was
only at the price of a substantial increase in both the length and
complexity of the statutory provisions themselves.
This article will explore the changes effected in the taxation
of Subchapter S corporations by the Revision Act. In many cases,
however, the new provisions are ambiguous and, occasionally, ap-

6. See notes 19-21, 33-46, and 58 irifra and accompanying text.
7. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG .. 2ND SESS., STAFF
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX RULES ON SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1980) (hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT). The STAFF REPORT
contains in an appendix the comments of the Treasury Department on the recommendations. See also Chang, Recommendations for Restructuring of Tax Rules
Relating to Subchapter S Corporations: A Comparative Summary, 34 TAX LAW.
403 (1981).
8. Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669.
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parently misdrafted. The legislative history is surprisingly sparce
and, at some points, inconsistent with the enacted legislation.
Moreover, no significant regulations have been issued yet under
the new provisions. As a result, many of the interpretations that
we will offer must be regarded as tentative at best.
As this Article was being completed, the Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee introduced the Technical Corrections
Bill of 1983 ("TCB"). 9 Such legislation is normally enacted with few
modifications. The TCB retroactively would amend the Revision
Act, and other recent legislation affecting Subchapter S, in several
minor respects. Unfortunately, the TCB leaves untouched the
substantive inadequacies created by the Revision Act. The more
significant provisions of the TCB are briefly described in the following pages.

II.

A

QUESTION OF SEMANTICS

Under prior law, the Code referred to a corporation that met
certain of the requirements for electing to be taxed pursuant to
Subchapter S as a "small business corporation" 10 and referred to
a corporation that actually elected to be taxed pursuant to those
provisions as an "electing small business corporation." 11 This terminology was confusing in part because the simultaneously enacted
section 1244 was entitled "Losses in Small Business Stock." Unfortunately, the definition of the small business referred to in section 1244 bore no resemblance whatsoever to the definition of the
small business corporation referred to in Subchapter S. Perhaps
for that reason, practitioners insisted on referring to an electing
small business corporation as a "Subchapter S corporation." In some
circles, however, such a corporation was referred to as a "tax option corporation." Under the Revision Act, Congress has made a
partial bow to commercial usage but not without adding some
modifications of its own. Henceforth, corporations electing under
Subchapter S are "S corporations" 12 and all other corporations are
"C corporations." 13 This article will refer to electing corporations
as "S corporations" but will not use the designation "C corporation." Non-electing corporations will simply be so described.
9. H.R. 3805, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 4, 1983).
10. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64(a), 72 Stat.
1606, 1650 (enacting I.R.C. § 1371(a) (repealed)). Hereinafter, all provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, as they appeared prior to amendment by the Revision
Act, are referred to as "Former I.R.C. §."
11. Former I.R.C. § 1371(b).
12. I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1).
13. I.R.C. § 1361(a)(2).
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QUALIFICATION, ELECTION, AND TERMINATION

When Congress somewhat tentatively introduced Subchapter
S in 1958, it imposed excessively restrictive limitations upon the
character of the corporations that were eligible to elect this new
pattern of taxation. Those restrictions remained for almost two
decades until the Tax Reform Act of 1976 initiated a landslide of
liberalizing amendments. 14 Since 1976, the definition of an eligible
corporation has been expanded repeatedly in incremental steps,
some of which, while expanding the definition of a Subchapter S
corporation, also introduced substantial additional complexity to
that definition. In the Revision Act, Congress has indicated its contentment with the present configuration of the definition of an S
corporation for, in sharp contrast to the complete revision of the
provisions governing the taxation of such corporations, little fundamental change has been made in the eligibility requirements.
Notwithstanding this legislative inactivity, the definition of an S
corporation cannot be regarded as fully matured. The requirements
for the making of a Subchapter S election remain more restrictive
than is necessary to accomplish the statutory objectives. It seems
probable, therefore, that Congress will continue to expand the class
of corporations eligible to make the election, and to simplify the
eligibility requirements.
A second reason exists for anticipating a continuing liberalization of the definitional requirements of Subchapter S. In recent
years, a growing consensus has emerged among tax specialists that
the double taxation of corporations is both improper in principle
and excessively distorting of economic behavior in practice. 15 While
political support for some measure of integration of the individual
and corporate income taxes fluctuates/ 6 the respectability of
eliminating the second level of tax at the election of the taxpayer
has grown enormously since 1958. That Congress did not dramatically expand the availability of Subchapter S in 1982 is somewhat
surprising. It seems probable that Congress will continue to support ad hoc expansions of the availability of Subchapter S.
While the basic structure of the definitional requirements of
an S corporation has been continued largely intact from prior law,
those definitions have been amended in a number of important
14. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
15. See, e.g., C. MCCLURE. MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE
(Brookings Institute 1979), and Comm. on Corporations, Report on the Integration
of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, 31 TAX LAW. 37 (1977).
16. Interest in integration has diminished since the adoption of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System of I.R.C. § 168. See Auerbach, Whither the Corporate Tax?: Reform After ACRS, 35 NAT"L. TAX J. 275 (1982).
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respects. Among the most significant are the declaration of an interim cease fire in the war over the treatment of debt as a second
class of stock and the elimination of the passive income restriction for newly formed corporations that elect to be treated as S
corporations from the date of their organization. At the same time,
unfortunately, new distinctions have been drawn between newly
formed and preexisting S corporations. 17

A. Eligibility
Following the somewhat confusing pattern of prior law, the
Revision Act continues to distinguish between requirements for
eligibility to elect Subchapter S status and circumstances that can
cause a Subchapter S election to terminate 18 and that distinction
is followed here. Thus, under section 1361(b) five types of requirements are imposed upon a corporation's eligibility: a maximum
number of shareholders, the type of permissible shareholders, a
single class of stock, not belonging to an affiliated group, and not
constituting a corporation entitled to certain special tax provisions.
1.

Maximum Number of Shareholders

The most frequently amended provision of Subchapter S is that
imposing a maximum limitation on the number of shareholders that
an electing corporation may have. Beginning with a strictly defined
limit of ten in 1958/9 the permissible size of an S corporation had
expanded to a relatively liberally defined twenty-five under prior
law. 20 The Revision Act increased the permissible number of
shareholders to thirty-five. 21
The Committee Reports 22 suggest that Congress selected the
number thirty-five because it conformed to the maximum number
of public offerees that may be included in an unregistered sale
17. For another description of the Revision Act, see Meale, Eligibility, Election and Termination under the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, 11 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 93 (1983).
18. Governed by I.R.C. § 1362(d).
19. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64(a), 74 Stat.
1606, 1650 (enacting I.R.C. § 1371 (a)(1)). The provision was first expanded in 1959.
Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-376, § 2(a), 73 Stat. 699. See also Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 902(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1608, and Revenue Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 341(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2843.
20. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 233(a), 95
Stat. 172, 250.
21. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(l)(A).
22. H.R. REP. No. 826, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1982)(hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT), and S. REP. No. 640, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1982)(hereinafter
cited as SENATE REPORT), reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3253.
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of a security under Regulation D. 23 Obviously, however, a determination by the Securities and Exchange Commission as to when
the public interest requires that a securities offering be registered
has no relevance whatsoever to the proper size of an S corporation. Since the present ceiling, like its predecessors, is an arbitrary
one, and appears needlessly restrictive, it is not unlikely that the
thirty-five shareholder limitation, along with other eligibility requirements, will be liberalized further. Furthermore, as currently
enacted, the definitional requirements do not, in fact, have the effect of limiting to thirty-five the number of shareholders an S corporation may have. As under prior law, husbands and wives are
treated as a single shareholder for this purpose (regardless of
whether they have a joint interest in the stock or file a joint income tax return) as are the estates of deceased spouses (regardless
of the identity of their beneficiaries). 24 Moreover, section 1361(c)(2)
permits a variety of trusts to be shareholders of an S corporation,
either permanently or for limited periods of time. The trust itself,
however, is not treated as the shareholder of the S corporation;
either the creator or beneficiary of the trust is so treated. 25 Thus,
if that individual is an S corporation shareholder in his individual
capacity, the presence of one or more such trusts as shareholders
does not increase the number of shareholders of the corporation
for the purpose of the computation of the thirty-five shareholder
maximum. As a result, while under the Revision Act an S corporation may not be owned by a great deal more than thirty-five
separate economic interests, the actual maximum number of
shareholders to whom income and loss must be allocated is in theory
unlimited and may easily be double or even triple that number.
All of this elaborate computational detail in order to impose
a not very onerous restriction, which itself has been repeatedly
expanded, may be sharply contrasted with the definition of a partnership for income tax purposes which, of course, contains no limitation on the number of partners. The rationality of retaining any
ceiling on the number of shareholders of an S corporation is doubtful. The original reason for limiting eligibility to elect under Subchapter S to corporations having a small number of shareholders
is not entirely clear. In the same legislative package, Congress
extended ordinary loss treatment to stock in another classification of small businesses which, in this case, was defined with
reference to the corporate net worth and contained no limitation

23. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1982). Significantly, the number of offerees
permissible under the various Rules in Regulation D is considerably larger than
35 and, under certain circumstances, is unlimited. See Rule .504.
24. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(1).
25. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(B).
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upon the number of shareholders.26 Presumably Congress concluded
in 1958 that the pattern of taxation provided by Subchapter S was
uniquely appropriate for "incorporated partnerships" in which
substantially all of the owners of the business also participated
in management. 27 In addition, it appears that Congress regarded
Subchapter S as an erosion of the tax base that was justified only
insofar as it implemented a national policy of encouraging small
business enterprise. Finally, Congress undoubtedly feared that the
process of auditing Subchapter S shareholders would be substantially more complicated than was the auditing of a single corporate entity subject to the regular income tax at the entity leveJ.28
It is unclear whether any of these policy justifications for
limiting S corporations are valid today. The expansion of the maximum number of shareholders to over thirty-five economic interests
and perhaps over 100 individual shareholders has far surpassed
any conception of an "incorporated partnership." This restrictiveness appears particularly inappropriate since publicly offered
limited partnerships, which not uncommonly have more than 100
limited partners, are not only permissible but also can offer substantially greater tax reduction advantages to their limited partners than can an S corporation. Furthermore, the Commissioner's
administrative difficulty in auditing Subchapter S corporations has
been eliminated, as it has been in widely owned partnerships, by
the adoption of an entity level audit procedure the results of which
are binding on all shareholders unless they specifically notify the
Commissioner of their intention to adopt an inconsistent position. 29
Finally, many would argue that the second level income tax imposed
upon regular corporations constitutes an improper distortion of
the allocation of taxation and that the pattern of taxation imposed
under Subchapter S would be more appropriate for all corporations.
Furthermore, eliminating any ceiling on the permissible number
of shareholders of an S corporation would not have the effect of
making the option available to widely held corporations. The specter
of an automobile manufacturing corporation making a "one shot"
election in order to pass through a gigantic loss to thousands of
shareholders could not occur. Other restrictions upon the making
of a Subchapter Selection, such as the requirement of unanimous
shareholder consent and the inability to have corporations and most
trusts as shareholders, together with the difficulty in most states
of effectively restricting transfers of S corporation stock for the

26. I.R.C. § 1244(c)(3).
27. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 68 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4791, 4876.
28. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
29. See text accompanying notes 479-503 infra.
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purpose of preventing disqualification, 30 effectively preclude the
use of Subchapter S by widely owned corporations. Indeed, it is
unlik~ly that the managers of many corporations in the intermediate
range of 100 to 200 shareholders would choose to proceed under
Subchapter S. No reason appears, however, why those relatively
few corporations should not be entitled to avail themselves of the
advantages offered by Subchapter S.
2.

Permissible Shareholders

As under prior law, an S corporation may have among its
shareholders only individuals, estates, and certain specified trusts
and may not have a non-resident alien stockholder. 31 To prevent
avoidance of the rule excluding nonresident alien stockholders, the
Revision Act expressly excludes foreign trusts from the category
of permissible shareholders of an S corporation. 32
The provisions of present law governing the types of trusts
that constitute permissible shareholders of an S corporation have
undergone a virtual explosion of statutory detail since 1976, when
trusts were first permitted to become shareholders of Subchapter
S corporations. 33 The Revision Act continues the description of the
types of trusts that are eligible shareholders of an S corporation
from prior law without modification, except for several minor
changes in the definition of the "Qualified Subchapter S Trust"
set forth in section 1361(d).34 Since the trust provisions appear excessively restrictive, and are of relatively recent origin, it is probable that this aspect of the definition of an S corporation will also
undergo further amendment. The types of trusts that are permitted
to be shareholders consist of: (a) a grantor trust, 35 including, for
a limited period of time, a trust which was a grantor trust on the
date of the death of the grantor; 36 (b) any trust that receives stock

30. Some states permit such restrictions by statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 202(d)(1974).
31. I.R.C. § 136l(b)(1).
32. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(flush language).
33. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 902(c)(2), 90 Stat. 1520,
1609 (1976).
34. See text accompanying notes 38-46 infra.
35. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(a)(i). To qualify, the entire trust must be treated as
owned by an individual. The provision include trusts, the income of which is taxable under I.R.C. § 678 to an individual other than the settlor.
36. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(a)(ii). The period is 60 days unless the entire corpus
of the trust is includible in the estate of the grantor in which event the period
is two years. The special two-year period was added by the Revenue Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 701(y), 92 Stat. 2763, 2921, and apparently was intended
to conform the grace period to the average length of time necessary to administer
an estate for those trusts that the grantor likely intended to be testamentary
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of an S corporation pursuant to a will, but only for a sixty-day
period; 37 (c) a voting trust; and (d) a "Qualified Subchapter S Trust"
as defined in section 1361(d).
Only the last described trust constitutes a significant expansion of the limitation on permissible shareholders to individuals.
Originally enacted as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981/8 the provision creating the "Qualified Subchapter S Trust"
allows certain trusts to qualify as shareholders of S corporations
at the election of the income beneficiary. For the trust to qualify,
the income beneficiary must elect to be treated as the owner pursuant to section 678(a) of that portion of the trust consisting of
the S corporation stock. 39 The effect of such an election, of course,
is to substitute the beneficiary for the trust as the shareholder
of the S corporation. The beneficiary, thus, must report an allocable
share of the income and deductions of the S corporation on his
tax return. Since the failure to elect 40 renders the trust ineligible
to be an S corporation shareholder, and thus prevents or terminates
the corporation's selection, the mechanics of this election are criticized below in connection with the S election itself. 41
Section 1361(d) is excessively restrictive. While the Revision
Act contains several minor liberalizing amendments to the definition of Qualified Subchapter S Trust, the class of trusts that can
qualify remains quite small. Only a trust that distributes, or is
required to distribute, 42 all of its trust accounting income 43 currently
substitutes. H.R. REP. No. 700, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1977).
Of course, the estate of a deceased shareholder may remain a shareholder
for an unlimited period of time. However, the Commissioner does have the power
to treat the estate as terminated for federal income tax purposes if its administration is unreasonably prolonged. Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1960).
37. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(iii).
38. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 234(b), 95 Stat. 172,251 (1981)(enacting former I.R.C.
§ 1371(g)).
39. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(l).
40. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2)(D) renders any election made pursuant to I.R.C. §
1361(d)(l) effective up to 60 days before the date of the election, in effect, giving
the income beneficiary a 60-day grace period during which to elect. The TCB
§ 20l(f)(l) would increase this grace period to seventy-five days.
41. See notes 109-11 infra and accompanying text.
42. The Revision Act added a clause to I.R.C. § 1361(d)(3)(B) to make it
clear that a trust can qualify as a Qualified Subchapter S Trust so long as the
trust instrument requires that all of its trust accounting income be distributed
currently, even though all of the income is not, in fact, distributed. Thus, the
S election of the corporation will not be jeopardized by the failure of the trustee
to make the appropriate distribution. TCB § 20l(f)(2) would limit qualification to
those trusts that are required to distribute income currently, thus eliminating
the possibility that, as long as all income was distributed currently, a trust would
qualify even if the trust instrument granted the trustee authority to accumulate
income. See text accompanying notes 49-50 infra.
43. The Revision Act added a clause to I.R.C. § 1361(d)(3)(B) to make clear
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and has a single current income beneficiary may qualify. Moreover,
the trust instrument must not permit trust assets to be
distributable to any individual other than the income beneficiary
during the beneficiary's life.44 The provision, as originally enacted,
precluded election by a trust that had more than one beneficiary
following the death of the income beneficiary. 45 The Revision Act
amended section 1361(d)(3)(C) to require a single beneficiary only
during the lifetime of the current income beneficiary. Thus, the
possibility of multiple beneficiaries after the death of the current
income beneficiary no longer will disqualify the trust during the
income beneficiary's lifetime. 46
that the word "income" for purposes of that subparagraph was to be defined
by I.R.C. § 643(b).
44. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(3).
45. Former I.R.C. § 1371(g)(3).
46. SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 9. Such a trust would cease to be
a Qualified Subchapter S Trust, and therefore, cease to be an eligible S corpora·
tion shareholder upon the death of the income beneficiary. Thus, the question
arises whether any of the grace periods granted to other eligible trusts when
their deemed owners die apply to allow the former Qualified Subchapter S Trust
time to distribute or otherwise dispose of the S corporation stock before its ownership of the stock causes a termination of the corporation's Subchapter S election.
Congress apparently intended that at least the 60-day grace period allowed to
such trusts by I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) apply to a Qualified Subchapter S Trust.
Indeed, the Senate Report states that it does apply. Unfortunately, while such
a grace period is clearly desirable it is not entirely clear that the statute, as
enacted, grants it.
Under the Revision Act, the trust will become disqualified following the death
of the income beneficiary if it no longer meets the definitional requirements of
I.R.C. § 1361(d)(3). That would result, for example, if it had more than one current beneficiary. Further, I.R.C. § 1361(d)(4) unequivocally states that the trust
ceases to qualify immediately when it no longer meets the requirements of I.R.C.
§ 1361(d)(3). This provision seems excessively harsh, since it will cause the trust
immediately to become an ineligible shareholder, which, in turn, will cause an
immediate termination of the corporation's Subchapter S election. The comment
in the Senate Report seems to be a reference to I.R.C. § 1361(d)(l)(A), which provides that a Qualified Subchapter S trust, as to which a valid election has been made,
is to be treated as a trust described in I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(a)(i), the provision dealing
with grantor trusts. The grace periods of I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) expressly apply
to such trusts on the death of the grantor or other deemed owner. However,
the statute does not expressly provide that the grace period provision supercedes
I.R.C. § 1361(d)(4) when the two conflict. Nor is it clear that this ambiguity can
be resolved without further legislation.
Similar language appeared in the legislative history of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, which first added the Qualified Subchapter S Trust to the law.
S. REP. No., 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 105, 195. However, under the 1981 provisions the election
terminated at the death of each income beneficiary and had to be made again
by the successor beneficiary. Thus, the statement could have been intended only
to grant a 60-day grace period to the new beneficiary to make a new election
as to a trust that continued to meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 1361(d)(3). Such
an interpretation would cause no conflict between the grace period provision and
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It is regrettable that Congress did not go further in eliminating
the restrictions on the Qualified Subchapter S Trust. The legislative
history of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 indicates only
that the predecessor to section 1361(d) was added to facilitate the
use of Subchapter S corporations by more businesses. 47 The provision does, in fact, permit the making of gifts of S corporation stock
to individuals to whom the transferor-shareholder would not want
to give the stock outright, either because the shareholder wishes
to place voting power and legal title in the hands of a trustee (for
example, if the beneficiaries were minor children or grandchildren)48
or because the shareholder wishes to give one donee an income
interest in the S corporation stock, but wishes the stock itself
ultimately to pass to others. 49 In order to preserve the corporation's Subchapter Selection, however, the shareholder must create
a separate trust for each current income beneficiary. Furthermore,
while the tr,ust instrument apparently may give the trustee discretion to accumulate income without precluding an election under
section 1361(d), the exercise of such discretion while the trust
owns S corporation stock will terminate the corporation's election
under Subchapter S. Since the trust no longer will be one that
either distributes, or is required to distribute, all of its fiduciary
I.R.C. § 1361(d)(4). Under the new law, however, such a grace period is unnecessary
since the initial election remains in effect unless the successor beneficiary affirmatively refuses to consent. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(BXii).
The statement in the Senate Report to the Revision Act raises another question. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) provides for two grace periods, the 60-day period
referred to in the Report and a two-year period for trusts the entire corpus of
which is includible in the estate of the deemed owner. The statute clearly mandates
application of the two-year grace period when the entire corpus of the Qualified
Subchapter S Trust is includible in the estate of the income beneficiary, as would
be the case, for example, if the income beneficiary had a general power of
appointment over the corpus. The reference in the Senate Report to the 60-day
grace period leaves unclear whether Congress intended the two-year period to
apply.
47. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 105, 195.
48. It appears that a trust created pursuant to I.R.C. § 2503(c) is eligible
to be a Qualified Subchapter S Trust, provided, of course, that a legal representative is appointed for the minor beneficiary and the representative makes the
election required by I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2). However, under the Revision Act there
is some risk in granting the trustee discretion to accumulate income during the
minority of the beneficiary, a standard aspect of such trusts. But, under the TCB,
granting the trustee such discretion would preclude qualification of the trust as
a Qualified Subchapter S Trust. See note 42 supra.
49. One of the laudable results of the change permitting multiple
beneficiaries following the death of the current income beneficiary is that the
new qualified terminable interest trust permitted under the federal estate tax
marital deduction provisions (I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)) is eligible to be a Qualified Subchapter S Trust. Of course, the surviving spouse must make the appropriate
election pursuant to I.R.C. § 1361(d).
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accounting income currently, it no longer will be a Qualified Subchapter S Trust. Section 201(f)(1) of the TCB would eliminate even
this flexibility by limiting qualification to those trusts that are required to distribute their income currently. The drafters of the
TCB undoubtedly introduced this provision to eliminate the power
of the trustee of an accumulation trust to terminate unilaterally
the corporation's S election. Such a device permits termination of
the Subchapter S election without compliance with the revocation
procedures of section 1362(d)(1) and therefore should not be permitted. While section 201(f)(1) of the TCB thus renders the qualification and termination provisions internally consistent, it does so
at the cost of an additional undesirable restriction on the class
of trusts that may be S corporation shareholders. The beneficiary
must elect to be treated as the owner for purpo~es of section 678(a)
of the S corporation stock held by the trust before the trust can
be a Qualified Subchapter S Trust; 50 therefore, the income therefrom
will be taxed to him whether or not it is distributed to him. It
is unclear why the power to accumulate should preclude qualification. Lastly, the limitations on accumulation and discretionary
distributions to other beneficiaries apparently are not confined to
the portion of the trust composed of S corporation stock. In this
respect, paragraphs· (1) and (3) of section 1361(d) appear inconsistent. The income beneficiary clearly is to be treated as the owner
of only that portion of the trust that consists of S corporation stock.
The paragraph defining a Qualified Subchapter S Trust, however,
speaks in terms of the whole trust.
The difficulty with the Qualified Subchapter S Trust as thus
restricted is that it does not comport with the normal estate planning desires of most individuals who would wish to place their S
corporation stock in trust. 51 A trust that permits discretionary
distributions among beneficiaries according to their needs rather
than according to a preconceived formula provides the greatest
flexibility in family estate planning. The restriction applicable to
Qualified Subchapter S Trusts prohibits placing the stock of an
S corporation in such a trust and, thus, creates an unnecessary
inflexibility in family estate planning. Since Congress could have
achieved its legitimate objectives without imposing such severe
50. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(l)(B).
51. The estate planning opportunities available to S corporation
shareholders through the use of trusts under current law are discussed in Huffaker
and Doering, Opportunities and Problems with SubS Holdings of Estates and Trusts,
J. TAX 130 (1983); Kanter, To Elect or Not To Elect Subchapter S-That Is a Question, 60 TAXES 882, 885-906 (1982); and Report of the Committee on Pre-Death
Estate Planning, Estate Planning After 1982 For the Subchapter S Shareholder,
17 REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. J. 724, 731-36 (1982).
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restrictions, it is hoped that the definition of Qualified Subchapter
S Trust will be expanded in time.
Apparently, there are two purposes for this series of restrictions. Requiring a single beneficiary effectively prevents using the
trust device to expand the beneficial ownership of an S corporation beyond the thirty-five shareholder limitation. Of course,
Congress could have prevented that result in a more flexible manner by counting each beneficiary of the trust as a shareholder as
is done with respect to voting trusts. 52 Secondly, requiring a single
beneficiary of the trust prohibits the use of a trust to accomplish
a special allocation of items of income and expense incurred by
the corporation. One of the restrictive features of prior law that
is continued under the Revision Act is the prohibition against an
s corporation specially allocating items of income and expense
among its shareholders although either a partnership or a trust 53
may do so. That aspect of the Revision Act is criticized below; 54
nevertheless, it remains a feature of the pattern of taxing S corporations. S corporations could easily circumvent the prohibition
against their allocating expenses by causing the stock of the corporation to be held by a trust having multiple beneficiaries.
The justification for prohibiting special allocations in S corporations and, a fortiori, through Qualifying Subchapter S Trusts is
tenuous. Special allocations generally are criticized on two grounds:
they introduce needless complexity into the computation of the
taxable income of the S corporation and they are abusive and,
therefore, should be eliminated as a matter of tax policy. A special
allocation permitted in a trust instrument, however, affects only the
computation of trust income and, thus, would not increase the complexity of the computation of income and expense by the S corporation itself. Secondly, because it prohibits special allocations,
the S corporation is unique among conduit taxation entities. Given
appropriate restrictions on such abusive allocations as the retroactive allocation popularized by the tax shelter industry, 55 special
allocations are not improper as a matter of income tax policy. Permitting the flexibility normally incident to trust taxation would
introduce desirable flexibility in the taxation of S corporations.
If Congress remains adamantly opposed to the avoidance of
the prohibition against special allocations, it could prohibit trusts
which have multiple beneficiaries and also require, or grant the
trustee discretion to make, special allocations, from being

52.
53.
54.
55.

I.R.C. §§ 1361(c)(2)(A)(iv) and (B)(iv).
I.R.C. § 704(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.652(b)-2, -3(1960), and 1.662(b}-1(1960).
See text accompanying notes 267-73 infra.
I.R.C. § 706(a) has established such restrictions for partnerships.
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shareholders in S corporations. It was not necessary to bar trusts
having multiple beneficiaries from being shareholders at all.
3.

One Class of Stock

The seemingly straightforward requirement for electing Subchapter S status that the corporation have outstanding only a single
class of stock56 in order to elect Subchapter S status has precipitated
the most extended and heated battle between taxpayers and the
Commissioner under Subchapter S. 57 For no apparent reason, the
Commissioner always has displayed an extraordinary inflexibility
in the construction of the one class of stock requirement notwithstanding that the consequences of an unintentional violation of the
requirement were extraordinarily harsh. The presence of a second
class of stock not only would preclude a Subchapter S election but
also would cause its termination.
Under the Revision Act, Congress liberalized the one class of
stock requirement in two significant respects: disparities in voting
rights are to be ignored, and some restrictions have been imposed
upon the treatment of purported indebtedness as a second class
of stock.
a.

Voting Rights

Under prior law, a series of statutory 56 and regulatory 00 changes
in the Commissioner's original position ultimately established that
disparities in voting rights produced by the voluntary action of
the shareholders did not create a second class of stock. Disparities
mandated by the certificate of incorporation, however, did create
a second class. Therefore, shareholder agreements, voting trusts
and irrevocable proxies all became permissible and effectively
emasculated the general prohibition. Since the apparent purpose
of the one class of stock limitation was to prevent undue complexity in the allocation of corporate income among shareholders with
differing economic interests, 60 there was no justification for the
retention of the prohibition against disparities produced by the
certificate of incorporation. This limitation has now been abandoned
under section 1361(c)(4) and differences in voting rights among otherwise identical shares of common stock are to be ignored for the
56. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D).
57. See, e.g., Bravenec, The One Class of Stock Requirement of Subchapter
S-A Round Peg in a Pentagorw,l Hole, 6 Hous. L. REv. 215 (1968).
58. Former I.R.C. § 137l(e)(1)(D)(voting trusts).
59. Rev. Rul. 73-611, 1973-2 C.B. 312. But see Rev. Rul. 71-522, 1971·2 C.B.
316.
60. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 453-54 (1954).
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purposes of the one class of stock requirement. The legislative
history does not elaborate upon this new provision but there is
no reason for the Treasury Department to construe it narrowly.
Thus, it should be permissible either for specified classes of otherwise identical stock to bear a differing number of votes per share
or for the corporation to establish different classes of stock with
each class having the right to elect a specified number of the directors of the corporation. Indeed, it appears permissible to issue nonvoting common stock and to vary the voting strength of the S corporation stock over time either by a recapitalization or by providing for the shift upon a contractually specified contingency.
b.

Consequences of Reclassifying Purported Indebtedness

As described in greater detail below, 61 under prior law, Subchapter S corporations, even more commonly than corporations
subject to the regular income tax, issued debt instruments to their
stockholders. Not uncommonly, the indebtedness arose as a result
of a reinvestment of earnings only recently distributed to the
shareholders and thus the holdings of the S corporation indebtedness often were roughly proportionate to stockholdings. Not too
surprisingly, this configuration of investment in a closely held corporation precipitated frequent attacks by the Commissioner upon
the purported indebtedness. The Commissioner alleged, under the
usual debt-equity analysis, 62 that, for tax purposes, the debt instrument should be reclassified as stock. If that reclassification
prevailed, the Commissioner would argue further that because the
reclassified indebtedness bore characteristics that differed from
the corporation's common stock, the indebtedness constituted a
second class of stock producing a termination of the Subchapter
S election as of the beginning of the year in which the indebtedness
was issued. The judicial attitude towards the Commissioner's argument was markedly unsympathetic, presumably because of the
severity of the consequences of finding a second class of stock.
Thus, some courts held that even though the purported indebtedness should properly be regarded for income tax purposes as a
form of equity investment, it nevertheless would not be regarded
as a second class of stock. 63 Even the Commissioner began toquestion the propriety of his position and announced that he no longer
would litigate the issue of whether indebtedness constituted a second class of stock for the purpose of the definition of a Subchapter

61. See text accompanying note 348 infra.
62. Now embodied in I.R.C. § 385.
63. See, e.g., Gamman v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 1 (1966), and Portage Plastics
Co. v. United States, 486 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1973).
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S corporation. 64 As a result of that concession, a peculiar de facto
recognition was extended to investments in S corporations that
quite closely resembled preferred stock.
The extended debate over the proposed regulations under section 385 has complicated the controversy over the proper treatment of reclassified indebtedness in an S corporation. 65 Section 385
expressly grants the Treasury Department the authority to issue
regulations governing the circumstances under which purported
indebtedness might be reclassified as stock. After repeatedly revising the regulations under that section, the Treasury Department recently proposed withdrawing them. Presumably, when
regulations under section 385 are issued, they will be applicable
to all corporations, including S corporations. Unfortunately,
however, the Revision Act was fashioned while the proposed regulations were being hotly contested between taxpayers and the
Treasury Department and their final form remained very much
in doubt. As a result, the steps taken by Congress towards resolving the treatment of debt in an S corporation are both tentative
and incomplete, and the full consequences of the issuance of debt
by an S corporation will remain uncertain until regulations under
both sections 385 and 1361 and, quite likely, further legislation,
are adopted.
Notwithstanding the lingering uncertainties, Congress has taken
a significant step towards preventing the loss of Subchapter S
status by virtue of the issuance of debt by an S corporation. Under
section 1361(c)(5), a debt instrument meeting the safe harbor requirements is not to be treated as a second class of stock even
though under normal rules it would be reclassified as an equity
investment. Fortunately for taxpayers, the safe harbor definition
is both relatively simple and relatively liberal. Congress, in defining safe harbor debt in section 1361, borrowed the concept from
the regulations to section 385 that straight debt should be relatively
free from reclassification. 66 The definition of safe harbor debt contained in section 1361(c)(5)(D) appears similar to the definition of
straight debt under section 385. For the purposes of the Subchapter

64. T.I.R. 1248 (July 27, 1973).
65. After over a decade of delay, final regulations to I.R.C. § 385 were
issued on December 31, 1980 (T.D. 7747, 1981-1 C.B. 141). However, through a
series of amendments to Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(a)(1)(1980), the effective date of
the regulations was postponed repeatedly. See T.D. 7744, 1981-1 C.B. 360; T.D.
7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60; and T.D. 7822, 311.R.B. 6. In the meantime, an entirely revised
set of regulations was proposed on January 5, 1982. Finally, on July 6, 1983,
the Treasury Department issued a proposed withdrawal, effective August 5, 1983,
of both sets of proposed regulations.
66. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-3(£) and 5(dX1980).
67. See text accompanying notes 274-82 infra.
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S rule, therefore, safe harbor debt includes any written unconditional indebtedness requiring repayment of a fixed sum of money,
whether on demand or upon a specified maturity date. The interest
rate and payment dates, however, must not be contingent on the
profitability of the S corporation nor subject to change in the discretion of the S corporation, and the debt must not be convertible
into S corporation stock.
Because no other factors pertaining to the indebtedness are
to be taken into account in determining compliance with the safe
harbor test, relative certainty that a second class of stock has not
been created can be achieved. The safe harbor test contains no
reference to the debt-to-equity ratio of the corporation, to the proportionality of the holdings of the debt to stock ownership in the
corporation, to the degree of subordination, to the consideration
for which the indebtedness was issued or to whether the interest
rate payable is reasonable. The last enumerated omission is, of
course, of substantial importance. While the interest rate specified
presumably must be paid (absent, perhaps, insolvency) in order
to comply with the requirement that the rate not be subject to
the borrower's discretion or geared to profitability, an S corporation apparently remains free to establish an unreasonably low rate
of interest without jeopardizing the availability of the safe harbor
rule. The establishment of an unreasonably high or low interest
rate, however, is not insulated by the safe harbor rule from attack
under other provisions of the Code. For example, under section
1366(e), described below,67 the Commissioner is empowered to make
reallocations of income in the event a member of a shareholder's
family furnishes capital to the corporation "without receiving
reasonable compensation therefor."
If debt issued by an S corporation meets the safe harbor test,
the Subchapter S election cannot be terminated for the reason that
the indebtedness constitutes a second class of stock. That much,
at least, is clear. On the other hand, because of the liberality of
the safe harbor test, in some instances, debt meeting that test will
nevertheless be regarded as equity under the more general rules
of section 385. 68 The status of safe harbor indebtedness for other
purposes under the Code remains highly uncertain. Both committee
reports recognized this potential inconsistency and suggested that
the Treasury Department issue regulations that would treat safe
harbor indebtedness as indebtedness for other purposes of Sub68. The extent of this discrepancy depends upon the final form of the section
385 regulations. Under the proposed revision of those regulations, straight debt
may be treated as stock because of the combined effect of an inadequate interest
rate, an excessive debt to equity ratio, having been issued for property, being
payable on demand, and being proportionately held. See Prop. Reg. § 1.385-6 [1983]
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) , 8904.
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chapter S in addition to the second class of stock requirement even
though the indebtedness would be treated as equity under section
385. Both reports contain the statement that "it is anticipated that
the safe-harbor instruments will be treated as debt under Subchapter S,. so that rio corporate income or loss will be allocated
to the instruments." 69 That statement in effect instructs the
Treasury to create an exception to the general application of the
regulations to section 385 for debt instruments meeting the safe
harbor test of section 1361 for the purposes of the rules governing the allocation of income and expense to shareholders. Quite
likely, the exception will be even broader. For example, because
the Subchapter S rules governing distributions are related to the
income allocation rules, it seems probable that the retirement of
safe harbor debt will not be recharacterized as a dividend. In addition, it seems likely that interest paid on safe harbor debt will
be deductible by the S corporation and thus by its shareholders.
On the other hand, there is no basis whatsoever for any prediction of the position the Treasury Department will take on the treatment of such safe harbor debt instruments under provisions of the
Code of general application.
If the debt instrument does not comply with the safe harbor
rule, its characterization is to be determined under the general
rules of section 385. 70 If under those rules the instrument would
be reclassified as stock, the question would be renewed under present law of whether that reclassified indebtedness should be treated
as a second class of stock. Although nothing in the Revision Act
expressly overrules prior case law holding that a debt instrument
that would be treated as stock under general reclassification rules
nevertheless was not to be treated as a second class of stock, the
Committee Reports imply that Congress intended its new safe harbor rule to be the exclusive avenue for avoiding that result. 71 While
a court might not regard itself as bound by such a statement in
the Committee Report, Congress has provided a relatively liberal
safe harbor rule for avoiding the consequences of a second class
of stock and it is reasonable to anticipate that the courts will be
inclined far more favorably towards treating reclassified indebtedness as a second class of stock under the present statutory scheme
than they were under prior law. Accordingly, a substantial premium
has been placed upon compliance with the safe harbor rules that
Congress has provided.
At one stage in the one class of stock battle, the regulations
69.

HOUSE REPORT,

at 8.

70. Id.
71.

Id.

supra note 22, at 8, SENATE REPORT, supra note 22,
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provided that if a purported debt instrument was held in substantially the same proportion as stockholdings, even if the debt instrument was reclassified, it would not be regarded as a second class
of stock. 72 The safe harbor rule of section 1361(c)(5) has not incorporated this approach. If a class of indebtedness does not meet
the safe harbor rule but, nevertheless, is held proport.ionately to
shareholdings, the debt instrument apparently will be treated as
stock and as a second class of stock if it is so classified under section 385.
The exclusion of convertible debt from the safe harbor rule
apparently was copied from section 385. However, the exclusion
also impedes evasion of the general inability of an S corporation
to specially allocate items of income and expense. In the case of
partnerships, it has long been common for the interest of various
classes of partners to shift upon the occurrence of a specified event,
such as obtaining a pre-specified level of profitability. 73 This so called
"flip-flop" permits allocation of all the losses of partnership to a
specified class of investors until they have received a recovery
of their investment whereupon the interests of other classes of
partners, typically the promoters of the venture, automatically increase. Such a shifting of participation percentages is not permissible in an S corporation; however, the result of such a flip-flop can
be approximated through the use of convertible securities. The
promoters could obtain convertible indebtedness which they would
be obligated not to convert until a specified level of losses had
passed through from the S corporation to the public investors. At
that time, the promoters could convert their securities and obtain
their desired degree of participation in further S corporation profits and losses. Under present law, that device can be used only
if the indebtedness passes the general requirements of section 385.
In enacting its safe harbor debt rule, Congress evidently concluded
that it did not wish to expand the circumstances in which convertibility could be used to achieve this objective.
It is unclear to what extent the prohibition upon convertibility
may be avoided through the use of warrants. Section 1361(c)(5)(b)(ii)
specifies that there may be "no convertibility (directly or indirectly)
into stock." The legislative history does not explain the significance
of the reference to indirect convertibility. Under prior law, the
Commissioner ruled that a Subchapter S corporation could issue
warrants to acquire its stock without jeopardizing its Subchapter

72.

Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-l(g)(1960)(before amendment by T.D. 7747, 1981-1

C.B. 141).
73. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (Example (5)) (1964) and W. McKEE, W.
NELSON AND R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF P ARTNERSIDPS AND PARTNERS
(1977) [hereinafter cited as MCKEE), , 10.02[1).
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S election. 74 Presumably, that rule will continue to be valid under
present law. 75 Accordingly, if a corporation wishes to avoid the
restriction on convertibility, it might issue straight debt accompanied by a warrant and provide that the debt instrument will
be accepted in payment of the exercise price under the warrant.
It is not clear why such a device would be regarded as inconsistent with Subchapter S status but the Commissioner might well
attempt to bar the use of such an investment unit under the "indirect" language.
Viewed as a safe harbor rule of the classification of indebtedness, the restrictions that are imposed by section 1361(c)(5)
are not unreasonable. However, in commenting upon the proposals
developed by the Joint Committee on Taxation that ultimately
formed the basis for much of the Revision Act, the Treasury Department opposed resolving the second class of stock dispute by overriding the general rules to be issued under section 385. 76 The
Treasury acknowledged the impropriety of producing a termination of a Subchapter S election because of a recharacterization of
a purported debt instrument; however, it suggested that the difficulty stemmed, not from the impropriety of the reclassification,
but rather from the limitation upon the issuance of a second class
of stock. Furthermore, the Treasury recognized that the effect of
case law decisions refusing to treat reclassified debt as a second
class of stock had already created a de facto Subchapter S preferred stock. As a result, the Treasury Department suggested that
Subchapter S corporations be permitted to issue a class of preferred stock that would have characteristics essentially identical
to the definition of safe harbor straight debt that was ultimately
enacted.
The Treasury alternative, while not altering greatly the
character of the securities that could be issued by an S corporation, had the distinct advantage of greater rationality because the
alternative would not have required treating a purported debt instrument differently depending upon the identity of the issuer.
That greater rationality would have translated into a greater
coherence in the application of certain Code provisions. For example, under the approach ultimately adopted by Congress, prior to
making a Subchapter S election a corporation may have outstanding a debt instrument that would be treated as stock under sec74. Rev. Rul. 67-269, 1967-2 C.B. 298.
75. Both Committee Reports mention this Revenue Ruling in their statement of prior law (SENATE REPORT, supra note 22 at 7; HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 22 at 7), but make no reference to it in their discussion of I.R.C. §§ 1361(c)(4)
and (5).
76. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 23.
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tion 385. If that instrument complies with the safe harbor rules
of section 1361, the election to be taxed under Subchapter S will
cause the instrument to be treated as indebtedness for some, and
perhaps all, purposes of the Code. The Subchapter S election,
therefore, might be treated as an exchange of stock for debt and
thus a taxable transaction. Congress appeared to recognize this
possibility and in a somewhat confused statement in the Committee
Reports 77 appears to indicate that the making of a Subchapter S
election should not produce a tax in this situation. On the other
hand, the Report also suggests that distributions with respect to
the instrument (which by hypothesis is treated as a debt instrument for Subchapter S purposes) might be treated as dividend
distributions to the extent of accumulated earnings and profits.
If these suggestions from the Committee Reports are accepted,
the result will fall just slightly short of chaos; the Treasury will
determine on a section by section basis whether the instrument
is stock or debt. All of that complexity would have bei:m avoided
if S corporations had remained subject to the general rules of section 385 and had been permitted to issue preferred stock rather
than safe harbor "debt."
Furthermore, the flexibility of an S corporation would have
been substantially increased if such corporations had been granted
the ability to issue a class of preferred stock. The primary financial difference between the safe harbor debt instrument that Congress approved and the class of preferred stock suggested by the
Treasury Department lies in the requirement that an annual return
be paid on the security regardless of the profitability of the corporation. A debt instrument imposes a fixed charge on corporate
earnings that in some years may seriously impair the corporation's
cash flow. Preferred stock, by contrast, is more flexible; dividends
are payable only as declared by the board of directors and in
general may not be declared if their payment would impair the
corporation's solvency. In many closely held corporations, the flexibility provided by preferred stock is highly desirable. Secondly,
the ability to issue preferred stock greatly expands the ability of
the present owners of an S corporation to transfer control of the
corporation to succeeding generations of managers without incurring undue tax consequences. Preferred stock has a distinct advantage over indebtedness because it may be exchanged for outstanding
common stock without immediate tax consequences. 78 As a result,
the stockholder-managers of a corporation, by exchanging their
common stock for preferred stock, can transfer both the residual
equity in the corporation and control over the corporate affairs
77.
78.

supra note 22 at 8; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22 at 8.
For example, in a recapitalization pursuant to I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(E).
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to the next generation of corporate managers without incurring
a prohibitive income tax liability. 79
Apparently, the only justification for limiting the availability
of Subchapter S to corporations having one class of stock is the
desire to avoid the complexities of allocating corporate income to
different classes of stock. 80 As the Treasury recognized, 81 however,
those difficulties could have been overcome if Congress had desired
to enhance the flexibility of S corporations by permitting the
issuance of preferred stock. In this respect, therefore, the Revision Act is unduly restrictive. Congress would do well to reconsider the propriety of permitting an S corporation to issue a class
of preferred stock.
c.

Other Issues

Other than permitting a disparity in voting rights, the Revision Act does not change the prohibitions of prior law against the
issuance of more than one class of stock in an S corporation. One
of the more difficult problems posed under prior law was the effect
of restrictions imposed administratively, pursuant to a state
securities law, upon making distributions upon stock held by promoters or other inside groups. Although in one case the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such a restriction effectively created
a second class of stock, 82 substantial doubts exist with respect to
the correctness of that decision. Under prior law, the regulations
contemplated a possible dividend waiver by a shareholder and provided that the Commissioner could, in appropriate circumstances,
reallocate the S corporation income to prevent the avoidance of
tax through such a device. 83 The regulation contains no suggestion
that such a temporary waiver would constitute the creation of a
second class of stock. By remaining silent, Congress has neither
accepted nor rejected the decision of the Ninth Circuit and, thus,
has left the development of a proper rule to further litigation.
4.

Ineligible Corporations

The Revision Act introduces a new concept into the requirements for eligibility to elect under Subchapter S. New section
1362(b)(2) lists five categories of corporations that are generically
79. This technique is explained in greater detail in text accompanying notes
149-52 infra.
80. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.
81. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 23-24.
82. Paige v. United States, 580 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Rev. Rul.
71-522, 1971-2 C.B. 316.
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-3(d) (1960).
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ineligible to make the election. Under prior law, an S corporation
could not be a member of an affiliated group within the meaning
of section 1504. 84 Section 1361(b)(2)(A) continues this prohibition in
a slightly expanded form. Under this section, membership in an
affiliated group is to be determined without reference to the exceptions contained in section 1504(b). Accordingly, if a corporation
directly or indirectly owns 80% or more of the stock of another
corporation, the parent corporation will be barred from electing
under Subchapter S regardless of whether the corporations actually
are entitled to file ·consolidated returns. The remaining four
categories of ineligible corporations described in section 1361(b)(2)
consist of corporations that compute their income pursuant to
unique rules and thus could not comply easily with the requirement that an S corporation compute its income as an individual.
The four enumerated ineligible corporations are: banks and other
financial institutions that use the reserve methods of accounting
for loan losses provided by sections 585 or 593; insurance companies;
possessions corporations that elect the section 936 credit; and
DISCs or former DISCs.

B. Election
The Revision Act continues the requirements of prior law that
a corporation affirmatively elect S corporation status, 85 and that
all persons who are shareholders on the date of the election consent to the election for it to be valid. 86 In general, the rules of
prior law will continue to apply to these procedural requirements. 87
Additionally, shareholders holding nonvoting stock under the new
provision authorizing issuance of such a security also must consent to the election. On the other hand, persons holding safe harbor
debt instruments presumably are not required to consent to the
election even if the purported indebtedness would be reclassified
as stock under the general rules of section 385 and, in fact, may
have been so reclassified prior to the Subchapter S election. The
Temporary Regulations to section 1362(a) have failed to deal with
either of these questions, but the Temporary Regulations dealing
with revocation of the election provide that holders of nonvoting
stock must consent to a revocation. 88 The election is valid for the
year in which it is made and all subsequent years until it is
terminated. 89
84. Former I.R.C. § 1371(a).
85. I.R.C. § 1362(a).
86. I.R.C. § 1362(a)(2).
87. See Temp. Reg.§§ 18.1362·1, -2, 48 Fed. Reg. 3591 (1983) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 18).
88. Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-3, 48 Fed. Reg. 3592 (1983) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 18).
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The new law slightly alters the time in which the election must
be made. Under prior law, the election had to be made during the
taxable year preceding the year for which it was to be effective
or within the first seventy-five days of the taxable year for which
it was to be effective. 90 The Revision Act replaces the seventyfive-day rule with the requirement that the election be made on
or before the fifteenth day of the third month of the year for which
it is to be effective, 91 the date upon which corporate income tax
returns are due.
Under prior law, there was some ambiguity concerning the extent to which a corporation and its shareholders must meet the
eligibility requirements for making a Subchapter S election during that portion of the year for which the election was first effective, but prior to the time upon which the election was filed. 92 Section 1362(b)(2)(B) eliminates these ambiguities by imposing the more
stringent interpretation. The corporation must meet all of the
eligibility requirements of section 1361(b) on each day of the taxable year for which the election is effective, including days prior
to the filing of the election. In addition, the new provision
specifically requires that all persons who own stock in the corporation during the taxable year for which the election is to be
effective consent to the election even though they had completely
disposed of their interest in the corporation prior to the filing of
the election.
The requirement that shareholders who have disposed of their
stock prior to the making of the Subchapter S election must consent to that election is somewhat harsh. Contrary to prior law,
Subchapter S income is now allocated to all shareholders on a daily
basis. Under present law, making the Subchapter S election will
allocate some portion of the S corporation income to the withdrawing shareholder who must include that income in his individual
return. Making the election, therefore, subjects the shareholder
to a tax that would not have been imposed upon him in the absence
of the election. Since that shareholder will be affected directly by
the making of the Subchapter S election, it is not unreasonable
to require him to consent to that election. The difficulty with the
provision is that it permits an individual who no longer has an
economic stake in the corporation to control for an entire year
the ability of individuals who continue as shareholders of the cor-

90. Former I.R.C. § 1372(c)(l).
91. I.R.C. § 1362(b)(l).
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-l(a) (1960) indicated that the eligibility requirements
did not have to be met until the election was filed although there was no statutory
basis for that position.
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poration to obtain the benefits of a Subchapter S election. The
Congressional solicitude for the withdrawing shareholder, thus, may
have a substantially adverse impact upon the far larger number
of continuing shareholders. Furthermore, the Congressional in<Sistence upon unanimous consent for the making of a Subchapter
S election is inconsistent with the present ability of a mere majority
of the shareholders of an S corporation to revoke the election. 93
The revocation of an election has an immediate financial impact
upon the shareholders of the corporation that may be as significant as the making of the election. If it is reasonable to subject
the minority shareholders in a corporation to an undesired revocation of the election, it would seem equally reasonable to subject
a shareholder who withdraws during the first two and a half months
of the corporation's taxable year to the consequences of the making of an election.94 Indeed, it seems odd to treat a single withdrawing shareholder more favorably than the holders of 49% of the
corporation's stock.
As under prior law, 95 if a corporation attempts to elect under
Subchapter S for a taxable year but the election is not effective
for that year, the election nevertheless will be effective for the
following and all succeeding taxable years. 96 Thus, if the election
is filed following the two and a half month grace period or is filed
during the grace period but the corporation fails to meet the
requirements of section 1362(b)(2) for the pre-election period, the
election will be treated as effective for the following year. The
Regulations, under prior law, qualified this provision with the
requirement that the corporation must have been eligible to make
an effective election both on the date the election was filed and
on the first day of the taxable year for which it was to be effective.97
Thus, temporary ineligibility during the year of election but subsequent to the election date did not render the election ineffective
as long as the corporation resumed eligibility by the first day of
the year for which the election was to be effective. The Temporary
Regulations under section 1362 continue this rule. 98
93. I.R.C. § 1362(d)(1), discussed in text accompanying notes 103-07 infra.
94. The allocation of income to such a shareholder would result in an
increase in the basis for his stock, thus reducing any gain on the disposition of
the stock. The allocation of income, therefore, would result only in the possible
conversion of some capital gain to ordinary income. In the alternative, Congress
could bar the allocation of any income to a shareholder who withdrew prior to
the filing of an election.
95. Former I.R.C. § 1372(c)(2).
96. I.R.C. § 1362(b)(2).
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-l(a) (1960).
98. Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-l(b), 48 Fed. Reg. 3591 (1983) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 18).
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An election made under prior law remains in effect and is
treated as an election made under section 1362(a);99 it is not
necessary for the corporation to file a new election. Under prior
law, the invalidity of an election attributable to the failure to file
timely consents could be avoided if the corporation obtained an
extension of time for the filing of a shareholder's consent. 100 The
Temporary Regulations have continued that practice. 101 In appealing cases, courts occasionally granted extensions years following
the date upon which the consent should have been filed. 102

C. Termination
With the Revision Act, Congress has improved greatly the provisions of Subchapter S governing both deliberate and inadvertent
terminations of the election, and the consequences of those
terminations.
1.

Revocation

Under prior law, a Subchapter S election could be revoked
voluntarily only with the unanimous consent of the corporate
shareholders. 103 On the contrary, and somewhat inconsistently, a
new shareholder of the corporation could affirmatively refuse within
a sixty-day period of time to consent to the Subchapter S election. 104
Thus, a single continuing shareholder could force the corporation
to continue as a Subchapter S corporation while a single new
shareholder could cause the election to terminate. Under the Revision Act both of these features of prior law now have been
eliminated. Section 1362(d)(l) now provides that a Subchapter S
election may be revoked only if shareholders owning more than
one-half of the number of shares of stock in the corporation consent to the revocation. With respect to the making of an election,
the statute apparently contemplates that the vote be computed
with reference to the number of shares outstanding, not to the
voting power of those shares, and the Temporary Regulations so
provide. 105 Thus it appears possible that a valid consent to a revocation can be made by shareholders who possess less than a majority
99. I.R.C. § 1379(a).
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-3(c) (1964).
101. Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-2(c), 48 Fed. Reg. 3591 (1983) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 18).
102. Hicks Nurseries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 138 (1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d
437 (2d Cir. 1975)(consent of new shareholder).
103. Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(2).
104. Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(1).
105. Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-3, 48 Fed. Reg. 3592 (1983) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 18).
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of the voting power of all outstanding stock, a questionable result.
Revocation itself, however, is a corporate act that generally requires shareholder approval and the approval, of course, must be
obtained from shareholders possessing a majority of the voting
power of the corporation's stock. In practice, therefore, revocation will require the effective consent of both the holders of a majority of the voting power in the corporation and the holders of a
majority of the number of shares of stock in the corporation.
These new "corporate democracy" features of Subchapter S
represent substantial improvements; the elimination of the ability
of the new shareholder to cause a termination of the election is
particularly worthy of note. When Subchapter S was first enacted
in 1958, the prevalent belief was that a new shareholder should
not be forced to accept the unusual method of income taxation provided by Subchapter S as part of the price of an interest in the
business venture. The original statute provided that the election
terminated unless the shareholder timely filed a consent to the
election. 106 By 1976, Congress recognized that the original provision resulted in many inadvertent terminations and changed the
law to provide that the election would continue in effect unless
the new shareholder filed a refusal to consent. 107 The 1976 provision, however, has been criticized because it allows a new
shareholder to extort additional consideration from the continuing shareholders as the price for not filing a refusal. Under the
Revision Act, new shareholders must take the corporation "as they
find it" with respect to its tax status.
Unfortunately, Congress was not consistent in its attempt to
prevent a single shareholder from preventing and causing the termination of a Subchapter S election. As noted above, the requirement
of unanimous consent for the making of an election has not only
been continued but has been expanded by the requirement that
a shareholder who withdraws from the corporation prior to the
filing of the election must also consent. 108 In addition, the initial
income beneficiary of a trust that is eligible to become a Qualified
Subchapter S Trust is required to elect that treatment, 109 and each
successive income beneficiary may affirmatively refuse to consent
to continuation of Qualified Subchapter S Trust treatment. 110
106. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat.
1606, 1650 (enacting former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(1)).
107. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 902(c), 90 Stat. 1520,
1608-09 (1976) (amending former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(1)).
108. See text accompanying notes 85-94 supra.
109. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2).
110. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2)(B)(ii). An interesting question arises as to when the
successor beneficiary's refusal to consent will be considered timely. The statute
can be read as allowing the successor beneficiary to refuse to consent at any
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Withdrawing an election, of course, renders the trust an ineligible
shareholder of the S corporation, thereby terminating the Subchapter S election. The provision dealing with the initial election
to qualify as a Qualified Subchapter S Trust was originally enacted 111
when each new shareholder had the power to terminate the corporation's Subchapter S election by filing a refusal to consent, and
has been reenacted, unchanged, in the Revision Act. The requirement that a successor beneficiary make an affirmative election
merely has been transformed from a requirement that the successor
beneficiary elect anew to have the trust treated as a Qualified Subchapter S Trust 112 into an automatic continuation of the election
unless the new income beneficiary affirmatively refuses to consent to the election. Thus, the new rule governing initial income
beneficiaries corresponds to the rule dealing with new shareholders
prior to 1976, while the rule governing successor beneficiaries is
identical to the rule governing new shareholders immediately prior
to the Revision Act.
It is not clear whether the retention of this more favorable
treatment of an income beneficiary was inadvertent. Perhaps Congress deliberately concluded that income beneficiaries of a trust
should not be forced to accept the consequences of an election to ·
treat the trust as a Qualified Subchapter S Trust, namely, the direct
inclusion of an allocable portion of the S corporation income and
expense in the beneficiary's income tax return. 113 There is, of course,
a basis for distinguishing such a beneficiary from a new shareholder
who purchased the stock in the S corporation; a new shareholder
presumably could have declined to purchase the stock while an
income beneficiary is not provided that choice. In almost every
instance, such concern for the plight of an income beneficiary is

time; however, that would seem to be inconsistent with the provision that the
election, once made, is irrevocable. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2)(C). Presumably, the Regulations will provide a grace period following the initial income beneficiary's death
before the election will become. irrevocable with respect to the successor
beneficiary.
Congress may have intended to supply some guidance on this matter by noting
that the 60-day grace period applicable to grantor trusts following the death of
the grantor would be applicable to a Qualified Subchapter S Trust that becomes
disqualified by reason of the death of the income beneficiary. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 22 at 9. While, as was stated above in note 46, the exact scope of
this comment is unclear, a 60-day grace period in this context would correspond
to that granted to new shareholders under former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(l) and to that
which apparently was intended to apply to a successor beneficiary's election under
former I.R.C. § 1371(g)(2). See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 91.
111. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 234(b), 95
Stat. 172, 251 (enacting former I.R.C. § 1371(g)(2)).
112. Former I.R.C. § 1371(g)(2)(B)(ii).
113. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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misplaced. Such trusts are family planning devices which serve
as an alternative to a direct gift of the S corporation stock between family members. In the case of an outright gift, the donee
is required to include Subchapter S income and loss in his individual
return. The same fate should befall an income beneficiary. The
general effect of this provision simply is to give an unwarranted
leverage to a disgruntled family member. Furthermore, as to the
initial income beneficiary, the transferor-shareholder who is advised properly will make his transfer conditional upon the timely
filing of the appropriate election by the income beneficiary. Thus,
the requirement that the initial beneficiary make an election will
become another "trap for the unwary" of just the type that the
Revision Act was designed to eliminate. Clearly, it would be preferable to require successor beneficiaries to take the trust and the
corporation as they find them as must other transferees. In addition,
the grantor of a trust, as well as the initial income beneficiary, should
be entitled to make the initial election. Indeed, if the trust meets
the definition of a Qualified Subchapter S Trust, the election should
be deemed made unless the income beneficiary affirmatively
objects.
In a further liberalization of prior law, section 1362(dXl)(C) provides that a revocation for a taxable year will be effective if filed
within the first two and a half months of that taxable year.
2.

Passive Investment Income

Under prior law, a Subchapter S election was terminated for
any year in which more than 20% of the corporation's gross receipts
consisted of passive investment income. 114 For S corporations that
do not have any accumulated earnings and profits attributable to
years in which a Subchapter S election was not in effect under
either present or prior law, this restriction on S corporations has
been eliminated entirely. 115 As a result, corporations that have been
S corporations under either present or prior law since their incorporation are free to derive any proportion of their income from
passive sources without penalty. On the other hand, the Revision
Act has liberalized only slightly the passive income rule for those
S corporations that do have earnings and profits accumulated during nonelection years.
Although in the early stages of the drafting of the Revision
Act Congress contemplated that the elimination of the restriction
on passive investment income would be applicable to all corporations, it became concerned that such a degree of liberalization would
114.
115.

Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5).
See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3).
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open substantial avenues of tax avoidance. 116 One of the concerns
that surfaced was the potential for deferring, and quite possibly
avoiding, gain on the complete disposition of the business activities
of a corporation subject to the regular income tax. 117 Under prior
law, a corporation planning to dispose of its entire business was
faced with two basic choices. It could sell those assets and liquidate
in which event the sale at the corporate level would be sheltered
from tax under section 337, but the shareholders would be subject
to tax on the entire amount of the appreciation in their stock. Alternatively, the corporation, by disposing of the assets and retaining
the proceeds at the corporate level, could become a private investment company. Under the second alternative, a tax would be incurred at the corporate level but no tax would be imposed upon
the shareholders. If the corporation had been owned by the same
shareholders for a substantial period of time and had reinvested
a substantial amount of its earnings, a not unlikely scenario, the
gain at the corporate level would be substantially less than the
gain that would be subject to tax at the shareholder level upon
a liquidation. However, if the corporation chose to remain in existence and it was relatively closely held, the corporation would
become a personal holding company. In order to avoid the punitive
tax on undistributed personal holding company income, 118 the corporation would be required to distribute the entire amount of its
ordinary income. Since the overall rate of tax imposed upon personal holding companies and their shareholders typically exceeds
the tax that would be imposed upon the same amount of income
derived by the shareholders in their individual capacity, the tax
advantage of keeping the corporation in existence often would be
eliminated quickly. Consequently, most corporations, when disposing of their businesses, chose to eliminate tax at the corporate
level by liquidating. If those corporations were given a third option,
of remaining in existence and electing to be taxed pursuant to Subchapter S, the balance would shift radically. The overall rate of
tax that would be imposed upon the continuing incorporated venture would be the same as the tax that would be imposed on the
shareholders had the corporation distributed the proceeds of sale
and liquidated. By remaining in existence, the corporation could
defer indefinitely the tax on the appreciation in the shareholder's
stock. If the shareholder died without disposing of the stock, tax
on the appreciation would be forgiven permanently. 119 Obviously,
STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
Lang, Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982: Dealing with Transition Rules,
60 TAXES 928, 930 (1982).
118. See I.R.C. §§ 541-47.
119. I.R.C. § 1014.
116.
117.
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this tax avoidance should not be permitted. This problem is just
one aspect of a fundamental question of our system of taxation,
namely, what should constitute the taxable event with respect to
appreciation in corporate stock. Under an ideal income tax the
shareholders' gain would be subject to tax, preferably upon the
sale of the business assets regardless of a liquidation or, at least,
upon the death of the shareholder. In the context of the Revision
Act, however, Congress sought to address the more limited goal
of preventing this tax avoidance through the use of Subchapter S.
One obvious remedy would be to bar a corporation that was
subject to the regular corporate income tax from electing under
Subchapter S if that corporation had both a substantial amount
of investment assets and earnings and profits. That prohibition
would be tailored relatively well to the tax avoidance potential
of the transaction. A corporation subject to the regular income
tax that has a substantial investment portfolio would either have
avoided the accumulated earnings tax 120 for a substantial period
of time or acquired that investment portfolio immediately before
the Subchapter S election, presumably through a disposition of
a substantial amount of its business assets. The Revision Act effectively adopts that prohibition but adds a grace period for
eliminating the accumulated earnings and profits. Under section
1362(d)(3), an S corporation election will be terminated if, in each
of three consecutive years, a corporation has both earnings and
profits accumulated during nonelection years and passive investment income in excess of 25% of the corporation's gross receipts.
In effect, a corporation deriving the prescribed level of passive
investment income has three full years of S corporation existence
in which to distribute the entire amount of its earnings and profits accumulated prior to the making of the Subchapter Selection.
If those earnings and profits have not been distributed by the conclusion of the three-year period, the S election terminates and the
corporation becomes subject to the regular corporate income tax
as of the first day of the following year .121
120. See I.R.C. §§ 531-37.
121. I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(ii). TCB § 201(h) would permit an S corporation to
elect to have prior law governing termination for exceeding the passive investment income limitations apply for taxable years beginning in 1982. Under§ 6(b)(3)
of the Revision Act, the new passive investment income provisions are effective
for such taxable years. The effect of § 201(h) will be to permit the corporation
to elect to lose its status as an S corporation under the stricter passive investment income termination provisions of former I.R.C. § 1372(eK5), but to avoid the
new tax under I.R.C. § 1375. However, TCB § 201(h) also provides that the "fresh
start" rule of § 6(e) of the Revision Act would not apply to the resulting termination. See note 147 infra. Thus, the corporation could not reelect to be taxed under
Subchapter S for five years unless it obtained permission of the Commissioner
pursuant to I.R.C. § 1362(g).
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Unfortunately, few corporations will be able to take full advantage of this three-year grace period because of the imposition
of a new tax on passive investment income added by the Revision
Act. Under section 1375, an S corporation that fails this passive
income test for a single year is subject to tax on the amount by
which its net passive investment income exceeds 25% of its gross
receipts. 122 The tax is imposed at the highest corporate rate, currently 46%, and is imposed upon the entire amount of the net
passive investment income in excess of 25% of gross receipts. Thus,
the amount subject to tax may not be reduced by the dividends
received deduction normally available to corporations. The
shareholders of the S corporation also will be subject to tax with
respect to this income, although the amount taxable to them is
reduced by the amount of the section 1375 tax imposed at the corporate level. 123 Thus, the section 1375 tax effectively imposes double
taxation on the entire amount of passive income in excess of the
25% floor. Accordingly, if the corporation has disposed of substantially all of its active business assets and, thus, substantially all
of its income is derived from passive investment sources, the combined taxes imposed upon this income will be prohibitive. As a
practical matter, therefore, corporations disposing of substantially all of their business assets will be forced to liquidate as under
prior law and will be unable to defer tax on their shareholders
by electing Subchapter S status.
As a technique for preventing the deferral and possible elimination of tax on a disposition of a business activity, terminating the
Subchapter Selection following a reasonable grace period appears
to be an appropriate remedy. On the other hand, the imposition
of a second level tax during this grace period at an effective rate
substantially higher than would be paid by either a regular business
corporation or a corporation subject to the personal holding company tax constitutes legislative overkill. Terminating the SubchapterS election will force the managers of corporations proposing
to dispose of their business assets to face the same choice presented
under prior law of either subjecting their shareholders to an immediate tax or operating as a personal holding company. The tax
imposed by section 1375, however, bears no relationship to either
the tax avoided by the shareholders or the tax avoided by failing
to come within the provisions of the personal holding company tax.
122. The amount subject to tax is defined by I.R.C. § 1375(b)(1)(A) as the
amount that bears the same ratio to net passive income as passive income in
excess of 25% of gross receipts bears to passive income.
123. I.R.C. § 1366(f)(3). In addition, if passive income includes capital gains
"taken into account" under the I.R.C. § 1374 tax on capital gains, the amount
of the gain subject to the§ 1374 tax is reduced by the amount of the gain taxable
under I.R.C. § 1375. I.R.C. § 1375(c)(2).
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One possible, but not terribly persuasive, justification for the
section 1375 tax is the relatively liberal definition of the section
1362 grace period. Before a termination occurs, an S corporation
having earnings and profits accumulated during nonelection years
must derive passive investment income in excess of the 25% floor
in each of three consecutive taxable years. Accordingly, corporations able to pass that test in one out of every three years will
be able to prevent indefinitely the termination of the Subchapter
S election.
On the other hand, passing the test by reducing the percentage of gross receipts that consist of passive investment income
will be far more difficult under present law. As under prior law,
the test is applied to gross receipts and not to gross income. Under
prior law, taxpayers could prevent terminations of a Subchapter
S election by churning temporary investments in capital assets.
Under new section 1362(d)(3)(C), gross receipts from the disposition of capital assets other than stock and securities are taken into
account only to the extent that the gains from such sales exceed
the losses. Thus, the mere buying and selling of property will not
enlarge the amount of gross receipts attributable to sources other
than passive investment income. The Revision Act has not altered
the rule of prior law that, for the purpose of computing passive
investment income attributable to the sale or exchange of stock
and securities, gross receipts from such sales include the gain from
such sales (gross receipts less basis) and are not reduced by losses
from the sale of securities. 124
Both the taxing and termination provisions appear overbroad.
Each of them is applicable without regard to the amount of accumulated earnings and profits or the period of time that has passed
since those earnings and profits were accumulated. Presumably,
Congress expected corporations having relatively small amounts
of accumulated earnings and profits to elect to avoid the tax and
termination penalties by distributing those earnings and profits
to their shareholders even though that distribution would
precipitate immediate ordinary income tax. Practitioners, however,
are painfully aware of the difficulty of computing accurately an
earnings and profits account, particularly when that account has
been accumulated over many changes in the provisions of the Code.
As discussed below in greater detail, 125 it is highly regrettable that
Congress did not provide some relief for an inadvertent failure
to distribute the entire amount of an earnings and profits account.
These penalty provisions would be applicable even if the earnings and profits of the corporation were accumulated gradually
124.
125.

I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(D)(i).
See text accompanying note 401 infra.
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through normal business operations, rather than through the
disposition of a business activity, and even though a Subchapter
S election had been in effect for many years before the corporation accumulated sufficient investment assets to exceed the 25%
ceiling. Such a corporation would bear no resemblance to the evil
that the tax and termination provisions were designed to address.
For a corporation that has been actively engaged in business under
a Subchapter S election for 15 years and has accumulated an investment portfolio only since the enactment of the Revision Act
to become subject to the tax and termination provisions simply
is wrong. Indeed, the overbreadth of sections 1362(d)(3) and 1375
appears particularly irrational in light of the fact that an entity
incorporating and electing to be taxed under Subchapter S after
December 31, 1982 may derive 100% of its income from passive
investment sources from its inception and neither jeopardize its
election nor become subject to the tax.
It is regrettable that a more tailored solution to the evil addressed by sections 1362(d)(3) and 1375 was not devised. In order
to prevent the inappropriate application of the tax and termination provisions, Congress should, at a minimum, amend those provisions to permit an S corporation to outlive their potential application. Thus, neither the tax nor termination provision should be
applicable if the corporation has been subject to a Subchapter S
election for over 5 years and has not had passive investment income in excess of 25% of its gross receipts in any of the 5 preceding
years. 126
One felicitous aspect of the Revision Act is that the definition
of passive investment income has been modified favorably in minor
respects. Section 1362(d)(3)(D) exempts interest on obligations attributable to the sale by the corporation of inventory or other
property held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business from the definition of passive investment income. It also
exempts gross receipts of an active lending or finance business
within the meaning of sections 542(c)(6) and 542(d)(1) from the
definition.
3.

Other Terminations

As under prior law, 127 the Subchapter S election automatically
terminates if the corporation ceases to meet the eligibility re126. The power of the Commissioner to waive inadvertent terminations provides some, but inadequate, relief from the termination provisions but no relief
at all from the tax. See I.R.C. § 1362(f).
127. Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(3).
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quirements for electing to be taxed pursuant to Subchapter S as
set forth in section 1361(b). 128 On the other hand, the Revision Act
has eliminated the prior law provision' 29 requiring a termination
of the election if the corporation derived more than 80% of its
income from foreign sources.
4.

Effective Date of Termination

Under prior law, terminations of a Subchapter S-election were
applicable to entire taxable years. A revocation, unless made during the first month of the taxable year, was effective only for the
succeeding taxable year. 130 Terminations attributable to such events
as ceasing to meet the eligibility criteria for making a Subchapter
S election 131 or the affirmative refusal by a new shareholder to
consent to the election 132 produced a retroactive termination of the
election beginning on the first day of the year in which the event
occurred. This effective date pattern was entirely unsatisfactory
in many respects. Notwithstanding the restrictions on voluntary
revocations, a corporation always could secure retroactive termination by engineering an event that would produce a retroactive
termination. Moreover, when the termination was inadvertent, the
retroactive termination barred the shareholders from harvesting
the benefits of a Subchapter S election and produced an enormously
harsh result compared to the generally insignificant event that
produced the technical loss of Subchapter S status.
The Revision Act changed these rules radically and quite
favorably. Section 1362(d)(l)(D) permits S corporations to revoke
their election as of any day specified in the revocation, even if
that day does not constitute the end of the corporation's taxable
year. Similarly, if the termination is attributable to the corporation's failure to comply with the requirements for eligibility to make
a Subchapter S election, the termination is effective on the day
upon which the corporation ceases to constitute a "small business
corporation" as defined in section 1361(d). 133 Finally, if the termination is attributable to the presence of passive investment income,
the termination no longer is retroactive but rather commences on
the first day of the taxable year after the third consecutive taxable year taken into account in determining that the passive investment income tolerances have ·been exceeded. 134
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

I.R.C. §
Former
Former
Former
Former
I.R.C. §
I.R.C. §

1362(d)(2).
I.R.C. § 1372(e)(4).
I.R.C. § 1372(e)(2).
I.R.C. § 1372(e)(3).
I.R.C. § 1372(e)(l)(C).
1362(d)(2)(B).
1362(d)(3)(A)(ii).
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Specifying that the effective date of a termination of a Subchapter S election shall be the date upon which the terminating
event occurs is obviously a substantial improvement over prior
law. As a result, the consequences of the termination under the
Revision Act are tailored far better to the underlying financial
reality than either the prospective or retroactive rules applied
under prior law. This advance, however, is necessarily achieved
at the cost of materially increasing the complexity of accounting
for a mid-year termination. Under section 1362(e)(1), a mid-year termination produces two short taxable years: the "S year," subject
to the Subchapter S election, and the "C year," not subject to the
election. For the purpose of allocating the income and loss of the
corporation for its year of termination between these two short
taxable years, section 1362(e) provides two alternative procedures,
a general rule and an elective alternative.
Under the general rule, each item of income and expense of
the corporation .incurred during the year of termination is prorated
between the two short taxable years on a daily basis. The amounts
allocated to the earlier short year then will be allocated to the
S corporation shareholders under the usual rule applicable to the
allocation of the income of an S corporation. The amounts allocated
to the post-termination short year will be subject to tax in accordance with the rules applicable to the taxation of corporations subject
to the regular corporate income tax. As a result, at least in theory,
the corporation is not required to close its books by virtue of a
mid-year termination of a Subchapter S election.
The operation of this pro rata allocation can be illustrated by
an example in which it is assumed that an S corporation, which
reported its income on a calendar year cash basis, revoked its election effective September 15th. The corporation would continue to
record receipts and disbursements without closing its books until
the end of the S corporation's taxable year on December 31st. Items
of income, deduction, loss and credit that are required to be
separately stated, and nonseparately stated income, then would
be computed under section 1366 for the entire year as though the
corporation had been an S corporation for the full year. Of each
such item, 257-365 would be allocated to the short Subchapter S
year and taxed to the shareholders as in prior years. The remaining 108/365 of each item would be allocated to the second short
year and taxed to the corporation under the rules generally applicable to corporations.
If all persons who owned stock in a corporation at any time
during the year in which the termination occurs consent, income
for the two short taxable years may be computed on the basis
of the actual income for the respective periods according to the
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corporation's books. 135 That is, the corporation may elect to close
its books on the date that a termination occurs and compute its
income for the two short years in accordance with the normal accounting rules under the Code.
It is not entirely clear why Congress selected the pro rata allocation as the general rule applicable when shareholders cannot agree
upon the alternative rule. Perhaps Congress anticipated that the
pro rata rule would be selected most often because it is simpler.
Indeed, because it eliminates the administrative burden of computing taxable income twice in a single year, the pro rata allocation provided by the general rule will be the cheaper and simpler
procedure in nearly every instance.
On the other hand, in these days of high tax consciousness,
most corporations can be expected to make trial computations of
the relative tax consequences of proceeding under both the general
rule and the elective alternative. Indeed, corporate managers probably have a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders to explain the varying consequences before asking them to elect or fail
to elect the alternative procedure. Thus, the simplicity of the pro
rata rule is largely illusory. Moreover, in most cases, rather than
choose the general rule, corporations will choose the elective
method of reporting income on the basis of separate accounting
periods for the two short taxable years.
Many terminations of Subchapter S elections are not inadvertent but rather are precipitated because the shareholders have
determined that the income tax consequences of operating under
the Subchapter S election no longer are desirable. When the decision is reached, the shareholders will normally wish to become subject to the regular income tax as quickly as possible. For example,
one of the reasons for making a Subchapter S election for a new
business venture is to allow the shareholders the direct benefit
of the tax losses anticipated during the early years of the business
while operating the business in corporate form for non-tax reasons.
When the business begins to produce taxable income that will not
be distributed, the shareholders may wish to terminate the election in order to benefit from the lower rate of progressivity of
the corporate income tax. If this turn-around in the business's taxable income can be identified as it occurs, the corporation can file
a prospective revocation of the election under section 1363(d)(l)
as of a date just prior to the anticipated receipt of income. In order
to maximize the tax benefit of the termination, the shareholders
will wish to compute the income separately for each of the two
short taxable years thereby produced, claim the losses incurred
135.

I.R.C. § 1362(e)(3).

608

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

in the early portion of the year under the usual Subchapter S rule
and cause the income received later in the year to be taxed to
the corporation. Therefore, they will choose the elective computation rather than the general rule.
That more corporations likely will choose the method that requires an affirmative election rather than the one that is
automatically applicable ordinarily would not be cause for severe
criticism. The terminations in which the elective computation is
likely to be chosen are themselves elective and relate directly to
the income tax consequences of the Subchapter Selection, therefore,
shareholders should be able to take action simultaneously to terminate the election and elect to have ordinary accounting principles govern the tax consequences of the termination. However,
there is a distinct incongruity between the two election procedures.
Unanimous agreement is required to elect the alternative separate
accounting rule while the Subchapter S election itself may be terminated by majority vote. In almost every situation the decision
to revoke the election will be the more important and will have
the more significant financial impact upon the shareholders. If a
majority rule is regarded as the most equitable to all concerned
in that context, it is extremely difficult to understand why Congress did not adopt the same rule for determining how the corporation should compute its income for the year of termination.
Indeed, this disparity in consent procedures may create a serious
trap for the majority shareholders and reintroduce the very problem that permitting revocation by majority vote was designed to
eliminate. While the majority indeed may be able to revoke the
Subchapter S election, they will not be able to maximize the tax
benefits of the termination without the consent of all other
shareholders. Potentially, therefore, a single shareholder having
little economic stake in the corporation may, for whatever reason,
obstruct the most favorable method of reporting income by the
remaining shareholders. The requirement of unanimity is particularly oppressive in view of the requirement that all shareholders who
have disposed of their stock during the year or have acquired stock
during the year of termination must also concur in the decision
to adopt the alternative method of accounting for income. 136 1f either
of the two accounting rules is to be applied in the absence of
unanimity among the shareholders, it would seem most appropriate
to apply the rule requiring the actual computation of income for
the two separate periods rather than a rule that somewhat arbitrarily prorates income over the period.
Since section 1362(d)(l)(D) permits the filing of a voluntary
revocation specifying any future date upon which the revocation
136.

I.R.C. § 1362(e)(3)(B).
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is to be effective, the question necessarily arises whether such a
revocation itself might be rescinded. There is no apparent reason
why such a prospective revocation cannot be rescinded prior to
its effective date; yet, because the revocation need be accompanied
only by the consents of a majority of the shareholders, it is unclear
which shareholders must consent to such a rescission, if it is permitted. Would it be sufficient for only a majority of the stockholders
to consent to the rescission, and, if so, must they be the same
stockholders who originally consented to the revocation? In order
to avoid these questions, and because a rescission of a revocation
more nearly resembles an election to be taxed under Subchapter
S than a revocation of the election, the Treasury Department would
be justified in requiring that any such rescission be accompanied
by the consents of all of those who are stockholders on the date
on which the rescission is filed. 137
5.

Inadvertent Terminations

One of the most interesting additions to Subchapter S
introduced by the Revision Act is the express grant of authority
to the Commissioner by section 1362(f) to disregard an inadvertent
termination of a Subchapter S election. Under prior law, inadvertent terminations occurred with horrifying regularity and because
the terminating event frequently was not discovered, or at least
not conceded, until years following its occurrence, the consequences
of such terminations were extraordinarily harsh to the relatively
unsophisticated shareholders who had sought the advantages of
taxation pursuant to Subchapter S. Many of the provisions of the
Revision Act are designed to prevent either an inadvertent termination or the excessively harsh consequences that flowed from
such a termination under prior law. The requirements for electing
to be taxed pursuant to Subchapter S remain relatively strict,
however, and the possibility of an inadvertent termination continues. Thus, this new provision constitutes a form of catch-all relief
for the shareholders of S corporations.
Under section 1362(f), relief may be granted if the termination
occurs either because the corporation ceases to qualify as a "small
business corporation" or because the corporation fails the three
year passive investment income test. The subsection contains three
prerequisites to the granting of relief:
(1) the Commissioner must determine that the termination was
inadvertent;
(2) steps must be taken within a "reasonable period" after
137. Contra, Shaw & August, An Analysis of the Subchapter S Revision Act:
Eligibility, Election, Termination, 58 J. TAX. 2, 7 (1983).
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discovery of the event resulting in termination to make the corporation a small businss corporation once again; and
(3) the corporation and each person who was a shareholder during a period of time to be specified by regulation must agree to
make such adjustments as the Commissioner prescribes.
Each of these three requisites to the exercise of the Commissioner's discretion will, of course, require substantial regulatory
elaboration. One of the most difficult problems that the regulations need to address is the definition of "inadvertent." Under prior
law, taxpayers seeking a retroactive termination of a Subchapter
S election would cause a corporation to violate deliberately one
of the conditions for eligibility to elect Subchapter S status. It is
clear that section 1362(f) precludes the granting of relief in such .
circumstances. Under present law, however, such artifices are unnecessary; voluntary revocations may specify the date of termination and there is no action that the corporation can take to make
the termination retroactive. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that
any corporation will cause a termination of a Subchapter S election under either the small business corporation definition or the
passive investment income restriction in the sense of willfully permitting the violation to occur in order to terminate the election.
Short of such clear, and presumably unlikely, cases, the nebulous
and unavoidably unsatisfying question arises: what state of mind
on the part of what individuals will constitute inadvertence within
the meaning of this relief provision? The range of possibilities seems
infinite. It is probable that the regulations will take the position
that a termination is inadvertent if it occurs because of an event
that the managers of the S corporation could not have anticipated 138
or one that they could not have prevented even if they had known
about it. 139 It is also probable that a termination will be considered
inadvertent if the managers of the S corporation were aware that
the terminating event was about to occur but were unaware that
its occurrence would cause a termination of the Selection because
138. For example, the passive investment income earned by the corporation
may unexpectedly exceed the limitations of I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3). The Commissioner
permitted reelection under former I.R.C. § 1372(f) before the expiration of the
five year waiting period (see text accompanying notes 146-47 infra) when, because
of a change in market conditions, a corporation's passive investment income exceeded the limitations under prior law. Rev. Rul. 78-275, 1978-2 C.B. 221.
139. Cf Rev. Rul. 78-275, supra note 138. See also, Rev. Rul. 78-333, 1978-2
C.B. 224, in which the Commissioner granted permission under former I.R.C. §
1372(f) to make a new election within the five year period when termination of
the prior election occurred because passive investment income exceeded applicable
limitations during a year when the corporation's business assets had been leased
to another while the corporation's manager was disabled and could not be replaced.
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they were ignorant of the law governing terminations. 140 On the
other hand, it is likely that a termination will not be considered
inadvertent if it is reasonable to expect the managers of the S
corporation to have anticipated the event and to have taken steps
to prevent its occurrence. 141 These relatively optimistic speculations
are based largely upon Congress's admonition to the Commissioner
to be reasonable in waiving the consequences of an inadvertent
termination. 142
The second prerequisite, that small business corporation status
be restored with reasonable promptness, seems relatively unambiguous. The provision, of course, is not applicable if the termination
is the result of a violation of the passive investment income test.
The elaboration of the third requirement is likely to be highly
controversial. Section 1362(f)(4) limits the discretion of the
Commissioner to require adjustments only by a parenthetical expression which requires that the adjustments be "consistent with
the treatment of the corporation as an S corporation." However,
the legislative history indicates that the Commissioner's authority
would extend beyond merely requiring the shareholders to report
their income in the same manner as it would have been reported
had the S election remained in effect. For example, the Committee
Reports suggest that if the termination is caused by a violation
of the passive investment income test for the reason that the corporation reasonably believed that it did not have accumulated earnings and profits, the Commissioner might require the shareholders
to treat the earnings and profits as were determined on audit to
have been retained by the corporation as ordinary dividend
distributions. 143 If, on the other hand, the termination occurred
because of an unanticipated receipt of an excessive amount of
passive investment income, it is not at all clear what adjustments
might be required. Since that excess passive income already would
have been subject to the relatively severe section 1375 tax at the
140. Cf Rev. Rul. 78-274, 1978-2 C.B. 220, in which the Commissioner permitted a corporation to reelect under former I.R.C. § 1372(f) after sale of stock
to a nonresident alien caused its election to terminate. The selling shareholder
was unaware that a nonresident alien could not be a shareholder of a Subchapter
S corporation. He repurchased the stock promptly when his attorney informed
him of the law.
The regulations under new I.R.C. § 1362(£) will probably contain an exception for the relatively rare instances when the taxpayers can be shown to have
deliberately attempted to remain ignorant of the law.
141. For example, if the managers of the S corporation attempt to avoid
the passive investment income limitations by generating active business income
but have reason to know that their attempt will fail for the third consecutive year.
142. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 12-13.
143. Id.
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corporate level and included in the corporation's taxable income
allocated to the shareholders, any further adverse tax consequences
of the receipt of that income would be punitive.
An inadvertent termination also may occur because a class of
purported indebtedness that did not comply with the safe harbor
rules of section 1361(c) (5) was reclassified as a second class of stock.
The legislative history specifically suggests that, in that circumstance, the Commissioner should waive the inadvertent termination if no tax avoidance has occurred. 144 Of course, it is not
clear what might be regarded as tax avoidance in this context.
If the debt instrument has been retired by the corporation and
the proceeds treated by the owner of the instrument as a tax-free
return of capital in circumstances in which a distribution by the
corporation with respect to its stock would also have been tax free
but would have reduced the accumulated adjustments account required by section 1368(e), the potential for a substantial tax reduction surely would have been obtained. Absent tax avoidance, it
would not be unreasonable for the regulations to require that the
offending security be eliminated, and, perhaps, to provide for the
restoration to income of any deductions claimed by the S corporation, and therefore its shareholders, for interest paid on the purported debt instrument. 145
Section 1362(g) continues the provision of prior law 146 that bars
a corporation from electing to be taxed under Subchapter S for
a five year period following the termination of a previous Subchapter S election unless the Commissioner consents to the second
election. 147 The relatively modest restriction that this revision
imposes upon the free movement between the regular and the Subchapter S patterns of taxation is considered below in connection
with the related tax upon capital gains. 148 In view of the scope of
the Commissioner's discretion to waive inadvertent terminations,
144. Id.
145. Where the termination occurs because the corporation acquires an ineligible shareholder, an adjustment of the income tax liabilities of the S corporation shareholders would be inappropriate beyond a reversal of any allocation of
income or expense to the ineligible shareholder. Presumably, the amount of any
allocation to an ineligible shareholder that the Commissioner orders reversed
should be reallocated to that shareholder's transferor rather than to the other
shareholders of the S corporation (unless, of course, the stock was originally issued
by the corporation to the ineligible shareholder).
146. Former I.R.C. § 1372(f).
147. Section 6(e) of the Revision Act enacts a "fresh start" rule that
eliminates the five-year waiting period for reelection if the termination occurred
under former I.R.C. § 1372. Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669, 1700 (1982). TCB
§ 201(j) would treat revocations under prior law in the same way as terminations
for purposes of § 6(e).
148. See text accompanying notes 335-43 infra.
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reelecting with the consent of the Commissioner will become far
less common. If the corporation cannot obtain a waiver of an inadvertent termination, either because the termination was determined not to be inadvertent or because the corporation failed to
take corrective action or to make the adjustments required by the
Commissioner, the Commissioner is unlikely to consent to the
reelection within the five year period. Accordingly, the section
1362(g) reelection will be useful only in those relatively rare
situations when a corporation experiences a bona fide change in
circumstances that will make a new Subchapter S election advisable.

D. New Planning Possibilities
The elimination of the restriction upon the receipt of passive
investment income, at least for some S corporations, together with
the ability to issue stock possessing different degrees of voting
power and the safe harbor debt rules open up significant new
planning possibilities for the use of S corporations. Some taxpayers
prefer to manage the investment portfolios of various members
of their family through a single business entity. In the past, taxpayers have employed trusts and partnerships, as well as corporations, for this purpose. The entity investment vehicle permits
centralized management of the investment portfolio and the ability
to spread the risk of speculative investments over a large number
of investors. In addition, the concentration of economic power that
the entity creates permits the investors to participate in investments as a group that would not be available to them individually.
Moreover, the use of an entity permits the older generation
members of the family to follow the advice of their estate planning consultants and make lifetime gifts to younger members of
the family without sacrificing their investment objectives. The gifts
are made of ownership interests in the investment vehicle and not
in its underlying portfolio of investments. It has become increasingly popular to take the planning for this investment vehicle a
step further. With certain of the entities that are used for this
purpose, it is possible to have the older generation acquire
securities in the investment vehicle that lack a growth potential,
and by issuing the younger generation a different class of security,
have them receive the appreciation in the investment portfolio.
Such a technique effectively passes the appreciation potential in
the investment portfolio to the second generation free of any
transfer taxes and freezes the size of the estate of the older
generation.
When the family's assets consist primarily of an active business
enterprise, the preferred investment vehicle traditionally has been
a corporation because of the well-established tax and corporate
law rules governing the division of ownership into different classes
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of stock. More recently it has been suggested that similar results
can be achieved through the use of a partnership. 149 Where the
assets consist of portfolio investments, the corporation would constitute a personal holding company unless the ownership of its stock
is distributed far beyond a few family groups. If the investments
held by the personal holding company consist of debt securities
or dividend paying stock, the company must distribute its ordinary
income annually in order to avoid the high tax upon personal
holding company income. As a result, the growth potential of the
investment company is blunted and the income from the investments is subject to a higher current rate of tax than would be
incurred if the investments were owned by the shareholders individually. To avoid these consequences, many taxpayers employ a partnership as the investment vehicle for portfolio investments. That
format, however, somewhat complicates both annual giving programs and the ability to freeze the estates of the older generation.
Under the Revision Act, such taxpayers may use an S corporation instead of a personal holding company as their investment
vehicle. Formation of a new corporation and an immediate election under Subchapter S will avoid completely the increased tax
that is created by the use of a personal holding company and will
permit an unlimited accumulation of earnings without the imposition of the accumulated earnings tax. In order to permit the freezing
of the estates of the older generation while not passing control
over the investment portfolio to the second generation at the time
such a corporation is formed, S corporations normally will issue
three types of securities: voting common stock, nonvoting common
stock, and indebtedness meeting the new safe harbor rules. The
older generation may hold the indebtedness and either all of the
voting stock or a sufficient amount to establish control over corporate affairs. The nonvoting stock, or a mix of voting and nonvoting stock, which will possess the right to substantially all the
appreciation in the corporate assets, may be given immediately
or over time to younger generation members of the family. A typical
estate plan would call for a gradual transfer of the voting stock
in the corporation to the second generation through a lifetime giving
program.
In most instances, this estate planning technique will be useful
only if the corporation can be formed free of tax. That objective
can be obtained if the incorporation qualifies under section 351.
If the diversification rules of that section are avoided/ 50 qualification under section 351 is normally routine.
149. Nelson, The Partnership Capital Freeze: Income, Estate, and Gift Tax
Consideratians, 1 VA. TAX R. 11 (1981).
150.

I.R.C. § 351(e)(1).
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The extent to which appreciation in the value of the S corporation can be shifted to the second generation free of transfer
taxes is largely a function of the rate of interest that must be paid
on the indebtedness issued to the older generation. To the extent
that a low rate of interest may be used on safe harbor debt
instruments, more appreciation may be shifted to the second
generation through an S corporation than through a corporation
subject to the regular tax. Of course, in establishing the interest
rate on any indebtedness, the family and its tax advisors must
take care not to violate the family group reallocation rules of section
1366(e)'5' or the Code provisions of general application such as
sections 385 and 482.
A Subchapter S investment company may not have any earnings
and profits accumulated during years in which a Subchapter S election was not in effect. The presence of those earnings and profits
would precipitate both the tax on passive investment income and
the ultimate termination of the Subchapter Selection. As a result,
in most instances it will not be possible merely to convert a
corporation presently subject to the regular income tax to a SubchapterS investment company. Possible techniques for eliminating
earnings and profits from an S corporation are discussed below .152
If the use of the S corporation device seems to produce sufficient
savings of income and transfer taxes, it might be desirable to suffer
the capital gains tax attributable to the complete liquidation of
the old corporation and to reincorporate the investment portfolio
in a new S corporation free of all earnings and profits.
If an existing corporation subject to a Subchapter S election
does not have earnings and profits accumulated during nonelection years but does have earnings and profits accumulated during
Subchapter S years, there still may be difficulties in implementing
an estate freeze. The first step in accomplishing an estate freeze
using a corporation subject to the regular tax is to convert
outstanding common stock owned by. the older generation into a
class of preferred stock. Subject to section 305 and the future application of section 306, such a conversion is free of tax. Unfortunately,
however, an S corporation cannot issue preferred stock: the freezing
security must be a debt instrument. Exchanging outstanding common stock for such a debt instrument is a taxable transaction and
in many instances the cost of an accelerated capital gains tax will
outweigh the prospective benefits of estate tax reduction. The
alternative is to distribute the debt instrument as a dividend and
make gifts of the common stock; however, if the corporation has
any earnings and profits, such a distribution could be subject to
a prohibitive ordinary income tax.
151.
152.

See text accompanying notes 27 4-82 infra.
See text accompanying notes 399-405 infra.
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COMPUTATION OF INCOME

A. Prior Law
The choice of the form in which to conduct business, with few
limited exceptions, 153 traditionally has determined the pattern of
taxation to which the business was subject. Subchapter S was added
to the Code in 1958 as an exception to a tax structure which
recognizes, now as then, two major classifications of business enterprise, the corporation and the partnership, and subjects them to
radically different forms of taxation.
If the business entity is incorporated, it is treated as a taxable
entity separate from its shareholders and is subjected to the corporate income tax,Is. thus producing a two-level taxing system. With
the exception of a few provisions that govern the taxation of the
transmission of property among corporations/ 55 a corporation is
required to compute its income in a manner not terribly dissimilar
from the manner in which individuals compute their income. 156 That
corporate taxable income is then subject to tax in the hands of
the corporation on an annual basis under a rate schedule that, compared to the rate schedule applicable to individuals, is relatively
nonprogressive and does not reach rates quite as high as does the
individual schedule. 157
In order for the owners of such an incorporated business to
obtain a direct benefit from the corporate earnings, they would,
in most cases, be required to subject those earnings to a second
level of tax. For example, if those earnings were distributed currently, the resulting dividend would be subject to tax at ordinary
income rates. 156 If the profits were realized through the sale of
corporate stock, the sale would be subject to the second tax, albeit

153. Between 1954 and 1966, certain partnerships were permitted to elect
under Subchapter R of the Code to be taxed as corporations. In addition, a business
trust or limited partnership may be treated as an association taxable as a corporation by Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1973).
154. I.R.C. § 11. Cf I.R.C. §§ 56 and 1201.
155. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 243 (85% or 100% exclusion for dividends received
by corporations) and 332 (non-recognition of gain on liquidation of subsidiary).
156. See generally B. BITTKER and J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND THEIR SHAREHOLDERS, ch. 1, (4th ed. 1979)[hereinafter cited
as BITTKER AND EUSTICE).
157. Under relatively recent legislation, the corporate and individual rate
schedules have become increasingly similar. Corporate taxable income below
$100,000 is now subject to five bracket rates ranging from 15% to 46%. In addition, the maximum individual rate has been reduced to 50%. For a further comparison of the corporate and individual rate structures, see text accompanying
notes 477-78 infra.
158. I.R.C. § 301(c)(1).
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at capital gains rates. 159 In order to distinquish between a corporate
distribution of profits and a return of the stockholder's capital,
the corporate tax provisions employ the concept of earnings and
profits. 160 A distribution from a corporation will be treated as a
dividend and subject to tax at ordinary income rates only to the
extent that the distribution does not exceed the corporate accumulation of undistributed earnings and profits. 161
If the owners of the business venture choose not to incorporate
and to become subject to partnership taxation, the picture changes
radically. 162 Although the existence of a partnership substantially
affects income tax liability, the partnership itself is not subject
to tax. 163 Rather, specific items of partnership income are allocated
among the partners pursuant to the terms of the partnership
agreement. 164 The partners then are required to include these items
of income and expense on their individual returns and are subject
to tax on those amounts pursuant to the same rate schedule that
is applicable to their other income. 165 In general, the allocated items
retain the same character on the individual partner's return as
they had in the hands of the partnership. 166
This two-pronged system was modified, although not as greatly
as might appear, by the introduction of the Subchapter S corporation in 1958. While later interpreters of Subchapters S often
referred to the new provisions somewhat casually as subjecting
a corporation to tax "like a partnership," Congress' limited objective for the 1958 legislation was to permit incorporated business
ventures to avoid having their income subject to tax on two levels,
the corporate and the shareholder. 167 Indeed, the underlying
philosophy of the 1958 legislation was to change the method of
taxing corporations only to the minimum extent necessary to
eliminate the corporate tax. As a result of this highly limited
objective, Congress created a third form of business taxation that
in many respects was more complicated than either of the other
two.
.
The limited nature of Congress' objective in enacting Sub-

159. I.R.C. §§ 1221 and 1202.
160. See I.R.C. §§ 312 and 316.
161. Under I.R.C. § 316, a distribution may be taxed as a dividend to the
extent of either current or accumulated earnings and profits.
162. See generally MCKEE, supra note 73, and A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL, and
P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION (1981).
163. I.R.C. § 701.
164. I.R.C. § 704.
165. I.R.C. § 702(a).
166. I.R.C. § 702(b).
167. S. REP. No. 1983, 85 Cong., 2nd Sess. 68 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 4791, 4876.
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chapter S is evidenced most clearly in the provisions governing
the computation of income under prior law. With few exceptions,
the income of an electing corporation was computed in exactly the
same manner as taxable income was computed for a nonelecting
corporation/ 58 however, the corporation itself was not subject to
the corporate income tax. 169 Instead, its taxable income, as so
computed, was taxed directly to its shareholders. 170 As the
mechanism for achieving that tax, Congress created the fiction of
a constructive year-end dividend to the shareholders of an amount
equal to the corporate taxable income. 171 That amount, with certain
modifications, was referred to under prior law as undistributed
taxable income and by practitioners as "UTI." Consistently with
the established corporate pattern, this constructive distribution
was subject to tax in the hands of the shareholders in precisely
the same manner as an actual dividend distribution would have
been. To the extent of the corporate earnings and profits, the
constructive dividend was subject to tax at ordinary income tax
rates. As a result, the earnings and profits account of a Subchapter
S corporation had to be computed accurately in order to determine
the ceiling on the amount of the constructive distribution that was
to be taxable to shareholders. Thus, under prior law, Subchapter
S corporations were required to compute annually not only the
amount of their taxable income, as modified under Subchapter S,
but also the amount of their current earnings and profits.
In principle, every corporation must compute its earnings and
profits currently. Unfortunately, that computation has always been
troublesome; the concept is not defined comprehensively
anywhere. 172 Section 312 sets forth a series of circumstances in
which the computation of earnings and profits is to vary from the
computation of taxable income but otherwise provides no assistance.
As a result, earnings and profits computations are notoriously
168. Former I.R.C. § 1373(d). See generally Lourie, Subchapter S After Six
Years of Operations: An Analysis of Its Advantages and Defects, 22 J. TAX. 166
(1965); L. BRAVENEC, TAXATION OF SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS (PLI, 1978); and BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 156 at ch. 6.
169. Former I.R.C. § 1372(b). As under current law, Subchapter S corporations were subject to tax on certain capital gains. Former I.R.C. § 1378. While
under I.R.C. § 58(d) items of tax preference incurred by the corporation were
allocated to its shareholders, if the corporation became subject to the tax on capital
gains, it also became subject to the add-on preference tax imposed by former
I.R.C. § 56 with respect to those capital gains.
170. Former I.R.C. § 1373(a).
171. Former I.R.C. § 1373(b).
172. BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 156, at , 7.03. See also Blum, The
Earnings and Profits Limitation on Dividend Income: A Reappraisal, 53 TAXES
68 (1975)(suggesting the elimination of the concept for all corporations).
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inaccurate. 173 For corporations subject to the corporate tax, this
relatively casual approach towards the computation of earnings
and profits is normally entirely adequate. Unless the corporation
argues that a current distribution to its shareholders is not subject
to tax in whole or in part because the distribution exceeds earnings
and profits, the precise level of the earnings and profits accounts
is largely academic. For Subchapter S corporations, however, the
accuracy of the computation was of immediate importance.
Actual distributions of cash by a Subchapter S corporation, at
least to the extent of the current earnings and profits of the corporation, were treated in precisely the same manner as dividends
from regular corporations. To the extent of the current earnings
and profits, such dividends were fully taxable as ordinary income
to the recipients. 174 At the corporate level, the amount of cash
dividends were charged against and reduced both the corporation's
earnings and profits account and the amount of its undistributed
taxable income. Consequently, the amount of the constructive yearend dividend to the Subchapter S shareholders was reduced by
the full amount of the cash distribution. 175 This two stage
computation did not alter the amount of corporate income that was
subject to tax to the shareholders but it did affect the identity
of the shareholders who would be subject to tax. While the constructive dividend was taxable to shareholders with respect to their
holdings on the last day of the corporation's taxable year/ 76 actual
distributions were taxable to those who received them. 177
These computations became considerably more complex,
however, if the Subchapter S corporation made an actual
distribution of any property other than cash. Regrettably, the
shareholders of Subchapter S corporations, for reasons discussed
below, 178 had a far greater incentive to cause their corporation to
make distributions of property, particularly debt obligations of the
Subchapter S corporation itself, than did shareholders of regular
business corporations. Prior law dealt with all such property
distributions quite harshly. Actual distributions in any form other
than cash did not reduce undistributed taxable income 179 nor, at
least as an initial matter, were the corporate earnings and profits
173. See Estate of Meyer v. Comm'r, 200 F 2d 592 (5th Cir. 1953)(computation
of earnings and profits by CPA determined to be in error by nearly $1 million).
174. Former I.R.C. § 1375(d)(by implication); and Treas. Reg. §
1.1373-l(d) (1968).
175. Former I.R.C. § 1373(c).
176. Former I.R.C. § 1373(b).
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-l(f) (1960).
178. See text accompanying note 353 infra.
179. Former I.R.C. § 1373(c).
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allocated to such property distributions. 180 Rather, notwithstanding
the property distrib,ution, the constructive year-end distribution
still comprised the entire corporate taxable income. In determining
the amount of each of these two distributions that actually was
to be subject to tax in the hands of the shareholders, the corporate
earnings and profits were allocated ratably between the fair market
value of the property and the entire amount of the constructive
distribution. 181
The earnings and profits that were available to support taxation
of these distributions included not only the corporation's current
earnings and profits but also all accumulated earnings and profits; 182
therefore, the net effect of a property distribution often was to
subject the shareholders to a far greater tax than would have been
the case if they were subject merely to tax on the corporate taxable
income. For example, assume that a Subchapter S corporation had
only a single shareholder and that it derived $100 of taxable income
for the current year. If the corporation made an actual cash distribution of $40 during the year, that $40 was subject to tax as was
any dividend distribution from a corporation. In addition, the corporation's undistributed taxable income, $100 less the $40 actual
distribution, also would have been subject to tax to the shareholder.
As a result, the shareholder would be subject to tax on the $100
of corporate taxable income. Even if the corporation had accumulated earnings and profits, no greater amount would be subject to tax. On the other hand, if the $40 distribution were in the
form of property, the constructive year-end distribution would be
the full $100. If the corporation's earnings and profits for the year
were also $100 and it did not have any accumulated earnings and
profits, the $100 of earnings and profits would be allocated ratably
between the $40 actual distribution and the $100 constructive
distribution. The shareholder, then, would have taxable income in
the amount of $29 attributable to the distribution of the property
and of $71 attributable to the constructive year-end distribution.
The computation seems unduly complex but the result, subjecting
the shareholder to tax on $100, seems essentially fair. If, however,
the corporation had accumulated earnings and profits in excess
of $40, the full amount of both the $40 property distribution and
the $100 constructive distribution would be subject to tax as if
the shareholder had received a dividend distribution of $140.
The existence of accumulated earnings and profits in a Subchapter S corporation was not a mere hypothetical possibility.

180. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(d) and (e) (1960).
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(e)(2) (1960).
182. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(g)(Example (4)) (1960).
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Unless the corporation had been a Subchapter S corporation since
its formation, it probably would have an earnings and profits
account attributable to its preelection years. However, even a
corporation that elected Subchapter S upon its formation could
have a substantial accumulated earnings and profits account. In
order that all taxable income was taxed to shareholders, prior law
provided that earnings and profits could never be less than taxable
income. 183 Taxable income, however, frequently is less than earnings
and profits. Tax-exempt interest, derived from the holding of
municipal bonds, for example, would not produce taxable income
but does create earnings and profits. 184 Moreover, while accelerated
methods of depreciation reduce taxable income, earnings and profits
are reduced only by straight-line depreciation. 185 Thus, the
constructive year-end dividend does not necessarily eliminate
current earnings and profits every year.
The use of the corporate tax dividend concept to govern the
income tax consequences of actual and constructive distributions
was far less favorable to the shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation than was the pattern of taxing partners. Since both actual
and constructive distributions were regarded as dividends under
prior law, they were subject to tax without regard to the underlying
character of the corporate income that produced the amount subject
to tax. With the notable exception of capital gains, the character
of the income earned by the corporation was not retained when
that income was distributed, actually or constructively, to
shareholders. As a result, Subchapter S corporations proved to
be substantially less flexible than partnerships and subjected their
shareholders to a higher overall rate of tax than would have been
applicable if the business had been operated as a partnership.
In retrospect, it seems evident that in 1958 Congress erred
in setting such limited objectives for its new form of business
taxation. Corporate conceptions that were suitable for a system
that contemplated the double taxation of the separate legal entity
of a corporation were unnecessary to the taxation of the
shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation and added the pointless
complexity and inflexibility described above. In the Revision Act,
Congress has pursued the twin objectives of eliminating from the
taxation of S corporations unnecessary corporate concepts while
bringing the taxation of those corporations into greater conformity
with the taxation of partnerships.
183. Former I.R.C. § 1377(b).
184. Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(b) (1960).
185. See I.R.C. § 312(k)(1), dealing with traditional accelerated depreciation
under I.R.C. § 167, and LR.C. § 312(k)(3), prescribing a similar rule for property
subject to the cost recovery system provided by I.R.C. § 168.
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B. Under the Revision Act
1.

Overview: Subchapter S's Place in the Sun

The Revision Act has changed completely the entire system
of taxing S corporations. 186 Indeed, the only important resemblance
that an S corporation bears to its predecessor, the Subchapter S
corporation, is that the entity generally is not subject to tax. 187
The Act even affects that generalization, however, by expanding
the circumstances in which the S corporation may in fact be subject
to taxation at the corporate level. 188 Congress has attempted to
correct the defects in prior law by disconnecting the taxation of
S corporations from the corporate concepts that needlessly plagued
its predecessor. That attempt was largely successful with respect
to relatively routine matters, such as the computation of income,
but was only partially successful with respect to more conceptual
questions. Under present law, an S corporation computes its income
in the same manner as does an individual and specific items of
corporate income and expense are allocated to the shareholders
for inclusion in their returns in a manner virtually identical to the
pattern of taxing partnerships. On the other hand, many of the
old corporate entity concepts persist. Corporate debt is not added
to the tax basis of the shareholder's investment in the corporation
and property distributions are reflected at market value rather
than under the partnership basis rule. As a result, although the
disconnection from corporate law that the Revision Act did accomplish has materially improved Subchapter S, the provisions remain
complex and often surprising. An S corporation is still subject to
a unique pattern of taxation, neither entirely borrowed from corporate entity concepts nor entirely embracing the partnership
conduit approach.
In many respects, the disconnection of the taxation of S
corporations from general corporate concepts has worsened the
problem of relating an S corporation to the pattern of taxing other
entities. While an S corporation computes its income in the same
manner as an individual, it remains a corporation. Thus, absent
186. For other descriptions of the Revision Act, see the series of articles
by Shaw and August appearing at 58 J. TAX 2, 84, and 300 (1983).
187. I.R.C. § 1363(a).
188. As under prior law, an S corporation may be subject to tax on certain
capital gains. See text accompanying notes 335-43 infra. In addition, the corporation may be subject to tax on certain passive investment income. See text accompanying notes 122-24 supra. Finally, if the corporation disposes of property upon
which an investment tax credit under I.R.C. § 38 was claimed for a non-election
year in a manner that produces a recapture tax under I.R.C. § 47, the S corporation, rather than its shareholders, is liable for the tax so incurred. I.R.C. § 1371(d)(2).
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further elaboration under the Code, an S corporation would be
treated as a corporation by those sections that accord different
tax consequences to transactions entered into by corporations than
to those entered into by individuals even though the corporate
income is taxable to individuals. To some extent, Congress
specifically addressed this entity characterization question in the
Revision Act. For some purposes under the Code, an S corporation is treated as an individual while for other purposes it is treated
as a corporation. Moreover, under other sections of the Act, an
S corporation is treated as a partnership and in some instances
its shareholders, and sometimes just some of them, are treated
as partners. Unfortunately, it is not always entirely clear how an
S corporation is to be characterized. While in some instances Congress stated explicitly how an S corporation is to be treated for
the purposes of a specific Code provision, in many other situations
the question is left either ambiguous or entirely open. While the
regulations, when issued, may assist in resolving many of these
ambiguities, the status of an S corporation under the Code is likely
to remain confused for many years in the future.
This uncertain, multi-faceted character of an S corporation may
have been unavoidable. The cost in terms of accelerated income
taxation of changing from corporate to partnership form is generally
prohibitive. 189 Thus, casual changes in the form in which business
is conducted in order to secure momentary tax advantages is rarely
feasible. Properly, Congress did not wish to impose such tax costs
upon the making of a Subchapter S election. 190 Quite the contrary,
few corporations are subject to any accelerated tax liability by
virtue of either electing or terminating a Subchapter S election. 191
Moreover, while special provisions of the Code are designed to
restrict the desirability of making temporary Subchapter S
189. The liquidation of a corporation is a taxable event which normally subjects the shareholders to tax on the full value of the corporation less their tax
basis for their stock. I.R.C. § 331. The alternative provided by I.R.C. § 333 subjects the shareholders to ordinary income taxation on the entire amount of the
corporate earnings and profits and thus is less desirable generally.
190. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 6; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22,
at 6.
191. The numerous questions that a mid-stream Subchapter S election raises,
under either prior or existing law, are beyond the scope of this Article. However,
under prior law and apparently under the Revision Act, a Subchapter S election
does not trigger depreciation recapture under I.R.C. §§ 1245 or 1250, nor,
apparently, does the election constitute the disposition of an installment obligation under I.R.C. § 453B. Under I.R.C. § 1371(d)(1), the election does not require
recapture of the investment tax credit provided by I.R.C. § 38. On the other hand,
operating losses from pre-election years may not be carried over and claimed
while the election is in effect although the years during which the election is
in effect count in determining the number of years to which a loss or credit may
be carried. I.R.C. § 1371(b).
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elections, those provisions are not punitive and, except in limited
circumstances, are not particularly effective. 192 As a result, the
possibility of tax manipulation beyond the remedial purposes of
Subchapter S remains relatively high. In order to reduce the
incentive for such tax motivated transactions, Congress concluded
that it was necessary to retain many of the entity based rules of
corporate taxation under the Revision Act. 193 Had the full pattern
of taxing partnerships been made available to S corporations while
permitting a Subchapter S election without significant tax costs,
corporate managers would have had available too wide a variety
of tax consequences of transactions between the corporation and
its shareholders. Preventing the anticipated abuses of Subchapter
S would have required a lengthy series of complex restrictions
that would have been inconsistent with the general desire of
simplifying the operation of Subchapter S corporations.
Whether Congress could have more closely conformed the
taxation of S corporations to the partnership conduit model will
undoubtedly be explored during the coming years. Perhaps experience under the existing Act will demonstrate that more of the
entity-based features of Subchapter S can be discarded without
undermining the integrity of those provisions. For the time being,
however, the general effect of the compromise reached under the
Revision Act is evident. While in many respects the operation of
a Subchapter S corporation has been simplified, the task of its tax
advisors remains as complex as ever. The intricate and partially
undefined position of the S corporation as part corporation, part
individual and part partnership is enormously confusing.
2.

Computing S Corporation Income
a.

In General

Reversing prior law, section 1363(b) provides that, with minor
exceptions/ 94 the taxable income of an S corporation shall be
192. See text accompanying notes 335-43 infra.
193. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.
194. In addition to the separate statement described below, I.R.C. § 1363(b)
permits S corporations to amortize organization expenses under I.R.C. § 248 and
bars the deductions that are not allowed to partnerships under I.R.C. § 703(a)(2).
That section disallows certain deductions because they are allowed at the partner (or shareholder) level, including personal exemptions, depletion of oil or gas
wells, and the net operating loss deduction. The provision also disallows a partnership deduction for foreign taxes, charitable contributions, and the itemized deductions for individuals. For both partnership and S corporations, the disallowance
of these deductions is largely superfluous because those items must be separately
stated and passed through to the partner or shareholder. For partnerships, Treas.
Reg. § 1.703-1(a)(2)(vii) (1960) expands this list to include the I.R.C. § 1202 capital
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computed in the same manner as that of an individual. As a result,
S corporations are denied deductions and exempted from inclusions
in income that are applicable only to corporations. For example,
S corporations may not take the dividends received deduction
provided by section 243 nor claim the "deemed paid" credit for
foreign taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries under section 902. 195
Many Code provisions governing the computation of taxable
income contain different rules for corporate and individual taxpayers. Absent additional guidance, in many cases it would be
unclear whether the application of those sections was controlled
by the general principle of section 1363(b) that an S corporation
computes its income in the same manner as an individual or by
the fact than an S corporation remains a corporation. For example,
in providing for the taxation of corporate distributions, section 301
distinguishes sharply between corporate and noncorporate recipients of the distribution. Regardless of how an S corporation is
required to compute its taxable income under section 1363(b), under
section 30l(d), the amount of a property distribution to be taken
into account by a corporate shareholder is not the fair market value
of the property distributed, rather it is the lesser of that value
or the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the distributing
corporation.
Congress has attempted to address such ambiguities in two
ways. Under section 1371(a)(2), an S corporation "in its capacity
as a shareholder of another corporation" is to be treated as an
individual for the purposes of Subchapter C of the Code, which
includes the three hundred series of sections governing the consequences of corporate transactions, such as distributions and
reorganizations. The significance of this provision in determining
how an S corporation is to be treated for purposes of Subchapter
gains deductions and the I.R.C. § 1212 capital loss carryover. Since these items
are computed at the S corporation shareholder level as well, a similar rule most
likely will be applied to I.R.C. § 1363.
One possible consequence of the exclusion of these items from the computation of the income of a partnership is that the limitation of I.R.C. § 704(d) may
not apply to such items. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-l(d)(2) (1960) and McKEE. supra
note 73, at, 10.10[1](b). Apparently, partners may deduct their share of charitable
contributions even though the amount of that expense exceeds the basis for their
partnership interest. Under the Revision Act, the limitation on the allowability
of losses to a shareholder's basis imposed by I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1) is expressly applicable to both charitable contributions and foreign taxes by I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1)
(last sentence). No explanation for this deviation from partnership taxation appears in the legislative history.
195. Because the S corporation is a corporati~n in spite of this provision,
it may incur expenses of a type that true individuals cannot; for example, expenses incident to the issuance and redemption of stock, liquidations, and taxable or tax-free acquisitions. Presumably, the treatment of these expenses will
be governed by the rules applicable to other corporations.
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C is considered below. 196 With respect to the computation of taxable
income, however, sections 1371 and 1363 make clear than an S corporation is to include the fair market value of a property
distribution from a corporation in which it is a shareholder and
is not entitled to use the corporation basis rule.
In addition, in the Revision Act Congress has amended several
sections of the Code to provide specifically for the treatment of
an S corporation. While it is quite clear that Congress intended
to provide a needed measure of assistance through this series
of specific amendments, that effort may prove to be more a source
of confusion than a source of assistance. The difficulty is that the
pattern of amendments made by Congress seems almost random.
In many cases, specific provision is made for an S corporation that
would appear completely unnecessary in light of the general statement that an S corporation is to compute its taxable income in
the same manner as an individual. For example, section 447 requires
certain corporations engaged in farming (and partnerships of which
a corporation is a partner) to use the accrual method of accounting
and to capitalize certain expenses. Since the provision directly
addresses the computation of income, it would seem to follow from
the general rule of section 1363 that the provision was not
applicable to S corporations. Nevertheless, subsection (c) of the
provision specifically so states. On the other hand, section 291,
added by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
("TEFRA")/97 requires that the amount of certain preferential items
included in a corporate return be reduced by 15%. For example,
a corporation is entitled to deduct only 85% of the amount of
intangible drilling expenses that it would have been entitled to
deduct in the absence of section 291.' 98 As orginally enacted, this
new provision specifically excluded from its application Subchapter
S corporations. 199 In the Revision Act, that specific exclusion was
deleted and, on its face, the provision is now applicable to all corporations. That pattern of amendment might indicate a Congressional intent that section 291 be applicable to S corporations;
however, legislative history to the Revision Act makes clear that
S corporations are not subject to the cut down rules of section
291. 200 Presumably Congress concluded that the general rule of section 1363 made this point with sufficient clarity that the specific
exclusion in section 291 was unnecessary.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
at 15.

See text accompanying notes 429-35 & 448-51 irifra.
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 204, 96 Stat. 324, 423 (1982).
I.R.C. § 291(b).
Former I.R.C. § 291(e)(2).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 14; SENATE REPORT. supra note 22,
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Section 170, permitting a deduction for charitable contributions,
provides different rules for corporations and individuals at several
points. In subsection (e)(3) and (4), for example, the section provides a special rule for determining the amount deductible with
respect to contributions of certain inventory and of scientific property to be used for research. Both of these special provisions are
applicable only to charitable contributions by corporations. Because
both provisions relate to the computation of income, an S corporation might be regarded as excluded from their application under
the general rule. Nevertheless, Congress specifically provided that
the special ceilings are not applicable to contributions by S
corporations.201 On the other hand, no other reference to a corporation in section 170 was modified similal'ly. In general, corporations
are subject to a 10% ceiling on the overall amount deductible with
respect to their charitable contributions and they are subject to
ceilings that are different from those applicable to individuals with
respect to contributions of certain appreciated property. 202 It is
clear that neither of these limitations is applicable to S corporations, but, rather, the full amount of their charitable contributions
is to be stated separately and allocated to their shareholders. 203
The ceilings on the amount deductible are to be applied at the
shareholder level. However, it is not at all clear why Congress
thought it necessary to provide specially for corporations for the
purposes of some provisions in section 170 but not for others. The
resulting pattern creates needless confusion.
In large part, the resulting statutory pattern merely has been
carried over from prior law. For example, sections 170(e)(3) and
(4) previously excluded Subchapter S corporations from their scope
and that exclusion has been continued under current law. In this
respect, the amendment of section 291 is exceptional. The difficulty,
of course, is that under prior law, a Subchapter S corporation was
regarded as a corporation and computed its income as a corporation; thus, the specific exclusions of Subchapter S corporations were
necessary to the_ result Congress sought. Under present law, in
many instances the exclusions do not appear to be necessary and,
thus, create uncertainty concerning how other sections of the Code,
lacking such specific references, are to be construed. It is unfortunate that Congress was not able to integrate the new S corporation more completely into the statutory pattern.
An S corporation is required to compute its taxable income
as if it were an individual, yet it remains a corporation for all other

201.
202.
203.
at 16.

I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)(A) and (4)(D)(i).
I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) and (e)(1).
HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 14; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22,
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purposes under the Code except to the extent that the Code
specifically provides to the contrary. As noted above, for certain
purposes under Subchapter C, an S corporation is regarded as an
individual and not as a corporation. Similar provisions are contained
in a series of specific Code sections. These provisions are also carried over from prior law but in general are necessary to the proper
construction of the Code. For example, an S corporation is subject
to the hobby loss provisions of section 183 and to the related limitation on the deduction of expenses with respect to a residence imposed by section 280A. 204
In other situations, Congress has continued the treatment of
an S corporation as a corporation when it should have treated it
as an individual. For example, under section 1244, a loss sustained
on certain stock is entitled to ordinary, rather than capital, loss
treatment. That favored treatment, however, is available only when
the stock is issued to, and held by, an individual or partnership. 205
With the elimination of the passive investment income restriction,
S corporations are free to invest in other businesses and, indeed,
may be used as investment companies. The unavailability of ordinary loss treatment under section 1244, however, seriously reduces
the attractiveness of investing in new or small business ventures.
There is no reason why the shareholders of S corporations should
not be entitled to the same benefits under section 1244 that are
available to partners. 206 The failure to amend section 1244 to extend its benefits to S corporations perpetuates a further unfavorable, and unnecessary, distinction between partnerships and S corporations that is inconsistent with the general approach of the Revision Act. 207
b.

Separate Statement

The mechanics of translating the income derived by an S corporation into the tax liability of its shareholders has been copied
virtually intact from partnership law. The S corporation is required
to separately state items of income and expense 208 and each
204. See also I.R.C. §§ 1251(b)(2), 1256(e)(3)(B), and 6661(b)(1)(B).
205. I.R.C. § 1244(a).
206. It would be reasonable to condition such an extension upon the corporation's continuous qualifications as an S corporation during the period beginning
with the issuance of the section 1244 stock and ending on the date the loss is
incurred.
207. As under prior law, stock issued by an S corporation may be section
1244 stock and normally it is desirable to qualify under that provision. However,
in contrast to the revision of Subchapter S, the passive investment income limitation on corporations issuing section 1244 stock has been retained. I.R.C. §
1244(c)(1)(C).
208. I.R.C. § 1363(b)(1).
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shareholder is required to take into account on his individual return
his pro rata share of each such item. 319 Under partnership tax accounting the number of such items that must be separately stated
is indeed impressive. 210 The Code in section 702(a) enumerates only
six such items while the regulations, 211 issued under express
statutory authority, 212 add many more. The partnership information return adds still others. Moreover, the partnership regulations provide that additional items must be separately stated and
taken into account by all partners if the separate statement would
result in an income tax liability for any partner that would vary
from the liability resulting from a failure to state the item
separately. 213 The items specifically enumerated in the Code, in the
regulations, or on the return, must be separately stated in all events
but other items are to be stated separately only if that statement
would affect the tax liability of a partner. Thus, literal compliance
with the partnership regulations requires that the partnership
specifically determine in each year, based upon the individual
characteristics of the partner's return, whether separate statement
would affect the tax liability of a partner.
Unlike the partnership approach, new section 1366(a)(1) merely
provides that the items that must be separately stated are those
"the separate treatment of which could affect the liability for tax
of any shareholder." The significance of the different statutory approach to the S corporation is not clear since no reference is made
in the legislative history to the deviation from the partnership provisions. Specifically, it is not clear what frame of reference should
be used in interpreting the meaning of the word "could" in section
1366. Virtually any item of income could affect the tax liability
of a shareholder of a Subchapter S corporation under some conceivable configuration of his individual income. If that is the construction that the Treasury places on the new statutory language,
the number of items that must be separately stated for S corporation purposes will be even greater than the number of items that
must presently be separately stated for partnerships. On the other
hand, the proper frame of reference for interpreting the word
"could" might be the individual characteristics of the shareholder's
returns. That is, a separate statement may be required if such
statement "could" be material to a shareholder in view of his other
sources of income and expense. In that event, the number of items
that must be separately stated for an S corporation might be
materially less than the number that must be separately stated
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

I.R.C. § 1366(a)(ll.
See McKEE, supra note 73, at , 9.03.
Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(i) (1972).
I.R.C. § 702(a)(7).
Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(ii) (1960).
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by a partnership, although the same problem of individual determinations of shareholders' income and expense situations would
remain. This uncertainty with respect to the scope of section 1366,
engendered by the use of the word "could" rather than the word
"would," should not substantively affect the tax liability of S corporation shareholders. It is clear that if the separate statement
would make a difference in fact, a separate statement must occur.
Rather, the doubt pertains to the procedural question of how complex it will be to prepare S corporation information returns. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the statutory language, it is probable that in issuing regulations pursuant to this provision the
Treasury will follow the partnership format. Thus, it can be expected that through a combination of these regulations and the
Subchapter S information return, S corporations will be required
to separately state a specified list of items of income and expense,
which probably will correspond to the items that must be separately
stated on a partnership return. In addition, the Treasury undoubtedly will require the separate statement of any additional item if
that separate statement would affect the tax liability of any
shareholder.
c.

Characterization of Income

While Congress was unquestionably correct in conforming the
taxation of S corporations to the existing pattern of taxing partnerships, that approach is not an entirely unmixed blessing. The
conformity thereby achieved necessarily will include the uncertainties that persist in partnership taxation. For example, new section 1366(b), governing the characterization of items of income and
expense allocated to a shareholder, states that the character of
any item is to be determined "as if such item were realized directly
from the source from which realized by the corporation." This
language is quoted directly from the similar provision applicable
to partnerships. 214 Where the characterization of an item of income
and expense is inherent in the item itself and is unaffected by the
nature of the recipient, this provision has caused little difficulty
under partnership taxation. However, it has long been recognized
that this provision is ambiguous where the character of an item
is affected by the nature of its recipient. 215 For example, gain from
the sale of property that would be entitled to capital gains taxation if the property had been owned by some sellers, will be subject to ordinary income taxation if the seller is a dealer in such
property. In that event, the character of an item received by the
214.
215.

I.R.C. § 702(b).
MCKEE, supra note 73, at , 9.05.
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corporation might be very different from the character of the same
item received by one of the shareholders. The literal language of
new section 1366(b), as well as the language of the partnership
taxation predecessor, suggests that the characterization is to be
made, at the shareholder or partner level. If that were the case,
different shareholders could be subject to different characterizations of the same item of income passed through the S corporation
and that diversity of result would make it impossible for the S
corporation to allocate separately items of income and expense.
The corporation would not know whether the item constituted
ordinary income or capital gains; therefore, it would be unable to
state separately the total amount of its capital gains and inventory sales income and thus would be required to state separately
each item of income and expense from each separate transaction
in which the corporation engages- a totally impossible burden.
When this question has arisen in the taxation of partnerships,
the more sensible construction generally has been achieved. The
Commissioner usually has taken the position that characterization
is to be determined at the partnership level and the courts usually
have agreed. 216 The legislative history of the Revision Act reflects
not only this confusion under partnership law but also Congress'
intention to incorporate that confusion into the new S corporation
rules. Thus, the House Report states that the characterization rule
for S corporations will be the same as the partnership rule and
that "under the partnership rules, this has generally resulted in
an entity level characterization." 217
In relatively rare circumstances, entity characterization might
result in improper tax avoidance. For example, a dealer in a certain type of property might transfer that property in a non-recognition exchange to an entity that he dominated and largely owned
in an attempt to secure capital gains on the disposition of the property. In such a circumstance, the character of the proceeds of the
disposition should be determined, arguably, by reference to the
dealer himself and not the entity. 218 Absent such transparent tax
avoidance, however, entity characterization yields the proper result
and is likely to prevail in the taxation of S corporations.
216. See, e.g., Barnham v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 43 (M.D. Ga. 1969),
aff'd per curiam, 429 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1970); Rev. Rul. 67-188, 1967-1 C.B. 216.
But see Riddell v. Scales, 406 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally MCKEE. supra
note 73, at , 9.05.
217. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 16; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22,
at 17.
·
218. To the limited extent of distinguishing ordinary from capital gain, this
level of characterization problem also existed under the old Subchapter S rules.
In an attempt to avoid the results described in the text, Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-l(d)
(1960) provided that while the character of gain was determined ordinarily at
the corporate level, if a Subchapter S corporation was used to convert ordinary
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Elections

One feature of partnership taxation that many taxpayers find
unduly restrictive is the requirement that most elections be made
at the partnership level. The entity level election requirement has
been justified on the ground that a partnership must be able to
compute its items of income and expense in order to allocate those
items to its partners. On the other hand, the very nature of an
election contained in the income tax laws implies an understanding that different taxpayers may be affected quite differently by
a taxing provision and, within the tolerance allowed by the election,
should be able to arrange their tax position to their best advantage.
Most elections are contained in provisions in which Congress intended to provide a benefit while recognizing that in certain circumstances the "benefit" offered might prove to be a disadvantage.
A taxpayer already sustaining operating losses, for example, derives
relatively little benefit from increasingly accelerated methods of
depreciation. Thus, the new cost recovery system, granted by section 168 in lieu of depreciation, permits taxpayers a wide latitude
in selecting the degree of acceleration they wish to claim. To the
extent that taxpayers are bound by an election made at the corporate or partnership level, they are denied this flexibility.
The conflict between aggregate and entity characterization of
a partnership often reduces to a conflict between flexibility and
administrative ease. The preference for partnership level elections
may represent an excessive concern for simplifying the audit of
partnerships. In some circumstances the added complexity of per- .
mitting elections at the partner level may be intolerably great,
not only to the Commissioner, but also to the partnership itself.
In many other cases, however, this conclusion is far from clear.
In any event, Congress has followed the partnership format
in section 1363(c).219 Subject to the same exceptions as are applicable
to partnerships, 220 all elections are to be made by the S corporation. Unfortunately, the list of exceptions to this general rule contained in section 1363 is not exclusive. Specific sections of the Code
occasionally provide that elections provided under those sections
income into capital gain in connection with the contemplated disposition of property, the character of the gain might be determined at the shareholder level.
This "collapsible" provision was not tested and its validity remains in doubt. A
similar provision probably will be included in the regulations governing S
corporations.
219. See I.R.C. § 703(b).
220. The shareholder level elections provided by I.R.C. § 1363(c)(2) are those
provided by: (1) I.R.C. §§ 108(d)(4) (discharge of indebtedness) and (d)(5); (2) I.R.C.
§ 163(d) (investment interest); (3) I.R.C. § 617 (mining exploration expenses);
and (4) I.R.C. § 901 (foreign tax credit). I.R.C. § 703(b)(1) also includes the election
under I.R.C. § 57(c) (defining net leases) but that provision is now obsolete.
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are to be made at the partner or S corporation shareholder level.
For example, TEFRA added new section 58(i) which permits taxpayers to amortize the tax benefits attributable to certain
enumerated preference items over a 10-year period. If that election is made, the amortized items are not treated as items of tax
preference either for the purpose of the alternative minimum tax
imposed by section 55 on noncorporate taxpayers or the add-on
minimum tax imposed· by section 56 on corporations. Section
58(i)(5)(D) provides that an election to claim the benefits of this
new provision is to be made separately by each partner or
shareholder of an S corporation. If Congress wished to provide
an enumeration in section 1363 of exceptions to the entity level
election provision, it is regrettable that the enumeration could
not be complete.
Clearly, it is desirable for the taxation of S corporations to
parallel the taxation of partnerships to the greatest extent possible. However, it is not at all clear that elections that can be made
at the partner level without causing excessive complexity or unfairness can also be made with similar ease at the S corporation
shareholder level. There are important differences between the
taxation of S corporations under the Revision Act and the taxation of partnerships, and those differences, in some circumstances,
make certain shareholder level elections impractical. For example,
the election under section 617 to deduct the cost of exploring for
hard minerals is excessively complex. Section 617 is considered
below in connection with other Revision Act changes governing
the treatment of natural resources. 221 A second election that does
not seem to operate properly at the shareholder level is the election to defer cancellation of indebtedness income.
In general, the cancellation of an indebtedness produces a gain
to the debtor that is taxable as ordinary income.2Z! Under the recently revised sections 108 and 1017, the recognition of that cancellation
income, in certain circumstances, may be deferred. To the extent
that the taxpayer is insolvent or the discharge occurs in the course
of a federal bankruptcy proceeding under Title 11, the amount of
the income is automatically applied in reduction of the taxpayer's
carryovers of operating losses, credits and capital losses in a
statutorily prescribed order. 223 Any remaining income then is applied in reduction of the basis of the taxpayer's depreciable property in the manner prescribed in section 1017.224 In addition, if
the indebtedness was incurred in a trade or business, the taxpayer
221.
222.
223.
224.

See text accompanying note 462 infra.
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12 (1960).
I.R.C. § 108(b).
I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(D).
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may elect to reduce the basis of his depreciable property by the
amount that would otherwise be taxed currently as cancellation
income, thus deferring tax on that amount. 225 Following the rule
applicable to partnerships, section 108(d)(6) provides that the provisions of section 108 are to be applied at the shareholder level
in the case of an S corporation and section 1363(c)(2)(A) provides
that the elections that may be made under section 108 are to be
made separately by each shareholder. The key to understanding
this pattern of section 108 lies in the insolvency exception to
cancellation of indebtedness income under prior law. 226 Since as
a matter of state law, general partners have unlimited personal
liability for partnership obligations, it makes little sense to apply
the insolvency test at the partnership level. If the partners
themselves were solvent and all of the creditors of the partnership would be repaid fully, there is no justification for failing to
tax income derived through the cancellation of an indebtedness
merely because the assets of the partnership itself were insufficient to discharge the partnership obligations. Applying the insolvency test at the partner level, however, produces different
results to different partners as some may be insolvent while others
are not. In addition, the elective application of section 108 is applicable only to the extent that a cancellation causes the taxpayer
to become solvent. 227 Thus, the amount subject to the election may
well vary for each partner. As a result, it is entirely appropriate
for section 108, and the elections thereunder, to apply at the partner level. On the other hand, there could have been the potential
for a substantial unfairness in so applying the basis reduction rules
of section 108. In many instances, the only depreciable property
in which a partner may have an interest would be the property
belonging to the partnership itself. If section 108 relief could be
elected only by a solvent partner to the extent that the partner
individually owned depreciable property, the benefits of that provision would commonly be unavailable to partners. Since the partnership, which had originally incurred the indebtedness now cancelled, might nevertheless own substantial amounts of depreciable
property, barring a partner from the benefits of section 108 would
be both irrational and excessively harsh. To prevent this result,
section 1017(b)(3)(C) provides that the interest of a partner in a
partnership shall be treated as depreciable property to the extent
that the property owned by the partnership consists of depreciable
property. In order for a partner to be entitled to reduce the basis
of his partnership interest under this provision, the partnership
225.
226.
227.

I.R.C. § 108(c).
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(b) (1960); Lakeland Grocery Co., 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937).
I.R.C. § 108(a)(2).
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also must reduce its basis in depreciable property as to that partner.
The net effect of these provisions is to extend to the partner the
benefits of section 108 by permitting him to recognize the cancellation income through greater distributions of income from the partnership to him in future years.
While section 108 is also applicable at the shareholder level
in an S corporation, the rationality of that application is not entirely clear. The shareholders of S corporations do not have
unlimited personal liability with respect to the obligations of the
corporation; therefore, insolvency at the corporate level is meaningful. On the other hand, the tax carryovers to be reduced through
the operation of section 108 do not exist at the corporate level
but rather are aspects of the computation of the tax liability of
the respective shareholders. Unfortunately, section 1017 does not
permit shareholders in S corporations to reduce the basis of their
S corporation stock in a manner analogous to the reduction of the
basis of a partnership interest. Accordingly, the unfairness
described above exists with respect to S corporation shareholders
and, in many instances, those shareholders will not be able to take
advantage of the elective deferral of tax on cancellation income
extended by section 108 to partnerships and other taxpayers. This
harsher treatment of shareholders of S corporations is wrong and
should be corrected by permitting a corporate level election to
reduce the basis of property in order to obtain the deferral benefits
of section 108.
Congress appears to have recognized this defect under section
108 and the TCB has adopted the approach suggested above. 228
Under the proposed amendment, section 108 is to be applied at
the corporate, rather than the shareholder, level and the elections
available under that section are to be made at the corporate level.
In addition, for the purpose of reducing the tax attributes of the
S corporation, losses not currently available to the shareholders
under section 1366(d)(1), because they exceed the basis of their investment, are to be treated as a net operating loss of the S corporation. That provision may require further development. As
presently drafted, the TCB amendment could cause the burden
of section 108 to fall unevenly among the shareholders since different shareholders will have different amounts of non-deductible
losses.
e.

Ceilings

Under many provisions of the Code, a ceiling is imposed upon
a benefit or allowance that is extended to a taxpayer. Neither the
new statutory provisions for S corporations nor the legislative
228.

TCB § 201(b).
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history to the provisions address the question of whether those
limitations are to apply at the corporate or shareholder level. The
general statements in the committee reports, however, suggesting
that the computation of S corporation income is to follow the computation of partnership income, probably will control the resolution of this issue. 229 Unfortunately, the treatment of ceilings for
partnership purposes has never been entirely clear. 230 The regulations indicate that the ceilings are to be imposed at the partner
level without addressing the question of whether they are also
applicable at the partnership level.231 In addition, many specific sections of the Code granting allowances contain their own rule. For
example, the limitation contained in section 48(c)(2) on the investment tax credit applicable to used property is to be determined
at both the partner and partnership level. Accompanying the new
S corporation rules are a series of amendments to other sections
of the Code that attempt to integrate the new S corporation into
the complicated scheme of the law. Where the specific section in
the past addressed whether ceilings were to be imposed at the
partner or partnership level, the issue has been resolved similarly
with respect to S corporations. For example, the limitations on
the investment tax credit for used property applicable to partners
and partnerships has been extended to S corporations and their
shareholders. 232 Similarly, the Act copied the enormously complex
partner level ceiling on the depletion allowance for oil or gas
production. 233
f.

Foreign Income

Section 1363(c)(2)(D) provides that each shareholder make the
229. See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 22, at 6.
230. MCKEE, supra note 73, at , 9.08[1].
231. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(iii) (1972).
232. I.R.C. § 48(c)(2)(D). Similar rules are contained in I.R.C. §§ 179(d)(8) and
194(b)(2)(B). I.R.C. § 48(q)(1) requires a corporate level reduction, equal to fifty
percent of the investment tax credit, in the basis of the asset as to which the
investment tax credit was taken. Neither I.R.C. § 48(q) nor the Revision Act requires any offsetting adjustment at the shareholder level, although it is clear
that the credit itself will be allocated to the shareholders under I.R.C. §
1366(a)(1)(A). TCB § 102(b) would add new I.R.C. § 48(q)(6), that would require
an "appropriate" adjustment in the basis of the S corporation stock in the hands
of the shareholders to "take into account" the corporate level reduction in the
basis of the asset; the provision requires the same adjustment in the basis of
a partner's interest in a partnership. The appropriate adjustment in a partner's
basis for his or her partnership interest may have to be determined individually,
to take into account the effect of any special allocations. Since special allocations
are not permitted under Subchapter S, the "appropriate adjustment" will always
be a reduction in the shareholder's basis in the S corporation stock equal to his
or her pro rata share of the corporate level reduction in basis.
233. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(13). See text accompanying notes 456-62 infra.
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election under section 901 to treat his or her share of any foreign
taxes paid as a deduction or a tax credit; section 1366(a)(1) provides that the amount subject to the election shall be separately
stated.234 These rules parallel the treatment of the foreign tax credit
in partnership taxation. 235 In addition, new section 1373(a) provides
that, for purposes of the provisions ·dealing with the foreign tax
credit (sections 901 through 908) and controlled foreign corporations (sections 951 through 964), the S corporation will be treated
as a partnership and its shareholders as partners. Section 1373(a)
was apparently added to make clear that source rules, including
the capital gains source rule of section 904(b), and the limitations
of sections 904 and 907 will also apply at the shareholder level. 236
These source rules and limitations apply at the partner level by
virtue of section 901(b). To implement this rule, the legislative
history contemplates that items of foreign source income and loss
will also be among the items required to be separately stated under
section 1366(a)(l)(A).237 In addition, section 1373(a) makes it clear
that neither the S corporation nor its shareholders are entitled
to the credit for foreign taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries under
section 902.
The election to be taxed under Subchapter Sand the termination of the election are treated under section 1373(b) as dispositions of the business for purposes of the recapture of foreign losses
under section 904(f). Thus, when a corporation elects to be taxed
under Subchapter S, it will have to recapture any foreign losses
previously taken and not previously recaptured. Similarly, upon
the termination of the corporation's Subchapter S election, the
shareholders will have to recapture any foreign losses passed out
to them and not previously recaptured. This rule seems correct
234. The flush language following I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1) requires a separate statement of amounts described in I.R.C. § 702(a)(6). That is the section requiring a
separate statement of a partner's distributive share of foreign taxes paid by the
partnership.
235. I.R.C. §§ 703(b)(5) and 702(b)(6).
236. SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 16; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22,
at 15. One author has suggested that this provision will permit special allocation
of foreign taxes to particular shareholders in charge of the S corporation's foreign
operations, pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2). That regulation deals with the
extent to which special allocation of foreign source income to particular partners
will be considered to have substantial economic effect. Fellows, Allocation of

Foreign Taxes To S Corporation Shareholders Under the Subchapter S Revision
Act of 1982, 61 TAXES 402 (1983). While a literal reading of the phrase "treated
as a partnership" might lead to that conclusion, it seems reasonably clear that
Congress's intent in drafting this provision was only to permit tax treatment
of foreign taxes to be determined at the shareholder level instead of at the corporation level, rather than to deviate from the general rules of section 1366 with
respect to allocation among shareholders.
237. SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 16; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22,
at 15.
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inasmuch as a different taxpayer will be eligible for the foreign
tax credit before and after an election or termination. However,
it injects an additional consideration that was not present under
prior law into the decision to elect or terminate Subchapter S
treatment.
3.

Timing and Shifting of Income
a.

In General

In marked contrast to the inflexibility of the computation of
the income of a Subchapter S corporation, prior law permitted a
substantial degree of latitude in the timing of the taxation of the
income of a Subchapter S corporation to its shareholders and in
the ability to shift that income from one shareholder to another.
While shareholders were subject to tax on actual distributions from
the Subchapter S corporation in the taxable year of the shareholder
in which the distribution was received, 238 constructive distributions
of undistributed taxable income were subject to tax in the taxable
year of the shareholder in which the taxable year of the corporation ended. 239 Moreover, in contrast to the rules governing the selection of the taxable year for partnerships, which in general requires
that partners and partnerships be on the same taxable year, 240 there
were no special restrictions upon the adoption of the taxable year
for a Subchapter S corporation. 241
The flexibility that these provisions created was not lost on
practitioners and it was not uncommon for Subchapter S corporations to adopt taxable years ending on January 31. Under such
election, income derived by a Subchapter S corporation during the
period extending from February 1, 1970 to January 31, 1971 would
be included in the shareholders' taxable income for the year 1971
for which a return was not due until April 15, 1972. As a result,
taxpayers were able to defer the payment of tax for substantial
periods of time. Perhaps even more favorably, the shareholders
of the Subchapter S corporation could elect whether they wished
to take advantage of that deferral possibility or whether they
wished to accelerate tax on the corporate income. For example,
in a year in which a major Subchapter S shareholder had unusually
238. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-l(f) (1960).
239. Former I.R.C. § 1373(b).
240. I.R.C. § 706(b)(l).
241. Like other corporations, a new Subchapter S corporation could adopt
any taxable year under I.R.C. § 441. However, the regulations imposed greater
restrictions upon the change of a Subchapter S corporation's taxable year than
upon the change of a regular corporation's taxable year. Treas. Reg.§ 1.442-l(c)(4)
(1960).
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low income outside of the corporation, the shareholders could cause
the corporation to make an actual cash distribution prior to the
expiration of the calendar year. Thus, given the availability of cash,
which of course could always be borrowed, Subchapter S shareholders had substantial flexibility in selecting the year in which
they wished to be taxed on income earned by the corporation.
Even more inconsistent with the normal application of the Code,
shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation had the opportunity
to shift the liability for taxes on Subchapter S income even after
that income had been earned. The rule applicable under prior law,
that the constructive distribution of undistributed taxable income
must be included in the return of a stockholder on the last day
of the taxable year of the Subchapter S corporation, was not altered
by shifts in the ownership of the corporate stock during the year.
Thus, as long as the Subchapter S stockholder was willing to make
a complete and unconditional transfer of his ownership of the stock,
he could transfer his potential liability for tax with respect to the
portion of the corporation's undistributed taxable income allocable
to his stock by making a gift of that stock just prior to the close
of the corporation's taxable year. By making such gifts in years
in which the corporation had unusually large amounts of income
and by transferring the stock to members of his family in materially
lower income tax brackets, a Subchapter S shareholder could obtain
quite substantial savings in income taxes.
Under the Revision Act, Congress has restricted severely the
ability of taxpayers to manipulate the timing of taxation of S corporation income and has eliminated the ability of taxpayers to shift
the incidence of tax on that income to transferees. Under new section 1378, an S corporation must use, as its period for accounting
for taxable income, a "permitted" year, which is defined as the
calendar year, unless it is able to establish to the satisfaction of
the Commissioner that there is a business purpose for the adoption
of a different accounting period. 242 This provision follows the
substance, although not the form, of the partnership rules which
require a partnership to use the same accounting period as that
used by all of its principal partners, defined as partners having
a five percent or greater interest in partnership profits or capital/43
unless a business purpose is established for the use of a different
year.244
In Revenue Procedure 83-25,245 the Commissioner has issued
relatively liberal rules governing the adoption or retention of a
242.
243.
244.
245.

I.R.C. § 1378(b).
Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(b)(3) (1973).
I.R.C. § 706(b)(1).
1983-15 I.R.B. 13.
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fiscal year other than the calendar year by corporations in connection with the making of an S election. 246 The Procedure states
three situations in which a fiscal year other than the calendar year
will constitute a permitted year under section 1378. First, a permitted year includes any fiscal year if shareholders owning a majority of the outstanding stock in the S corporation have or adopt
the same year. 247 In addition, the Procedure indicates that the permitted year requirement is satisfied if the requested year will result
in a deferral of income for a period of three months or less to
shareholders owning a majority of the outstanding stock in the
corporation. 248 Thus, in a corporation the majority of whose
shareholders are calendar year taxpayers, fiscal years ending on
the last day of September, October or November will be permitted
years. Thirdly, the Procedure indicates that a permitted year includes the natural business year of the corporation, and contains
a mechanical test for determining whether a proposed fiscal year
constitutes the natural business year for this purpose. 249
The general effective date of the Revision Act is January 1,
1983 and, as originally adopted, that general provision also was
applicable to the new taxable year provisions. 250 However, the
Treasury Department evidently became concerned that too many
S corporations would attempt to adopt fiscal years prior to the
first day of 1983 in order to take advantage of the grandfathering
provision described below. Accordingly, in the Technical Correc246. Unfortunately, the Commissioner has not yet indicated whether similar
rules will apply to corporations that have elected previously to be taxed under
Subchapter S and now wish to change their fiscal year. However, Congress has·
expressly indicated an intention that the rules governing whether an S corporation may have an accounting period other than the calendar year be similar to
those governing partnerships. H-R REP. No. 986 (Conf. Rep.), 97th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 22 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4203, 4210. For
the procedures governing adoption and change of partnership fiscal years, see
Treas. Reg. § L706-1(b)(4) (1973) and the Revenue Procedures cited in notes 248
and 249 infra.
247. Rev. Proc. 83-25, § 4.02, 1983-15 I.R.B. 13, 15. However, in order for
the S corporation to qualify for this permitted year, any principal shareholders
who change their accounting year to the one chosen for the corporation first must
secure the approval of the Commissioner for their change of year under Treas.
Reg. § 1.442-l(b)(1) (1960). A principal shareholder is one who owns more than
five percent of the outstanding stock in the corporation. Temp. Reg.§ 18.1378-l(b)(1),
48 Fed. Reg. 3593 (1983) (to be codified _at 26 C.F.R. pt. 18).
248. Rev. Proc. 83-25, § 4.03, 1983-15 I.R.B. 13, 15. Rev. Proc. 72-51, 1972-2
C.B. 832, provides a similar de minimus rule for partnerships as long as the deferral
is no longer than three months for any principal partner.
249. Rev. Proc. 83-25, § 4.04, 1983-15 I.R.B. 13, 15-16. Compare Rev. Proc.
74-33, 1974-2 C.B. 489, which defines the natural business year of a partnership
and the extent to which it may be used as the partnership's accounting period.
250. Revision Act, § 6(a). Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 6(a), 96 Stat. 1669, 1697 (1982).
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tions Act of 1982,251 Congress provided that section 1378, governing the taxable years of S corporations, should take effect on the
day following October 19, 1982, the date when the Revision Act
was approved. 252 Therefore, unless the corporation had elected to
be taxed under Subchapter S prior to October 20, 1982 and had
adopted a fiscal year other than the calendar ·year prior to that
date, it will be required to adopt a permitted year in accordance
with the new rules of section 1378 before it will be eligible to elect
Subchapter S treatment. 253 The Temporary Regulations mitigate
the retroactive application of this effective date provision through
the adoption of a generally available de minimus rule consistent
with Revenue Procedure 83-25. Thus, a corporation that was formed
prior to January 1; 1982, filed a Subchapter S election after October 19, 1982, and adopted a taxable year ending on the last day
of September, October or November, will be permitted to retain
that taxable year. 254
A potential trap exists under section 1378 for taxpayers
attempting to elect under Subchapter S when, whether through
ignorance or otherwise, the corporation has not adopted a permitted
year. In that event, the election will not be effective unless the
corporation seeks and obtains a determination from the Commissioner that a business purpose exists for the use of the adopted
fiscal year. The Temporary Regulations 255 attempt to prevent such
ineffective elections first by providing that in most circumstances 256
a corporation may adopt automatically a calendar year if it otherwise does not have a permitted year and, then, by providing that
the making of a Subchapter S election by a corporation eligible
for that automatic change will be treated as an automatic change
of the taxable year to the calendar year. That relatively imaginative
regulation will save many elections that otherwise would not have
become effective. Some taxpayers, however, may be surprised to
learn that the filing of a Subchapter S election automatically
changed their accounting period. If such a corporation wishes
to retain its fiscal year, or to adopt a new fiscal year other than
the calendar year, the Temporary Regulations provide that such

251. Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365 (1982).
252. Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 305(d)(1)(A), 96 Stat. 2365, 2399 adding § 6(f) to
Revision Act.
253. I.R.C. § 1378(a)(2).
254. Temp. Reg. § 18.1378-1(c), 48 Fed. Reg. 3593 (1983) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 18); Rev. Proc. 83-25, § 4.03, 1983-15 I.R.B. 13, 15.
255. Temp. Reg. § 18.1378-l(b), 48 Fed. Reg. 3593 (1983) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 18).
256. The regulation requires that all shareholders owning 5% or more of
the outstanding stock of the corporation have or adopt the calendar year as their
taxable period.
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a request may accompany the making of a Subchapter S election. 257
If the request is denied, however, the Subchapter S election will
not become effective unless the election is accompanied by a further
request to adopt the calendar year in the event that the request
to adopt a different year is denied. These Temporary Regulations
apply to all Subchapter S elections made after October 19, 1982.
Some of the more complicated provisions of the new S corporation rules are addressed to transitional problems. The general rule
of section 1378 does not require existing Subchapter S corporations
that presently use a fiscal year that would not be permissible under
the new law to change their accounting period. Thus, corporations
for which a valid Subchapter S election was in effect prior to
October 20, 1982 may continue to obtain whatever benefits of deferral they obtained previously. The grandfathering of existing corporations obviously created the potential for the development of
a market in used Subchapter S corporations that could provide
the benefits of an 11-month deferral of tax to their new owners.
In order to prevent, or at least retard, that development, section
1378(c) effectively provides for the loss of grandfathered status
upon a shift in the ownership of the corporation in excess of fifty
percentage points subsequent to December 31, 1982. Since the application of this rule will require a clear demonstration of the percentage of stock in the Subchapter S corporation owned by each
shareholder on December 31, 1982, any ambiguities in ownership
should be resolved promptly. In order to make the required computation, the increase in the percentage of the stock of the S corporation owned by each shareholder must be aggregated with the
similar increases of all other shareholders. When that increase exceeds 50%, grandfathered status will be lost. Having so provided,
Congress continued to exclude certain increases in stock ownership from the fatal computation. 258 Thus, stock acquired from any
person who owned it on December 31, 1982 (or who acquired it
in an exempt transfer) either by inheritance from any person, by
gift from a family member (within the meaning of section 267(c)(4)),
or pursuant to certain buy-sell agreements 259 from a family member
257. Temp. Reg. § 18.1378-l(b)(2)(ii), 48 Fed. Reg. 3593 (1983) (to be codified
at 26 C.F .R. pt. 18).
258. I.R.C. § 1378(c)(3).
259. This buy-sell agreement exception of I.R.C. § 1378(c)(3)(A)(ii) (III) is
defined quite tightly. The agreement must have been continually in force since
September 28, 1982, and must provide that on the death of a stockholder, his
stock "will be" sold to those surviving parties to the agreement who were parties on September 28, 1982. The provision suggests that both the obligation to
sell and the obligation to purchase must be mandatory and unconditional. Oddly,
however, the provision does not require that the agreement be written.
Although the definition of a qualified buy-sell agreement refers only to sales
on the death of a shareholder, the provision exempting this stock exempts ac-
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is not to be treated as acquired after 1982, but rather will be
regarded as held on December 31, 1982. It should be underscored
that this dispensation does not extend to all acquisitions of stock
by one S corporation shareholder from another but only to acquisitions of stock in the manner described above by any person,
regardless of whether he was a shareholder on December 31, 1982.
For example, if one individual who was a shareholder on December
31, 1982 purchases stock in the corporation from another such
shareholder (other than pursuant to a qualified buy-sell agreement)
the increase in percentage ownership of the S corporation so purchased counts against grandfathered status.
The greatest danger of accidental loss of grandfathered status
will occur when S corporation stock is redeemed, perhaps because
of death or retirement of a shareholder-employee. Such a redemption automatically increases the percentage ownership of the S corporation stock by each of the remaining shareholders. If over
one-half of the stock that remains outstanding following the redemption is treated under these rules as having been acquired after
December 31, 1982, grandfathered status will be lost by virtue of
the redemption. Although many buy-sell agreements commonly used
by closely held corporations require that a shareholder's stock be
redeemed by the corporation rather than purchased by the other
shareholders, such agreements are not covered by the statutory
exception for newly acquired stock. Presumably, that omission was
intentional. If shifts in ownership occasioned by a redemption did
not produce a loss of grandfathered status, the 50% change in
ownership rule could be circumvented all too easily through a combination of sales and redemptions. Obviously, the application of
this transitional rule must be monitored carefully. It is not fully
clear whether buy-sell agreements in effect on September 28, 1982
may be modified at the present time to replace mandatory redemption provisions with shareholder purchase requirements and
thereby obtain the benefit of the grandfathering rule. The definition of a "qualified buy-sell agreement" contained in section
1378(c)(3)(D) requires only that the agreement be in existence since
September 28, 1982 and that the agreement provide that upon death
stock will be sold to persons who were parties to the agreement
on that date. The provision does not specifically address amendments to agreements or require that the parties to such agreements
were bound on September 28, 1982 to purchase the stock. Nevertheless, it would be appropriate for all of the grandfathering provisions to be narrowly construed. On the other hand, buy-sell
agreements can always be amended to delete mandatory redempquisitions "from a qualified transferor (or his estate) who was a member of' the
transferee's family. Thus, it is unclear whether inter vivos sales pursuant to a
buy-sell agreement that also requires transfers at death fall within the exemption.
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tion features that might result in the loss of grandfathering status.
In many circumstances, it may be appropriate to convert mandatory
redemption provisions into options or to provide an exception in
the event that the redemption could result in the loss of grandfathered status. 260
The entire transitional rule provided under section 1378 should
be criticized harshly. The overriding purpose for the adoption of
the new S corporation rules was to simplify Subchapter S and to
eliminate the countless "traps for the unwary" that littered its
provisions. Complicated transitional rules such as this one governing the loss of grandfathered fiscal years are inconsistent with that
objective. Of course, whenever Congress enacts a material change
in the taxing statute it is appropriate to give due consideration
to those who have acted in reliance upon prior law. On the other
hand, that quite legitimate objective must in every instance be
balanced with the countervailing desire to produce a Code that
is manageable and comprehensible. From the perspectives of equity
and complexity, the transitional rule in section 1378 is inappropriate.
Since every S corporation continues to be eligible to adopt any
fiscal year for which a business purpose exists, it is difficult to
make a case for preserving the fiscal year of existing Subchapter
S corporations on equitable grounds. By definition, such taxpayers
had garnered a tax adv~ntage that Congress has now determined
to be inappropriate. A continuation of the benefits that those
shareholders legitimately received under prior law cannot be
justified today. On the other hand, it was obviously a complicated
matter for Congress to address the grandfathering of those benefits.
On balance, the transitional rule of section 1378 is inappropriate
and should be deleted. 261
While Congress equivocated with respect to the tax deferral
potential inherent in the selection of fiscal years, it abruptly terminated the ability of shareholders of S corporations either to affect
260. If grandfathered status is lost and the corporation does not have a
permitted year, I.R.C. § 1378 provides that the corporation no longer will be
treated as an S corporation as of the beginning of its next taxable year. That
provision raises many questions. Presumably, if a permitted year is adopted before
the end of the year in which the loss of grandfathered status occurs, the election
will not terminate at all although that is not certain from the statutory language.
If Subchapter S status is in fact lost, it is unclear whether the loss constitutes
a "termination" within I.R.C. § 1362(d); that provision does not refer to I.R.C.
§ 1378. If the event is not a "termination," then it obviously cannot be an inadvertent termination eligible for relief under I.R.C. § 1362(£). Presumably,
therefore, the regulations will treat the loss of grandfathered status as a termination and as eligible for relief.
261. For a compelling argument against all such grandfathering, see Graetz,
Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 47 (1977).
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the timing of their liability for tax on corporate income or to shift
the incidence of tax on that income to others. As examined more
fully below, 262 actual distributions by S corporations will no longer
in most instances be subject to tax. Rather, as in the taxation of
parnerships, S corporation shareholders are subject to tax on their
allocable portion of the corporate income without regard to whether
it has been distributed. In calculating each shareholder's allocable
portion of the corporate income, the Revision Act employs the rule
that previously was applicable to the allocation of Subchapter S
losses, a topic also addressed below. 263 Under new section 1377(a),
each item of S corporation income that must be separately stated,
and the residual income, is to be allocated to each shareholder on
a ratable basis determined by the number of days during the year
in which he was a shareholder and his percentage interest in the
corporation. If, under present law, a shareholder were to assign
a portion of his stock in an S corporation to a child on December
30, the transferor, not the child, would be subject to tax on all
but the last day's worth of corporate income. While the foregoing
description clearly is consistent with Congress' intent in enacting
the new provisions/54 and undoubtedly reflects the manner in which
it will be interpreted, the statutory language itself is not as
clear. Section 1366(a)(l) requires that the income of an S corporation be taxable to shareholders in their taxable year in which the
taxable year of the S corporation terminates. An individual who
disposed of his entire interest in the corporation during the taxable year would not be a shareholder on the date on which the
corporation's taxable year terminated. Nevertheless, it is quite clear
that the statute is referring to any individual who was a shareholder
at any time during the taxable year of the corporation. 265
Congress recognized that the general rule described above,
allocating corporate income ratably to each day during the corporate taxable year, would work a hardship in some cases. For
example, if a shareholder sells his stock in an arm's-length transaction in an early part of the corporation's taxable year, he will
be unable to establish a price for the stock that can reflect accurately the income of the corporation to be earned during the
balance of the year. Notwithstanding that the price established
may reflect a projected low level of earnings, the shareholder will
be subject to tax on a ratable share of the earnings derived
262. See text accompanying notes 359-85 infra.
263. See text accompanying note 291 infra.
264. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 15-16.
265. If a shareholder dies during the corporation's year, the portion of the
S corporation income attributable to the period prior to his death is includable
in the shareholder's final income tax return even though the corporation's year
does not end within that final year. I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1).
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throughout the entire year even though that amount is materially
greater than the amount taken into account in the sale. In some
situations, shareholders may be able to protect themselves from
such occurrences by providing for contingent payments in the contract of sale geared to the actual earnings of the corporation
throughout the balance of the taxable year. Obviously, however,
such agreements are unwieldy, create the potential for abuses between the parties, and are not obtainable in all events. Section
1377(a)(2), therefore, provides an alternative rule for the allocation
of items of income and expense in any year in which a shareholder
terminates his interest in the corporation. If all persons who are
shareholders in the corporation during the taxable year agree, for
the sole purpose of the allocation of corporate income, the taxable
year of the corporation shall be regarded as closed on the date
on which the termination of interest occurs. In that event, income
earned before and after the termination of interest is to be allocated
separately as if the corporation had two taxable years. The requirement that all shareholders of the S corporation concur in this
alternative method for allocating corporate income seems unnecessary. The alternative method of allocating income should have
no effect at all upon shareholders who have not altered their interests in a corporation during the taxable year. Since those individuals have no interest in the outcome of this election, it seems
unnecessary and perhaps improper to permit them to participate
in the election. It should have been sufficient for Congress to require all individuals who either completely terminated their interest in the corporation during the year or acquired stock from
such a terminating individual to consent to the election.
As drafted, the alternative method for allocating income apparently applies only in the event of a complete termination of
interest, and the Temporary Regulations confirm that
construction. 266 Evidently, however, there is little reason to bar
the application of this more flexible rule to a partial disposition
of stock by a shareholder. The difficulties in establishing a proper
purchase price on the sale of stock are just as great as they are
when the shareholder completely terminates his interest. Perhaps
in limiting the application of this provision to complete terminations, Congress was concerned about the limited possibilities of
shifting the tax on previously accrued income, or shifting accrued
losses created by the elective provision. For example, many
businesses have cyclical income patterns with substantial incomes
in one portion of the year and reduced income or even losses in

266. Temp. Reg. § 18.1377-1, 48 Fed. Reg. 3592 (1983) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 18).
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other portions of the year. In that situation, a high bracket
shareholder might wish to make a gift of stock following the low
point in the business cycle, thus obtaining a loss for the short year
for himself while shifting the income to be derived in the latter
portion of the year to his lower bracket children. If the alternative
method of allocating income is applicable only on a complete termination of interest, such careful timing of intra-family gifts can
occur only once for each shareholder in the older generation. If
partial dispositions invoked the alternative provision, such
manipulations could occur on an annual basis. Nevertheless, a
shareholder can dispose of his stock only once. It is difficult to
see what greater tax avoidance is created by a series of small,
but well timed, gifts of S corporation stock than would be produced
by a single di~position by a member of the older generation of
his entire interest, thus obtaining the entire benefit of splitting
taxable years at one time. On balance, the need to provide greater
flexibility in the allocation of income in the case of an arm's-length
sale would appear to outweigh whatever concern Congress may
· have had with respect to the shifting of income on the gift of S
corporation stock.
In contrast to Congress' careful attempts to prevent the assignment of income by transfers of stock, the Revision Act apparently
has created a major opportunity to shift the incidence of tax on
accumulated earnings and profits through non-pro rata distributions,
a possibility considered below.
b.

Special Allocations

Two aspects of partnership taxation have proven to be critical
to the tax shelter industry: the ability to specially allocate items
of income and expense, and the addition of partnership indebtedness
to the basis of the individual partners. Not too surprisingly, in
spite of Congress' general objective to conform the taxation of
S corporations to partnership taxation, the Revision Act contains
neither provision. The basis question is considered later;267 the inability to specially allocate items of corporate income and expense
is analyzed here.
In the taxation of partnerships, each item of income and expense is allocated to the partners pursuant to the terms of the
partnership agreement, including any amendments prior to the date
of filing the partnership return. 266 That single provision gives the
partnership form much of its enormous flexibility. On the other
hand, the provision has produced, at least in the past, considerable
267. See text accompanying notes 313-19 infra.
268. I.R.C. §§ 704(a) and 761(c).
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taxpayer abuse. 269 Notwithstanding its potential for abuse, the
ability to allocate specific items of partnership taxable income and
deductible expense to particular partners, in a manner that varies
from the general allocation of partnership income and expense or
from the relative capital accounts of the partners, can serve an
entirely legitimate business purpose. Perhaps the most appealing
case for permitting such an allocation occurs upon the contribution of appreciated property to an existing partnership. Assume,
for example, an existing partnership, AB, where the partnership
assets consist of $100 in cash and assume that C has become an
equal partner upon the contribution of appreciated property having a value of $50. In reality, the property contributed to the partnership by C does not have a value to the partnership of $50
because it brings with it the liability to pay federal income tax
on the element of appreciation. That liability, however, cannot be
valued accurately. The liability can be deferred indefinitely into
the future by failing to dispose of the asset and may never be incurred if the asset declines in value subsequent to its contribution
to the partnership. Accordingly, there is no accurate way that
the parties can value the property contributed by C and
appropriately reduce his interest in the partnership. Moreover, it
is entirely appropriate that C should bear the burden of taxation
with respect to the pre-contribution appreciation in the property.
If he, in fact, is given a one-third interest in the partnership because
the liability for income taxes cannot be valued, he will have
benefited from the appreciation in the value of the property. The
ideal solution is to permit the partnership to allocate to C the liability for any tax attributable to the pre-contribution appreciation
in the value of the property. Under the rules applicable to partnership taxation, such an allocation is permissible. 270 Admittedly,
the need to specially allocate gain or loss attributable to pre-contribution appreciation or depreciation is far greater in a partnership
than it is in a corporation. The need arises only if gain is not realized
on the contribution. Under partnership law, a contribution of appreciated property to a partnership does not constitute a taxable
event. 271 In the corporate context, the contribution of appreciated
property constitutes a nontaxable event only if the transaction falls
within the scope of section 351. In general terms, that nonrecognition provision is applicable only on the formation of corporations
or when the property is contributed by a shareholder who, follow269. For example, in the past, year-end tax shelter offerings sought to
allocate retroactively losses for the entire year to partners joining the venture
at the end of the taxable year. That abuse is now barred by the combined effect
of I.R.C. §§ 704(a) and 706(c)(2)(B).
270. I.R.C. § 704(c).
271. I.R.C. § 721(a).
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ing the contribution, owns eighty-percent of the outstanding stock
of the corporation. Nevertheless, just because the need to specially
allocate gain attributable to pre-contribution appreciation or
depreciation will not occur as commonly in the context of an S
corporation as it will in connection with a partnership, this does not
alter the importance of such flexibility on the occasions in which
the need does arise.
Moreover, it is not uncommon in the conduct of a small business
that the owners of the business retain a special interest in certain
of the business assets. A partner may be willing to contribute a
particular asset such as a building to the partnership for its use
during the duration of the partnership, but may demand that the
building be returned to him upon termination of the partnership.
In addition, the partner may be willing to bear the economic cost
of the deterioration of that particular asset in return for an entitlement to any gain upon its disposition. Although, in law, the
asset has become partnership property, in reality, the partner has
merely loaned the property to the partnership. There is nothing
devious about such a business arrangement and there is no reason
why the tax laws should not accommodate it. Under partnership
taxation, the depreciation in that building may be specially allocated
to the contributing partner as long as he is willing to bear the
economic deterioration of the asset through a reduction of his
capital account by the amount of the depreciation claimed. 272
Similarly, any gain on the disposition of the asset may be specially
allocated to that partner as long as the actual proceeds of sale
are also allocated to him, thereby increasing his capital account.
In this respect, partnership taxation recognizes the flexibility of
small business arrangements and conforms to their quite legitimate
and non-tax related expectations.
Under the rules applicable to S corporations, neither these nor
any other special allocations of corporate income or expense are
permissible. Under. the rule described above requiring the ratable
allocation of all items of corporate income and expense to each
shareholder, special allocations are precluded. As a result, in this
very material respect, the taxation of S. corporations varies substantially from the taxation of partnerships and is far less attractive
to taxpayers than the pattern of taxation applicable to partnerships.
The making of special allocations of items of income and expense by an S corporation would be made somewhat more complex by the inherent differences between partnerships and corporations under state law. Most special allocations, other than those
272. I.R.C. § 704(b); Orrisch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 395 (1970), affd, 476 F.2d
502 (9th Cir. 1973); and see Krane and Sheffield, Beyond Orrisch: An AUernative

View of Substantial Economic Effect Under Section 704(b) (2) Where Nonrecourse
Debt Is Involved, 60 TAXES 937 (1982).
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with respect to pre-contribution appreciation or depreciation, must
be accompanied by an underlying economic effect upon the partners in order to achieve recognition for tax purposes. For example, for partnership accounting purposes, the loss attributable to
depreciation must reduce the capital account of the partner to whom
the tax loss is allocated and that reduction in capital account, in
turn, must result in a reduction of the amount of partnership assets
to which the partner would be entitled upon a liquidation of the
partnership. Those economic adjustments are accomodated easily
under partnership law. The allocation of partnership assets upon
liquidation and adjustments to capital accounts is governed by the
partnership agreement which may be drafted in whatever manner the partners choose.
This flexibility is lacking under state corporate law. Corporate
law contemplates that upon liquidation the assets of the corporation will be distributed ratably among shares of the same class
of stock and between classes of stock as provided by the certificate
of incorporation. While in theory, even assuming that the Revision
Act had permitted different classes of stock in an S corporation,
priorities in the application of the proceeds of a liquidating corporation could be altered by annual amendments to its certificate
of incorporation, in practice such a procedure would be too unwieldy. Annual amendments to the certificate of incorporation could
be avoided if the liquidation preference, as stated in the certificate
with respect to each share of stock, were such amount as specified
by the board of directors from time to time. It is doubtful, however,
that such a provision would be enforceable today in any state. 273
The problem described, however, is a problem of flexibility of state
corporation laws and not a problem of federal income taxation.
If through either interpretation or legislative revision, state corporation laws proved sufficiently flexible to accommodate a substantial economic effect in connection with the special allocation of tax
liabilities, there is no apparent reason why the federal taxing
statute should bar such an allocation.
Responsible students of income taxation uniformly would agree
that the ability to make special allocations has been abused widely
in the past and remains a matter of concern. However, to the extent
that businesses organized in partnership form are permitted special
allocations, the same flexibility should be extended to businesses
organized in the corporate form and electing to be taxed pursuant
to Subchapter S. If Congress becomes persuaded that special alloca273. Typical state corporation statutes specify that the liquidation preference
of any class of stock must be stated in the certificate of incorporation. See, e.g.,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-201 (1979).
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tions in the partnership context should be curtailed further, it
obviously would be appropriate to extend that curtailment to S
corporations. In the interim, however, it is disappointing that Congress produced such a substantial disparity in treatment between
partnerships and the new S corporation.
c.

Allocations of Income Among Family Members

When more than one member of a family owns an interest in
any business entity, a high potential exists for shifting income
among members of that family. While in form a transaction might
appear to be a failure to act at arm's-length with a non-controlled
entity, and thus not subject to challenge, in substance it would
be .a failure to act at arm's-length with a family member and would
constitute a disguised gift and an impermissible assignment of income. For example, in a partnership or Subchapter S corporation,
a high bracket partner or shareholder who is also a key employee
may fail to obtain adequate compensation for his services. The
amount of the shortage remains the income of the entity to be
allocated among all of the owners, including lower bracket members
of the employee's family, and thus, the overall tax on the family
unit is reduced. In order to blunt this potential for tax avoidance,
the statutory provisions governing both the taxation of partnerships and Subchapter S corporations have contained specific provisions dealing with the allocation of income in such circumstances.
Under the prior law applicable to Subchapter S corporations,
the Commissioner was specifically authorized to reallocate
dividends, whether actual or constructive, among shareholders who
are members of the same family group if he determined that such
reallocation was necessary in order to reflect the value of services
rendered to a corporation by those family member shareholders. 274
Thus, if one shareholder-employee received either excessive or inadequate compensation, the liability for tax on the Subchapter S
income could be allocated either to or from that shareholder. Any
amount reallocated continued to be treated as a dividend, and not
as compensation for services, to the affected shareholder.
The statute did not address directly the possibility that
dividends themselves might be allocated in a manner not properly
reflective of stock interests of the shareholders in Subchapter S
corporations. Presumably, any such disproportionate distribution
of income could have been regarded as a gift under general principles of taxation. The regulations, however, specifically provided
that should a shareholder receive less than his pro rata share of
274.

Former I.R.C. § 1375(c).
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a corporate distribution, a proper portion of the amount distributed
to members of his family could be reallocated to him for income
tax purposes. 275
The rule applicable to family partnerships is considerably narrower. While reallocation among Subchapter S shareholders was
authorized regardless of how the stock was obtained, reallocation
among family partnerships is authorized under section 704(e)(2) only
when a partnership interest has been transferred from one partner
to another. When such a transfer has occurred, the Commissioner
is authorized to reallocate income only when the transferor of the
partnership interest has received inadequate compensation for services or an inadequate return on invested capital. Finally, the allocation may be made only between the transferor and the transferee
of a partnership interest. Thus, under a literal application of the
statute, the Commissioner is not authorized to reallocate income
should a low bracket donee-family member receive excessive compensation, nor is he authorized to reallocate income in the event
a high bracket taxpayer receives inadequate compensation but no
partnership interests have been transferred by that partner to
another. Of course, the Commissioner's authority to reallocate income in the family partnership context may be broader than the
specific authority granted by section 704(e)(2). While in a clear or
abusive case, the Commissioner could be expected to prevail in
an attack upon the allocation of income among family members
in a partnership, in practice arrangements falling outside the scope
of section 704 have obtained substantial insulation from
reallocation. 276 On the other hand, the statutory family partnership provision is broader than prior law applicable to Subchapter
S corporations because it specifically authorizes a reallocation of
income in the event the proportion of partnership income in excess
of reasonable compensation for services (the return on partnership
capital), is allocated disproportionately to the donee. Again, the
statute does not authorize an allocation in the event partnership
income is allocated disproportionately to the transferor relative
to his capital interest.
New section 1366(e) continues the Commissioner's authority to
reallocate income among family members owning stock in S corporations in a somewhat strange synthesis of prior law provisions
governing partnerships and Subchapter S corporations. Under section 1366(e), if an individual who is a member of an S corporation
shareholder's family receives inadequate compensation from the
corporation for either performing services or furnishing capital,
the Commissioner may adjust the items taken into account by the
275.
276.

Treas. Reg. § 1.137~3(d) (1960).
McKEE, supra note 73 at , 14.05.
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family members in order to reflect the value of the services or
capital. In contrast to the partnership provisions, but following
prior law applicable to Subchapter S corporations, section 1366(e)
applies whether or not there has been a transfer of a stock interest between family members. However, in an extension of prior
law governing Subchapter S corporations, the provision is expressly applicable even if the family member employee is not himself
a stockholder in the S corporation. Thus, if inadequate compensation is paid to a nonshareholder employee, S corporation income
may be reallocated by the Commissioner to him and away from
shareholder members of his family.
Reallocations of S corporation income are permitted under section 1366(e) when there is a failure to pay either adequate compensation for services or an adequate return on "furnished capital."
In one important and highly questionable respect, this provision
appears to go further than either its Subchapter S or partnership
predecessors. Apparently, section 1366(e) is intended to apply not
only to inadequate return on an equity investment of capital in
the corporation, but also to inadequate return on capital lent to
the corporation. Thus, if a nonshareholder member of a
shareholder's family loans money to the corporation but does not
obtain an adequate rate of interest, the statute apparently grants
the Commissioner authority to make an allocation of income from
the shareholder members of his family to the family member
creditor. In isolation, this provision is as reasonable as is granting
the Commissioner authority to make a reallocation in the event
of an inadequate return on labor. However, the authority of the
Commissioner to, in effect, increase the rate of interest payable
on a debt obligation must be viewed in context of the extended
battle over the form of the regulations to section 385. 277 At this
writing, the final form that those regulations will take remains
in doubt. As originally issued, the regulations gave the Commissioner extensive power to adjust the rate of interest payable on
corporate debt obligations through the creation of original issue
discount.Z78 If that aspect of the regulations survives, it should be
the exclusive remedy available to the Commissioner in the event
of an inadequate rate of interest and it would be improper to grant
a further, and slightly different, authority under the provisions
applicable to Subchapter S. On the other hand, if the final regulations under section 385 do not grant the Commissioner this authority, it would seem highly questionable to grant the Commissioner
similar authority, but only with respect to S corporations under
the very general language of section 1366(e). At present, therefore,
277.
278.

See note 65 supra.
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (1980).
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the scope of this new provision as applicable to loans from either
stockholders or members of their families remains in doubt.
Somewhat surprisingly, but in common with partnership taxation, the new S corporation provision is not applicable in the event
the family member employee receives excessive compensation for
services or an excessive return on capital. It does not necessarily
follow, of course, that if one shareholder receives excessive compensation, other shareholders must have received either an inadequate
compensation or an inadequate return on capital. It is entirely conceivable that the Commissioner would be able to demonstrate that
one shareholder employee had obtained excessive compensation
for services but that the corporation could demonstrate that no
other shareholder employee received inadequate compensation and
that the residual return on capital was entirely adequate.
The absence of a specific reference in the statute to the possibility that an employee of the corporation may receive excessive
compensation creates troublesome problems of interpretation. The
Commissioner has general authority under section 162 to disallow
any deduction for excessive compensation for services and there
is no reason to suppose that this general authority does not extend to S corporations. Should the Commissioner disallow such a
deduction to an S corporation, the effect would be to increase the
income immediately subject to tax of all of the shareholders of
the corporation, not merely members of the family of the employee
who received the excessive compensation. Such a result would be
strangely at variance with the specific authority granted the Commissioner under section 1366(e) in the event of an inadequate compensation. Moreover, in a corporation subject to the regular tax,
such a disallowance has no effect upon a shareholder employee
who receives excessive compensation. He remains subject to the
same amount of income tax, albeit with respect to dividend rather
than salary income. In an S corporation, however, the reclassification of a portion of the salary as a distribution of cash with respect
to stock normally will have no immediate income tax consequences
other than a reduction of the shareholder's tax basis for his stock.
Thus, the effect of such a disallowance would be to convert the
cash distribution to the excessively compensated shareholder from
immediate ordinary income into a deferred capital gain while
penalizing the other shareholders of the corporation in a manner
more harsh than Congress apparently sanctioned under section
1366(e). One solution to this anomaly would be to construe new
section 1366(e) broadly to grant the Commissioner authority to make
a reallocation of S corporation income in the event of excessive
compensation as well as in the event of inadequate compensation.
The validity of a regulation so construing the new provision,
however, would be dubious in light of the express statutory
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language and its origin in prior law, which clearly limited reallocations to the payment of inadequate compensation. It would seem,
therefore, that section 1366(e) should be amended to extend the
scope of the Commissioner's authority to the payment of excessive
compensation with respect to labor or capital, as well as inadequate compensation.
If a reallocation is required under section 1366(e), it is not entirely clear how the adjustment is to be made. The statute provides
only that the Commissioner is authorized to "make such adjustments in the items taken into account by [the family members]
as may be necessary in order to reflect the value of such services
or capital." Logic would suggest that inadequate compensation for
services or inadequate interest on borrowed capital should be corrected by imputing income to the individual and a correlative deduction to the members of his family. Indeed, when the individual who
is compensated inadequately is not a shareholder, it is difficult to
see what other solution would be rational. Section 1366(e), however,
does not appear to sanction such an approach. Rather, the provision contemplates a reallocation of specific items of corporate income and, perhaps, expense among the family members. This plainly
less rational approach appears borrowed from the partnership rule
that authorizes a reallocation of distributive shares in the event
of inadequate compensation. 219 That partnership approach, however,
is entirely unsuited to an S corporation in which special allocations are not permitted and all items of income and expense are
allocated ratably to shareholders in proportion to their
stockholdings. As a result, section 1366(e) will require either
creative regulatory interpretation or, preferably, legislative
correction.
Both Committee Reports contain the statement that the Commissioner has authority under this section to adjust the timing
of compensation. ~ Section 1366(e), as enacted, does not reflect Congress' intent to give the Commissioner such authority inasmuch
as it grants him power to make adjustments to reflect more
accurately the "value" of services or capital. Furthermore, such
authority has no precedent under either the partnership tax provisions or the prior law governing S corporations. However, the
Treasury might, based upon this comment in the legislative history,
adopt regulations interpreting the Commissioner's authority under
section 1366(e) to include adjustments to the taxable year in which
compensation must be taken into income by a member of a
shareholder's family and deducted by the shareholders.
2

279.
280.
at 17.

I.R.C. § 704(e) (2).
HOUSE REPORT, supra

note 22, at 16; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22,
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The Commissioner has explicit authority to deal with matters
of timing under a number of other sections of the Code. Even if
the reference to timing in the legislative history were held to
justify, as a general matter, regulations concerning timing under
section 1366(e), it seems highly unlikely, absent express statutory
authorization, that the reference could justify granting the Commissioner broader authority under section 1366(e) than he has under
the other provisions. Moreover, in most cases the Commissioner
does not need additional authority. Obviously, the only power a
regulation concerning timing could give the Commissioner is the
power to require that a particular item be included in income or
deducted in a different taxable year from that in which it is actually
received or paid. If the payment of compensation were accelerated
so that the family member received compensation prior to actually
rendering services or furnishing capital to the corporation, the Commissioner could require an adjustment to "clearly reflect income"
pursuant to his general authority under section 446. Similarly, if
payment were deferred, the employee or investor would have
received inadequate compensation in the earlier year thus invoking the rules of section 1366(e). Furthermore, new section 267(f),
considered below, 281 specifically deals with the deductibility of
expenses paid to related persons by an S corporation. Clearly, Congress did not intend to give the Commissioner authority to make
an adjustment under section 1366(e) that would conflict with the
express statutory rules of section 267(f).
The reference to timing in the Committee Reports might be
construed by the Treasury as authorizing the Commissioner to adjust the time of the deductibility of payment of compensation to
family members if such adjustment would change the shareholder
entitled to the deduction. For example, a high-bracket shareholder
might arrange for the payment for services performed by a lowbracket family member to be made early in the corporation's taxable year, and subsequently make a gift of his stock to a low-bracket
taypayer (either the family member employee or someone else).
Under section 1377(a),282 the transferor may, with the consent of
all other shareholders, elect to treat the transfer as closing the
corporation's current taxable year as to himself and the transferee
so that he will get full benefit of the prepaid deduction. Without
this election, the deduction would be prorated daily over the corporation's actual taxable year, and the transferee would benefit
from that part of the deduction corresponding to the fraction of
the year during which he owned the stock. Such tax manipulation
should not be permissible. However, because this device would not
281.
282.

See text accompanying notes 283-87 infra.
See text immediately following note 265 supra.

1983]

SUBCHAPTER S REVISION ACT

657

alter the S corporation's actual taxable year in which the deduction was claimed, the Commissioner arguably may lack the authority
to challenge the accelerated deduction under general accounting
principles such as section 446(b). Thus, the Treasury may claim
the authority under the language in the Committee Reports to alter
the timing of income or deductions in the event of a transfer of
S corporation stock.
d_

Related Taxpayer Transactions

Section 267, one of the oldest tax avoidance provisions in the
Code, generally denies the normal tax benefit of two specified transactions when the parties to the transaction fall within the strictly
defined categories of related persons described in section 267(b).
The two transactions affected by the section are losses from the
disposition of property and deductions for interest or other business
expenses unless the expenditure is actually paid, or otherwise includable in the income of the recipient, within two and a half months
following the close of the year in which a deduction for the expenditure is claimed. There is no question whatsoever that section
267 is badly in need of revision. 283 It was drafted in a far simpler
era in which the attack against tax avoidance had not become nearly
as finely tuned as it is today. Thus, the list of relationships contained in section 267(b) is incomplete, particularly with the absence
of any reference to partnerships, and the definitions of the transactions subject to section 267 are relatively liberal. The two-andone-half month tolerance permits a one-year deferral of income;
a deduction for an accrued expenditure is not disturbed if the
recipient is subject to tax on the amount in the following year.
Unfortunately, Congress has made section 267 worse. New
section 267(f) contains a special rule governing the deduction of
interest and other expenses by an S corporation when paid to a
defined category of related persons. Under this new provision, an
S corporation will not be permitted a deduction for interest or
expenses deductible under sections 162 or 212 prior to the day
upon which the amount of the expenditure is included in the gross
income of the related person- The only difference between this
special rule and the general rule of section 267 is the elimination
of the two-and-a-half month leeway and, thus, the deferral of income for one year. There should be no objection to the elimination
of this deferral possibility; it is entirely consistent with the new
S corporation provisions governing the adoption of fiscal years.
On the other hand, it represents the very worst in legislative draft283. See Coven, Affinity Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code: A Case
Study in Nonsimplification, 45 TENN. L. REV. 557 (1978).
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ing to adopt this new rule only for S corporations. Whatever
substantive merit such a new provision might have is outweighed
enormously by the increased complexity of having two similar, but
slightly different, provisions attacking the same tax avoidance
technique when undertaken by different taxpayers. Quite obviously,
if Congress is dissatisfied with section 267, the entire provision
should be overhauled in its application to all taxpayers.
The new provision contains a second change from the general
format of section 267. New subsection (f) contains its own definition of related taxpayers and that definition is vastly broader than
any of the definitions contained under the general rule of section
267(b). 284 Thus, the S corporation is regarded as related to any person who owns two percent of its stock or to any person related
to such a shareholder within the meaning of section 267(b) or section 707(b)(l)(A). 285 Evidently, the two percent stock ownership is
to be computed without the application of any stock attribution
rules. While section 267 contains such rules in subsection (c), those
rules are applicable only for the purposes of subsection (b), not
subsection (f). On the other hand, in determining whether an entity
is related to such a two percent shareholder within the meaning
of subsection (b), presumably, the attribution rules of subsection
(c) are applicable. If so, new subsection (f) creates a provision of
enormous scope. For example, if the brother of a two percent
shareholder in an S corporation owns fifty-one percent of the stock
of a second corporation, that corporation is regarded as related
to the S corporation.
In addition, the S corporation is regarded as related to all of
the individuals or entities to whom it would be regarded as related
under the general rule of section 267(b). 286 In general, however,
all of the subsection (b) relationships will also fall within the special
rule of subsection (f). It should be noted that section 267 is rendered
unnecessarily confusing by this use of two overlapping sets of relationship definitions, but that would merely seem the natural
consequence of the highly undesirable creation of a special rule
governing S corporations.
It would seem excessively harsh to define a two percent
shareholder of an S corporation as a related person for the purposes of this new provision, particularly if the definition of related
person is to be expanded to include all persons related to such

284. Under I.R.C. § 267(b), corporations are regarded only as related to
shareholders owning 50% or more of their stock. Under the similar rule applicable
to partnerships, a partnership is regarded only as related to a 50% partner.I.R.C.
§ 707(b)(l).
285. I.R.C. § 267(0(2).
286. I.R.C. § 267(0(2)(c).
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a stockholder. In general, the holder of only two percent of the
stock of a corporation will be a mere employee who has received
compensatory stock and whose interests are quite unrelated to
those of the majority stockholders. The tax avoidance potential
in accruing unpaid salary due to such individuals would seem to
be far outweighed by the enormous complexity of tracing the section 267(b) relationships of such a minor stockholder. While the
tax avoidance potential of S corporations may be greater with
respect to accrued items than is presented by most of the relationships described in section 267, the two percent requirement is too
far out of line with preexisting law. Such extreme fine tuning of
tax avoidance provisions rarely is justified in light of the complexity they create. It would have been preferable for Congress to have
been content to disallow deductions for accrued expenses between
S corporations and shareholders having a substantial economic interest in the corporation. Section 1563(e), for example, employs a
relatively extreme five percent de minimus rule in attributing the
ownership of stock. If Congress were to insist upon the use of a
two percent test for the purpose of defining a shareholder who
is related to the S corporation, it should at least eliminate the provision that expands that relationship by including other entities
or individuals related to a shareholder as minor as a two percent
shareholder. Such an extension of the scope of the defined relationships should be limited to substantial shareholders.
By way of contrast, the other substantive transaction governed
by section 267, the disallowance of losses on the sale of property
among related persons, is extended to S corporations without the
special modifications contained in new section 267(f). The category
of relationships under subsection (b) has been expanded by the
inclusion of S corporations and other entities but only in the
presence of fifty percent overlapping ownership. 287
There is one desired change in prior law that the Revision Act
did not make. Under section 1311, in a variety of tightly defined
circumstances, the general statute of limitations on both refunds
and deficiencies is waived. In general, the provision is designed
to prevent a double inclusion in income, or a double deduction,
when an adjustment to tax liability is made but the usual statute
of limitations bars making a correlative adjustment. For no
apparent reason, S corporations and their shareholders have never
been brought within the scope of this provision.288 As a result, the
inequity that section 1311 is designed to prevent can, and occa-

287. I.R.C. § 267(b)(10) (partnerships), (11) (otherS corporations) and (12) (other
corporations).
288. I.R.C. § 1313(c). By contrast, trusts and their beneficiaries, and part·
ners, are included.
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sionally does, occur in the context of S corporations. For example,
should the Commissioner successfully contend that a corporation
was not an S corporation for a year in which it had not made any
actual distribution to its shareholders but they had nonetheless
included all of the corporate income in their individual returns,
the shareholders plainly should be entitled to a refund of tax in
order to prevent the double inclusion of an item in income. Nevertheless, if the statute of limitations for claiming refunds of tax
has expired, that refund cannot be obtained and the mitigation
provision of section 1311 will not be of any assistance. While the
new relief provisions, described below, 289 permitting limited tax
free distributions following the termination of a Subchapter S election at least permit shareholders to withdraw from the corporation
the amount upon which they have been subject to tax, in many
instances that relief will not be available because the corporation
will neither have sufficient cash reserves to make the distribution
nor wish to incur that amount of indebtedness. Moreover, such
a distribution will not compensate for what would in effect amount
to the prepayment of a tax liability by several years.
V.

LOSSES

For many taxpayers the most favorable aspect of a Subchapter
S corporation was that a net loss incurred at the corporate level,
like a net profit, would pass through to the shareholders and could
be used by them to offset unrelated income in their individual tax
returns. 290 Unfortunately, this feature of Subchapter S corporations
under prior law was subject to a series of technical and highly
restrictive provisions that, in far too many cases, caused the loss
of the pass-through benefit that Congress intended. Indeed, the
case law under this provision was a virtual chamber of horrors.
The newS corporation rules eliminate many, but by no means all,
of the unsatisfactory features of prior law.

A. Prior Law
Under prior law, a net operating loss incurred by a Subchapter
S corporation was prorated over each day in the taxable year and
allocated to all shareholders during the corporation's year. 291 Thus,
in sharp contrast to prior law provisions governing the allocation
of Subchapter S income, the benefit of operating losses could not
be shifted by a transfer of stock.
·
289.
290.
291.

See text accompanying notes 423-27 infra.
Former I.R.C. § 1374.
Former I.R.C. § 1374(c)(l).
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As in the case of the taxation of partnerships,292 the losses that
could be claimed by shareholders in a Subchapter S corporation
could not exceed the amount of their investment in the
corporation. 293 Thus, losses could not be claimed in excess of the
sum of a shareholder's tax basis in his Subchapter S corporation
stock and in any indebtedness of the corporation held by the
stockholder. Losses allocated to a shareholder were applied first
in reduction of the basis of his stock and thereafter in reduction
of the basis of any indebtedness. Quite unlike partnership taxation, however, losses in excess of that amount were forfeited permanently. Although the basis limitation also applies to partnership losses on an annual basis, excess losses incurred in any year
could be claimed by a partner in future years when his basis was
restored either by partnership profits or by further investments. 294
No such loss carryover, however, was available to a shareholder
in a Subchapter S corporation. 295 Moreover, the likelihood of
operating losses exceeding shareholders' bases in Subchapter S
corporations was far greater than in partnerships. In a major difference from the pattern of taxing partnerships, debt incurred at
the entity level by a Subchapter S corporation did not cause an
increase in the shareholder's basis. Thus, a corporation that leveraged its operations with outside indebtedness could easily incur
operating losses in excess of the shareholders' investment, but those
losses could never be claimed by its shareholders. Moreover, a Subchapter S corporation was denied the ability to carry operating
losses over to other years of the corporation. 296 Thus, profits earned
in future years, in effect a recovery of nondeductible losses, would
be fully taxable to shareholders. In the taxation of partnerships,
this inequity is eliminated substantially by increasing the basis
of a partner's interest in the partnership by an allocable portion
of any indebtedness incurred at the entity level.297 As a result, nearly all losses incurred by a partnership may be deducted currently
by its partners.
Furthermore, a shareholder could lose basis in a Subchapter
S corporation in ways other than by claiming operating losses. For
example, if the Subchapter S corporation was formed in a transaction subject to the provisions of section 351 and in the exchange
the corporation assumed liabilities of the business in an amount
that exceeded the aggregate basis of properties contributed to the
corporation, the shareholder would obtain a zero basis for his stock
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

I.R.C. § 704(d).
Former I.R.C. § 137 4(c)(2).
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(d)(1) (1960).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1374-l(b)(2) (1963).
Former I.R.C. § 1373(d)(1).
I.R.C. §§ 722 and 752(a).
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in the corporation even though the value of the assets transferred
vastly exceeded the amount of the liabilities assumed. 298 As a result,
the shareholder would not be able to claim operating losses incurred
by the corporation until such future time as his basis in the corporate stock increased. In addition, if the Subchapter S stock
became worthless during a taxable year, presumably because of
operating losses, the Subchapter S shareholders could be denied
the benefit of losses attributable to the portion of the corporation's taxable year subsequent to the date on which the stock
became worthless. In a questionable decision, 299 the Tax Court held
that because worthlessness is treated as a sale or exchange of the
stock under section 165(g), it must be treated as a disposition of
stock for purposes of Subchapter S as well, thus terminating the
shareholder's entitlement to further losses. As a result, a portion
of the ordinary loss sustained during the year was converted into
a capital loss on the constructive disposition of the Subchapter
S stock.
While income of a Subchapter S corporation increased the basis
of a shareholder's stock, thus restoring his eligibility to claim future
losses, no provision of prior law allowed for recovery of the basis
of indebtedness eroded by losses.300 Thus, a subsequent retirement
of indebtedness produced a gain to the stockholder. That result
appeared particularly harsh when the funds used to retire the indebtedness were attributable to current earnings that were fully
subject to tax to the shareholder as a constructive dividend attributable to undistributed taxable income. 301
The loss pass-through was limited to operating losses. Capital
losses incurred by the corporation did not pass through to
shareholders; nor did they reduce the amount of the corporate taxable income that was taxed to the shareholders. On the other hand,
Subchapter S corporations were entitled to carry capital losses
forward to be applied against capital gains incurred in future
years. 302

B. Under the Revision Act
1.

In General

Under new sections 1366(a) and 1377(a), losses are allocated to
298. I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (d)(1). See Wiebusch v. Comm'r, 59 T.C. 777,
aff'd, 487 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
299. Abdalla v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 697 (1978).
300. Former I.R.C. § 1376.
301. See Cornelius v. Comm'r, 494 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1974).
302. In these respects, a Subchapter S corporation was treated like any
other corporation. I.R.C. §§ 1211 and 1212.
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S corporation shareholders pursuant to the same daily proration
formula that is applicable to the allocation of S corporation income
(and which under prior law was applicable to the allocation of
operating losses). As noted above in connection with the allocation of S corporation income, the new law does not provide clearly
that losses may be allocated to an S corporation shareholder who
disposes of all his stock during the taxable year although prior
law was explicit on the point.303 Nevertheless, the legislative history
to the Revision Act apparently contemplates such an allocation 304
and there is no indication that Congress intended any change in
this respect. Because new section 1366(a) requires the allocation
of specific items of income and expense, all such items incurred
by an S corporation, including capital losses, are now allocated to
S corporation shareholders. As under prior law, losses allocated
to a shareholder are applied first in reduction of the basis for his
stock in the corporation 305 and thereafter in reduction of the
adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the S corporation held by
the shareholder. 306 Although any loss in excess of that amount incurred during the taxable year may not be claimed by the taxpayer
in that year, 307 in contrast to prior law, that excess loss is not
forfeited permanently. New section 1366(d)(2) adopts the rule applicable to partnership taxation and provides that any loss disallowed to a shareholder because it exceeds his aggregate basis
in the S corporation stock and debt may be carried forward and
claimed as a loss by him in a future year in which his basis has
been increased either by corporate income allocable to him or by
a contribution to capital.
In addition, Congress anticipated that the new ability to carry
forward losses could result in the carry-over of unused losses to
a taxable year of the corporation in which the S corporation election had terminated. A forfeiture of losses in that manner would
seem particularly inequitable when the termination of Subchapter
S status was not desired by the affected shareholder and perhaps
occurred without his knowledge. That possibility quite commonly
occurs when the termination results from the corporation ceasing
to qualify as a small business corporation, in which event (under
present law) the Selection terminates upon that date. To minimize
the possibility of such a forfeiture of losses, section 1366(d)(3) provides that the unused loss can be claimed by the shareholder as
a loss incurred on the last day of the so-called "post-termination
303.
304.
at 17.
305.
306.
307.

Former I.R.C. § 1374(c)(2)(A).
note 22, at 16; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22,

HOUSE REPORT, supra

I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(B).
I.R.C. § 1367(b)(2)(A).
I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1).
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transition period" ("PTTP") to the extent of the shareholder's basis
in the corporation's stock on that day even though the Subchapter
S election has been terminated. This grace period for the claiming
of carried over losses, which is used for other purposes under the
new law as well, should eliminate much of the harshness incurred
under prior law upon involuntary terminations of Subchapter S
elections. Unfortunately, the definition of the "post-termination transition period" contained in section 1377(b) is ambiguous and does
not appear to conform to the description of the provision contained
in the legislative history. As a result, it is not entirely clear how
the grace period is intended to operate. Since these ambiguities
are more significant with respect to post-termination corporate
distributions, the PTTP is analyzed in that context below. 308
The seeming unfairness under prior law of prohibiting the
restoration of the basis of indebtedness in a Subchapter S corporation that had been eroded by losses has been reversed. Under section 1367(b)(2)(B), if the basis of any such indebtedness has been
reduced through the claiming of losses, any increase in basis to
which the shareholder is entitled must first be allocated to a restoration of the basis of the indebtedness. Only after the basis of the
indebtedness has been restored to its initial level will the basis
in the shareholder's stock be increased. While this provision is properly designed to mitigate the harshness of prior law, it will require regulatory elaboration. For example, further advances by
the shareholder to the corporation presumably will be ignored in
determining when the basis of the indebtedness has been returned
to its initial level. Similarly, it may be presumed that if the
shareholder no longer owns the indebtedness at the end of a year
in which he is entitled to an increase in basis, the increase in basis
will be allocable to the shareholder's stock and neither lost nor
allocated to the transferee of the indebtedness.
In most instances, a shareholder either will be indifferent to
whether the basis of his stock or of his indebtedness is increased
because the basis in either security will support the claiming of
losses, or he will prefer the rule specified in section 1367 requiring
a restoration first of the basis of the indebtedness. Notwithstanding the liberalization of the rules governing the consequences of
distributions from S corporations, 309 in many situations a greater
amount can be withdrawn from the corporation free of tax upon
the retirement of indebtedness than by a distribution with respect
to stock. 310 On the other hand, there may be situations in which
308. See text accompanying notes 423-27 infra.
309. See text accompanying notes 359-91 infra.
310. That would be the case, for example, if an S corporation had accumulated earnings and profits and sought to make a distribution in excess of
accumulated Subchapter S income.
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a taxpayer would prefer a restoration of the basis of his stock to
a restoration of the basis of his debt. For example, a loss on the
worthlessness or disposition of stock in an S corporation is eligible for the ordinary loss treatment provided by section 1244 but
a loss on a disposition of indebtedness is not. Section 1244 treatment is barred for losses attributable to increases in the basis of
stock, including increases in the basis of S corporation stock attributable to the allocation of corporate profit to the shareholder. 311
Section 1244 treatment, however, may be available to the extent
of the initial basis of S corporation stock, even though that initial
basis has been reduced by losses but subsequently restored to its
initial level. In such a situation, a shareholder may wish to dispose
of indebtedness before a restoration in basis occurs.
A further problem of construction is presented by the making
of a donative transfer of both S corporation stock and indebtedness.
Post-transfer income of the S corporation will produce an increase
in basis to the donee, but it is not clear whether that increase
in basis is to be allocated to the donated stock or the donated debt.
The basis of the indebtedness would have been reduced by prior
S corporation losses, but, at the time of the reduction, it was not
the donee's indebtedness. The unfairness that this new provision
addresses is not altered by whether the reduction in the basis of
the indebtedness occurred while the debt was held by its present
owner or by a predecessor in interest. Accordingly, the relief that
new section 1367(b)(2)(B) extends should be available when the taxpayer holds indebtedness, the basis of which is determined by the
basis it had in the hands of his transferor, if that basis was reduced
by losses allocated to that transferor. It is not entirely clear,
however, whether the Treasury would consider such a regulation
consistent with the statutory language which refers to a reduction in "the shareholder's basis." 312
The Revision Act also has coordinated the loss pass-through
with the worthless stock loss provision contained in section 165(g).
Under section 1367(b)(3), losses allocated to an S corporation
shareholder for any taxable year in which the stock of the corporation becomes worthless may be claimed by the shareholder
without regard to the worthlessness loss. Any basis in the stock
remaining after reduction attributable to those losses may then
be claimed as a worthless stock loss.
2.

Effect of Corporate Debt

The Revision Act has eliminated many of the unsatisfactory
311.
312.

Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(d)-2(a) (1960).
I.R.C. § 1367(b)(2)(B).
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features of prior law and in many material respects conformed the
new S corporation provisions to partnership law, but in one highly
significant respect, the Act perpetuates a distinction between the
taxation of S corporations and partnerships. As under prior law,
the shareholders of S corporations are not permitted to increase
the basis for their stock in the corporation by virtue of borrowing
at the corporate level. As a result, losses incurred at the corporate
level cannot be claimed by S corporation shareholders in an amount
in excess of their basis in corporate stock and indebtedness, an
amount approximating their investment in the corporation enlarged
by the net amount of any income allocated to the shareholders
but not distributed to them.
This limitation upon the total loss that an S corporation
shareholder may claim to the amount of his investment in the corporation may have made eminently good sense under prior law
because the entity characteristics of the Subchapter S corporation predominated. Since the deductibility of a loss sustained by
a shareholder on an investment in a regular business corporation
is limited to the amount of his investment in the corporation, 313
it may have seemed logical to impose a similar limit upon losses
incurred by a shareholder in a corporation electing under Subchapter S. In fact, it might seem logical in any context to limit
the tax benefit of any loss attributable to an activity to the amount
currently invested in that activity. Because by definition the taxpayer cannot sustain a greater economic loss, there might seem
little reason to extend a tax benefit with respect to a greater
amount. Permitting taxpayers to claim a tax benefit attributable
to the loss or expenditure of borrowed funds, however, does not
create an artificial tax loss in excess of the taxpayer's actual
economic loss. Rather, the question is one of the timing of claiming tax deductions or losses. Under long established rules of income tax accounting, the point in time at which an individual is
entitled, indeed compelled, to claim the tax benefit of an expenditure is wholly unaffected by whether the funds used to make
the expenditure were borrowed. 314 Similarly, a taxpayer's basis in
property is unaffected by the source of the funds used for the purchase, even if those funds were borrowed under an arrangement
that did not involve the personal liability of the taxpayer, for example, a nonrecourse loan. 315 Under normal circumstances, that is,
313. I.R.C. § 165(b).
314. The methods of accounting permitted by I.R.C. § 446(c) do not make
that fact relevant. The Supreme Court applied this principle expressly in Crane
v. United States, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), even though the borrowing was connected
directly to the deductions in question by a mortgage on the property being
depreciated.
315. Crane so held. Id.
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absent deliberate tax manipulation, these general principles produce a correct tax result. The economic detriment is suffered by
the taxpayer at the time the expenditure is made or the purchased
property depreciates and it is proper that this economic detriment
should be reflected in a contemporaneous reduction in income tax
liability. If the taxpayer were denied a tax benefit at the time the
expenditure was made and required to defer claiming the deduction until the indebtedness was repaid, the computation of taxable income would become disassociated from the taxpayer's
economic change in position. Moreover, the taxpayer would obtain
a substantial measure of control over the timing of his tax deductions by choosing to repay the indebtedness in a year in which
its tax consequences would be most advantageous.
In a highly technical sense, the normal application of these
general timing and basis rules is not affected by limiting the losses
that may be claimed by a partner or S corporation shareholder
to the basis of his investment. In reality, however, if the basis
of that investment is not enlarged by borrowings at the entity
level, the normal consequence of these rules will be altered. Deductions that could be claimed currently if the business were conducted
as a sole proprietorship will be deferred because of the basis
limitation.
In the taxation of partnerships, this disruption of the normal
timing and basis rules is avoided. The amount of any borrowing
at the partnership level increases the basis of the partners' interest in the partnership, thereby permitting a current tax benefit
from losses and expenditures. Consequently, conducting a leveraged
business operation in partnership form is not penalized. The
possibility of a windfall tax loss might be created if the partnership did not in fact repay the indebtedness. In that event, the
ultimate economic loss would fall upon the creditor rather than
the partners who claimed the tax benefit. That possibility is
eliminated, however, by a proper application of the rules governing cancellation of indebtedness income. To the extent that the
indebtedness is not repaid, the partnership, and thereby the partners, become subject to tax on the amount not repaid. In effect,
the tax benefit from the prior deductions is recaptured. 316
Admittedly, other systems for accounting for indebtedness could
be devised; whether they would be superior is debatable. Until
such a different system is generally adopted, however, the treatment of indebtedness under the taxing system should be neutral
with respect to the form of business enterprise. It is highly
316. In the partnership context, the proper computation of this tax was
confused by the decision in Stackhouse v. United States, 441 F.2d 465 (5th Cir.
1971). Nevertheless, it is clear that such a cancellation of indebtedness should
produce income under I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). See McKEE, supra note 73, at , 9.06[2].
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undesirable for the taxing system to treat indebtedness differently
depending upon whether the business is incorporated, if the tax
is not computed at the entity level. Yet, that is the result reached
by continuing the prohibition against adding the amount of borrowings at the entity level tc the basis of S corporation stock. As
a result of this disparity in treatment, a major difference remains
between the taxation of partnerships and S corporations which
is inconsistent with the general objectives of the Revision Act.
The primary consequence of this restriction on the addition of corporate borrowings to the basis of stock in S corporations is that
the shareholders will not be entitled to obtain the benefits of the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System provided by section 168 if their
investment is materially leveraged at the corporate level. It is difficult to understand why Congress would wish to withhold that
investment stimulation from S corporations while granting it to
all others.
The above described treatment of indebtedness under our taxing system has not been subject to extensive criticism when the
borrower incurred personal liability for the repayment of the loan.
When the loan is without recourse to the personal assets of the
borrower, however, the propriety of the normal timing and basis
rules has been questioned. It is not entirely clear whether this
reevaluation of the role of nonrecourse indebtedness is in response
to a perceived difference in principle between loans for which the
debtor is personally liable and those for which he is not, or is in
response to the greater opportunities for abuse and tax manipulation when personal liability does not exist. 317 Regardless of the rationale, Congress and the Treasury view nonrecourse indebtedness
with growing suspicion. Corporate shareholders, as a matter of
state law, do not incur personal liability for corporate borrowings;
from the perspective of the shareholder all such borrowings resemble nonrecourse indebtedness. That view of corporate borrowings,
however, does not justify treating the shareholders of S corporations differently from partners in partnerships that incur
nonrecourse indebtedness. The ability of all taxpayers to obtain
tax benefits attributable to the expenditure of funds obtained in
a nonrecourse borrowing is restricted by the "at risk" rules of section 465, which was adopted in response to growing abuses of

317. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Tufts v. Comm'r, __ U.S. __ , 103
S. Ct. 1826 (1983) eliminated one such tax abuse by holding that, for purposes
of I.R.C. §§ 1001(b) and 752, the amount realized upon disposition of property
subject to a nonrecourse mortgage is the full amount of the outstanding indebtedness, even though the fair market value of the property on the date of
disposition was less than the indebtedness.
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nonrecourse indebtedness by the tax shelter industry. While the
"at risk" rules should be applicable to the shareholders of S corporations to the same extent that they are applicable to partners,
there is no justification for subjecting S corporation shareholders
to an additional and far stricter rule.
Moreover, it is not consistent with the financial realities of the
closely held corporation automatically to regard corporate borrowings as being in the nature of nonrecourse indebtedness. A substantial amount of such borrowing is secured through the personal
guarantees of one or more of the corporate shareholders. By virtue of those guarantees, the shareholders incur personal liability
that is not meaningfully distinguishable from the liability of a
general partner. When such a guarantee exists, it is as appropriate
to increase the basis of the shareholder for a proper proportion
of the guaranteed corporate indebtedness as it is to increase the
basis of a partner. While, of course, in most instances such a
shareholder will not be called upon to perform this guarantee,
general partners rarely are called upon to discharge partnership
obligations from their personal assets. Even if Congress were unwilling to conform the taxation of S corporations to the taxation
of partnerships completely in this respect, it is unfortunate that
Congress did not permit a basis adjustment when the personal
liability of a shareholder in the form of a guarantee is present.
3.

Shareholder Guarantors

To some extent, the harshness of failing to increase the basis
of stock by corporate borrowings has been mitigated by other
changes in the Revision Act that will operate to benefit shareholder
guarantors. It is not uncommon for a corporation to sustain losses
in years priQr to defaulting on its indebtedness. Under prior law,
as under the Revision Act, a shareholder guarantor was not entitled
to claim his allocable portion of those losses by virtue of the
guarantee. While his subsequent payments under the guarantee
would be treated as increasing the basis of his stock, thus entitling
him to claim future losses incurred by the corporation, he could
not obtain thereby the benefits of the losses previously incurred.
Under prior law, such losses had to be claimed in the year incurred
and could not be carried forward. As a result, many Subchapter
S guarantors lost entirely the benefits of losses sustained by the
corporation, notwithstanding their substantial investment under
the guarantee on behalf of the corporation. Under present law,
those losses can be carried forward and claimed by the guarantor
for the year in which he discharges his obligations under the
guarantee. The net effect of this relatively roundabout route to
the claiming of S corporation losses is that, to the extent that an
S shareholder in fact becomes personally liable for corporate obliga-
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tions, he will be entitled to claim losses originally attributable to
a corporate borrowing.
While the position of a shareholder guarantor thus is much
improved under present law, the result remains far different from
that under partnership taxation. The guarantor still is not entitled
to claim losses in the year in which the loss or expenditure producing the tax deduction was incurred.318 Rather, the tax benefit
is deferred until the indebtedness is in fact repaid. In this respect,
the treatment of a guarantor resembles the treatment of a partner
subject to the "at risk" provisions; yet the guarantor does not
benefit from the exceptions and refinements contained in section
465.
Under prior law, a guarantor could improve his position by
substituting himself as the direct creditor of the corporation. The
Commissioner has ruled that if a guarantor, by issuing his personal
note to the S corporation's lender, caused the corporation to become
directly indebted to the guarantor rather than to the original lender,
the guarantor's basis for his investment in the S corporation would
be increased by the face amount of the note. 319 Through this device,
the guarantor would be entitled to claim the S corporation losses
currently rather than at the time he is required to discharge his
obligations under the guarantee. While the necessity of the guarantor's assumption of primary liability in order to obtain S corporation losses has been eliminated by carrying forward the corporate
losses, the device still may be useful if a shareholder wishes to
accelerate the deduction of such losses.
4.

Section 465

Under section 465 certain taxpayers are barred from claiming
any losses attributable to an activity to the extent that the
aggregate amount of those losses exceeds the amount of the taxpayer's investment in the activity that is "at risk." The "at risk"
amount includes the .investment of the taxpayer's own funds as
well as the investment of borrowed funds upon which the taxpayer
has personal liability. 320 Thus, in general effect, section 465 bars
taxpayers from claiming deductions attributable to the expenditure
of nonrecourse borrowings. The disallowed losses may be carried
forward by the taxpayer and used at such future time as the taxpayer's amount "at risk" increases.321 The section contains elaborate
rules defining the separate activities to which the "at risk" rules
318.
319.
320.
321.

Rev. Rul. 71-288, 1971-2 C.B. 319.
Rev. Rul. 75-144, 1975-1 C.B. 277.
I.R.C. § 465(b).
I.R.C. § 465(a)(2).
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are applicable 322 and that exclude certain transactions from the provision, particularly investments in real property. 323
Under prior law, section 465 was expressly applicable to all
Subchapter S corporations ..324 The provision was not applicable,
however, to partnerships; the limitations of the section were applied
only at the partner level.325 As a result, a loss sustained by a
partnership from engaging in tax sheltering activities or other
activities financed by a nonrecourse borrowing passes through to
its partners without limitation. Each partner is required to compute
separately the amount of deductions so allocated that exceeds the
partner's individual amount "at risk" in the partnership activity.
For this purpose, nonrecourse borrowing, whether by the partner
or by the partnership, does not constitute an amount "at risk." 326
Thus, the limitation imposed by section 465 on a partner's deduction
of such losses is significantly stricter than that imposed by the
limitation upon claiming losses in excess of a partner's basis for
his partnership interest.
Prior law imposed upon Subchapter S corporations a third
limitation on the claiming of losses. Section 465 not only was
applicable at the shareholder level, but also was applicable at the
corporate level. 327 Thus, losses at the entity level that exceeded
the S corporation's "at risk" investment were disallowed at the
corporate level and did not pass through to the shareholders. Such
losses could be carried forward by the S corporation and would
be allowable to shareholders in future years as the corporate
amount "at risk" increased.328 Somewhat oddly, taxpayers often
benefited by having the limitation of section 465 apply rather than
the basis limitation, because losses currently disallowed under
section 465 could be carried forward while losses exceeding the
shareholder's basis would be forfeited forever. 329
Under the Revision Act S corporations no longer are subject
to section 465 as such,330 but Congress has continued the application
of that provision to corporations that meet the stock ownership

E.g., I.R.C. §§ 465(c)(2) and (3)(B).
I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D).
Former I.R.C. § 465(a)(l)(B).
I.R.C. § 465(a)(l)(A). See McKEE, supra note 73, at , 10.11[2).
I.R.C. § 465(b)(2).
Former I.R.C. § 465(a)(l)(B).
I.R.C. § 465(a)(2).
See the extensive analysis of the application of I.R.C. § 465 to S Corin Bravenec, Subchapter S Corporations and Shareholders Under the At
Risk Rules of Section 465, 36 TAX LAW. 93 (1982) and Bravenec, Subchapter S Corporations and Shareholders Under the At Risk Rules-Revisited, 36 TAX LAW. 765

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
porations

(1983).

330.

I.R.C. § 465(a)(l).
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requirements of a personal holding company. 331 It is not at all clear
from the Revision Act modifications to section 465 whether closely
held S corporations continue to be subject to the provisions of section 465 at the entity level. For the purposes of that provision,
an S corporation is regarded as a corporation. Moreover, section
465 clearly affects the computation of income; an S corporation
must compute its income in the same manner as an individual. 332
Individuals, of course, are subject to section 465. 333 However, if
S corporations were regarded as subject to section 465 because
they compute their income as individuals, then all S corporations
would be subject to the provision regardless of whether their stock
is so closely held that they meet the requirements of the personal
holding company definition. It seems unlikely that Congress
intended that result in view of its deletion of S corporations from
the enumeration of taxpayers subject to section 465. Section 201(1)(1)
of the TCB attempts to resolve this question by limiting the provision dealing with closely held corporations to non-electing corporations. Although this proposed amendment to section 465(a)(1)(B)
does not deal directly with the deemed individual rule, it seems
to indicate clearly that section 465 was not intended to apply any
longer to any S corporation at the entity level.
Although the amended section 465 is ambiguous it probably
no longer will be applied at the entity level to any S corporation.
Whether section 465 should ever be applied at the entity level
to either corporations or partnerships is debatable. The resulting
triple restriction on the allowance of losses is unacceptably complex and can produce irrational results. 334 On the other hand, sheltering income at the entity level through deductions attributable to
nonrecourse indebtedness is difficult to justify because those deductions are not allowed to individuals. Regardless of the propriety
of applying section 465 at the entity level, S corporations and
partnerships should be treated similarly. Because the overriding
objective of the Revision Act was to conform the taxation of S
corporations to the taxation of partnerships to the extent possible,
the Treasury Department most likely will resolve statutory
ambiguities in favor of conformity. Accordingly, it seems probable
that the regulations will construe the amendment to section 465
as exempting S corporations from the application of that section
at the entity level.
331. I.R.C. § 465(a)(l)(c).
332. I.R.C. § 1363(b).
333. I.R.C. § 465(a)(l)(A).
334. For a contrary opinion of the continuing applicability of I.R.C. § 465
to closely held S corporations at the entity level, and a thorough discussion of
the irrational results this application can cause, see Bravenec, supra note 329.
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CAPITAL GAINS AND "ONE-SHOT" ELECTIONS

With the adoption of Subchapter S, Congress acknowledged
that it was acceptable for a corporation and its shareholders to
be subject to only a single level of tax. On the other hand, Congress has remained wary of the ability of taxpayers to switch back
and forth between the normal system for taxing corporations and
Subchapter S. Presumably Congress is concerned that if taxpayers
were able to elect their desired method of taxation annually, the
judicious use of Subchapter S could result in a lower burden of
taxation over a period of time than would be imposed upon the
business under either system of taxation alone. As a result, Subchapter S contains a variety of provisions designed to restrict such
freedom of choice. If that is indeed Congress' concern, the striking
feature of each of these provisions is its relative ineffectiveness.
A corporation is free to elect Subchapter S for a single year only
and, unless the corporation has an extraordinary amount of capital
gains in that year, the only penalty incurred is the inability to
again elect Subchapter S for a period of years. 335 In essence, a corporation can move freely in and out of Subchapter S- but only once
in every five years. Somewhat inconsistently, perhaps, the reverse
is not true; an S corporation may not terminate its election for
a one-year period. Under the same five-year wait provision, unless
the consent of the Commissioner is obtained, the corporation cannot
reelect under Subchapter S for five years. In addition, if a corporation attempts to pass through to its shareholders a substantial amount of capital gains income in the course of a "one-shot"
election, the capital gain becomes subject to tax at the corporate
level.
In the one provision of the Revision Act that is carried over
unchanged from prior law, a corporation previously subject to the
regular tax that elects Subchapter S treatment and, within three
years, incurs a capital gain in an amount exceeding fifty percent
of the corporation's taxable income for that year is subject to tax
at the corporate level on the gain at the same rate that would
have applied had Subchapter S treatment not been elected. 336 This
provision has no effect upon the taxation of the capital gain at
the shareholder level except that, in computing the amount of gain
taxable to the shareholder, a deduction is permitted for the tax
paid by the corporation. 337 Thus, the section addresses only the
335. See text accompanying notes 146-47 supra.
336. I.R.C. § 1374.
337. I.R.C. § 1366(£)(2) reduces the amount of long-term capital gains passed
through to the shareholders by the amount of any tax paid by the corporation
under I.R.C. §§ 56 and 1574.
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incurring of massive capital gains, such as might be incurred on
a transaction falling just short of a partial liquidation. Moreover,
even though the transaction does not amount to a partial liquidation, the section imposes an overall burden of taxation similar to
the tax imposed upon such a transaction. 338 In many instances, the
total capital gains taxes at the corporate and shareholder levels
will be less than the taxes that would have been imposed had the
corporation not made a Subchapter S election but had distributed
the proceeds of the disposition as an ordinary dividend to its
shareholders.
If the ability to switch back and forth between the regular and
Subchapter S system of taxation posed a serious threat of tax
avoidance, Congress might have been more rigorous in foreclosing
this device. For example, the entire benefit of a Subchapter S
election could be denied retroactively if that election were
terminated within two years. Such a provision could contain
appropriate exceptions governing the death of a major shareholder,
for example, or a disposition to unrelated persons of a majority
of the corporation's stock.
Clearly, the "one-shot" pass through of capital gain should not
be permitted. The transaction that section 137 4 is designed to
impede amounts to the extension of the exclusion from tax provided by section 337 to transactions that may not even qualify as
partial liquidations. In addition, the ability to secure one level of
tax on a capital gain might in some situations seriously undermine
the collapsible corporation provisions of section 341 339 (although in
most instances in which the corporation would be eligible for capital
gains treatment, the collapsible provisions may deserve to be
undermined). It is not at all clear, however, that this tax avoidance
use of a Subchapter S corporation is any more serious than other
temporary uses of the option. It seems, for example, highly
inappropriate to permit a substantial extraordinary loss to pass
through to shareholders pursuant to a one-year Subchapter S
election although no provision of either prior or present law
prevents such a use of Subchapter S. Additionally, it seems
somewhat peculiar to permit a corporation to elect Subchapter S
338. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(4).
339. I.R.C. § 341 is designed to prevent the conversion of ordinary income
into capital gain through the device of causing a corporation to create value in
property which then is realized by the shareholders through a transaction in the
stock of the corporation rather than the exploitation of the value created. The
capital gains pass through of an S corporation, however, is not a stock transaction that triggers the collapsible provisions. However, the I.R.C. § 1374 tax only
retards the avoidance of I.R.C. § 341 when the collapsible assets produce a capital
gain upon a disposition. The application of I.R.C. § 341 in most such circumstances
is questionable and often can be avoided under I.R.C. § 341(e).
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only for its final year of existence in order to extend the benefits
of section 337 to items of income not insulated from tax under that
provision. 340 In any event, the pattern of prior law has been continued: Except where substantial capital gains are incurred, the
only sanction for making a "one-shot" election is the prohibition
against reelection for five years.
In light of the other changes made to Subchapter S, it appears
unfortunate, if not erroneous, for the prior law version of the section
1374 tax to have been continued without modification. The tax is
imposed when the taxable income of the corporation exceeds $25,000
and the capital gain exceeds $25,000 and exceeds fifty percent of
taxable income. Section 137 4(d), as amended by the Technical
Corrections Act of 1982, provides that the taxable income of the
corporation, for purposes of applying these tests, shall be
determined under section 63(a) with certain modifications. 341 The
cross-referenced provision defines taxable income of a corporation
as gross income minus all deductions. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether the S corporation is liable for the special tax,
the income of the S corporation must be computed in the same
manner, with certain minor modifications, that it would be computed
if the corporation had not elected under Subchapter S. The decision
to require all calculations under section 1374 to be made by
reference to taxable income computed as though the corporation
were subject to the regular corporate income tax is unfortunate.
Since an S corporation has no other occasion to compute its income
in this manner, its normal computations of income and expense
will not disclose whether it is approaching liability for the special
tax on capital gains. In order to make that determination, the corporation's accountants will be required to make this special and
highly complex computation, at the corporation's expense. No useful
purpose is served by determining the liability for the special capital
gains tax by referring to the income as it would be computed for
a co.rporation. Both the $25,000 and the fifty percent tolerances
are entirely arbitrary. It is needlessly complex and expensive for
taxpayers to be required to make complicated and precise computations in order to determine whether the amount of their capital
gains exceeds a totally arbitrary floor. It would be preferable if
the section were amended so that the taxable income concept used
in the triggering definition was the same as the taxable income
normally computed by the S corporation.
As under prior law, an S corporation generally is not subject

340. See text accompanying notes 439-41 infra.
341. The corporation may not claim the net operating loss deduction or the
special deductions allowed to corporations by I.R.C. §§ 241 to 250 (except the
§ 248 organization expense amortization). I.R.C. § 1374(d)(2).
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to the additional taxes imposed upon items of tax preference. Under
section 58( d), however, as under prior law ,342 if a corporation
becomes subject to the tax imposed on capital gains by section
137 4, the S corporation also becomes subject to the add-on corporate minimum tax imposed by section 56- but only with respect
to capital gains subject to that tax. Under prior law, incidentally,
the express exemption of the S corporation was contained in the
preference tax provisions. 343 In the Revision Act, the exemption
is accomplished by the general rule of section 1363 that, unless
otherwise provided, an S corporation is not subject to the taxes
imposed by Chapter One of the Internal Revenue Code.
VII.

CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS

A. Prior Law
Without question, the greatest failure under prior law in the
scheme of Subchapter S was the manner of taxing actual distributions from the corporation to its shareholders. Under the scheme
of taxing partnerships, the distribution of cash or property from
a continuing partnership rarely produces a tax to the distributee
partner. 344 Rather, taxation of gain on any appreciation in partnership properties is deferred by reducing the basis of the partner's
interest in the partnership by the amount of any cash distributed
plus the adjusted basis to the partnership of any property
distributed. 345 The partner acquires a basis in the distributed
property equal to its basis in the hands of the partnership. 346 This
rule is highly favorable to the conduct of business in partnership
form. Partners can substantially reduce their level of investment
in the partnership by exchanging a highly appreciated partnership interest for partnership property and the transaction will not
produce a tax until the partner receiving the distribution converts
that property into cash or other property. While in some cases
this liberal non-recognition rule permits an arguably improper
deferral of gain, the rule obtains ample justification in the flexibility it permits partnership operations. Because of this rule, partners and partnerships are able to contribute and distribute cash
and other property with relatively little fear of adverse or unanticipated tax consequences. As a result, relatively unsophisticated
taxpayers engaged in business in partnership form have been able

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Former
Former
I.R.C. §
I.R.C. §
I.R.C. §

I.R.C. § 1372(b)(l).
I.R.C. § 58(d).
731(a)(l).
733.
732(a).
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to avoid the unfortunate predicaments in which shareholders in
Subchapter S corporations found themselves. The drafters of the
original Subchapter S provisions seemed to believe they were adopting a similar rule for Subchapter S corporation shareholders. The
legislative history stated that "where a shareholder has been taxed
on corporate earnings which were not at that time distributed,
and then the corporation in a subsequent year distributes these
earnings to such shareholders no further tax is required from the
shareholder at that time,_ since these earnings have already been
taxed to him in a prior year." 347 That happy result, however, was
not to be.
Under prior law, as it was ultimately enacted (and interpreted
by relatively unfriendly regulations), actual distributions from a
Subchapter S corporation (with a minor subsequently enacted
exception) were treated exactly like distributions from corporations
subject to the regular income tax to the extent of the corporation's
current earnings and profits. 348 Only actual distributions in excess
of current earnings, therefore, could be regarded as distributions
of the taxable income of the corporation that had been taxed
previously to the shareholders but not distributed. This amount
was referred to as previously taxed income or PTI. 349 Moreover,
the regulations, with some support in the legislative history, took
the position that only cash distributions from the corporation could
be regarded as distributions of PTJ.350 Of course, the distribution
of cash in an amount equal to the current earnings and profits
of the corporation did not increase the tax payable by shareholders;
had that amount not been distributed, it would have been taxable
as a constructive year-end dividend. 351 Before a shareholder was
able to withdraw the previously taxed income, however, an actual
cash distribution equal to the amount of current earnings and profits
was required. Moreover, the regulations took the position that any
distribution of PTI must be pro rata to all shareholders; distributions in redemption of the Subchapter S stock did not qualify. 352
As a result, the cash burden of making distributions of PTI was
more than most businesses could bear. Furthermore, if the corporation attempted to generate cash in order to make a distribution
of previously taxed income, the conversion of the asset to cash
would be a taxable event to the S corporation shareholders. In
347. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 68 (1958), reprinted in 1954
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4791, 4876-77.
348. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-l{d) (1968).
349. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b) (1968).
350. Id.
351. Former I.R.C. §§ 1373(b) and (c); see text accompanying notes 171 &
177-80 supra.
352. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b) (1968).
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practice, therefore, many Subchapter S corporation shareholders
were unable to obtain distributions of previously taxed income.
This failure of expectations under Subchapter S led to a lengthy
series of battles between taxpayers and the Commissioner as taxpayers sought to secure the anticipated advantage of the Subchapter S format through other means. Shareholders commonly
caused their corporation to make annual cash distributions, either
to prevent the build-up of PTI or to obtain a distribution of PTI,
whereupon the distributed cash would be lent back to the
corporation. 353 It is indeed a sad commentary upon the structure
of prior law that cash could be removed from a corporation free
of tax far more easily through the traditional mechanism of the
repayment of indebtedness than it could be removed as a distribution of PTI. Unfortunately, the Commissioner attacked this device
with surprising vigor. Where possible, he argued that the
distribution and reinvestment constituted a step transaction that
amounted to the distribution of a corporate obligation. 354 Since such
an obligation constituted property, not cash, it did not constitute
a distribution of PTI nor did it eliminate completely a taxable yearend constructive dividend. When this attack was not available, the
Commissioner argued that the indebtedness obtained by the
stockholder should be recharacterized under the usual debt-equity
analysis as stock, rather than debt. 355 Furthermore, the Commissioner took the position that the recharacterized indebtedness constituted a second class of stock and that, consequently, the Subchapter
S election had been terminated retroactively. 356
The need to distribute PTI in order to secure the supposed
advantages of operation as a Subchapter S corporation became
particularly acute when stock in the corporation was to be sold
or donated to another or the Subchapter S election was to be
terminated. The regulations took the position that the PTI
attributable to a shareholder's stock constituted an account that
was personal to the shareholder to whom the income had been
taxed and was not transferable by him. 357 Thus, distributions from
the Subchapter S corporation to the transferee could not be
regarded as tax free distributions of PTI accumulated prior to the
transfer. As a result, the little ability that existed under prior law
to distribute PTI was lost permanently if the stock became the
subject of a gift. In addition, the regulations stated that a
distribution of PTI had to occur while the Subchapter S election

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

See Bittker and Eustice, supra note 156, at , 6.08.
Roesel v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 14 (1971).
Stinnett v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 221 (1970).
See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(e) (1968).
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was in effect. 358 Distributions following the termination of the election would be treated as regular dividends and would thus be subject to ordinary income tax under section 301(c) to the extent of
the corporation's accumulated earnings and profits for the year
following the termination. When the termination was inadvertent
and thus, under prior law, retroactive, the effect of this rule was
extraordinarily harsh.

B. Under the Revision Act
1.

In General

Under the Revision Act, how S corporation distributions are
treated depends upon whether or not that corporation has accumulated earnings and profits. For corporations lacking earnings and
profits, the new rules have been simplified considerably and brought
substantially into line with the taxation of partnerships-although
with a most significant catch. 359 For other corporations, the rules
have been changed but not much improved. Unfortunately, most
S corporations will have earnings and profits and, thus, will not
be eligible for these simplified rules. Nearly every corporation that
elected Subchapter S treatment after having been subject to tax
as a regular corporation will have an accumulated earnings and
profits account. In addition, most corporations accumulated some
amount of earnings and profits even when operating under the
provisions of prior law because of the discrepancies between the
computation of taxable income and the computation of earnings
and profits. 360 Thus, the simplified rules governing distributions
will be applicable, in general, only to corporations formed after
January 1, 1983, that elect to be taxed under Subchapter S·from
the time of their initial organization.
For such fortunate corporations, the old concept of previously
taxed income has been discarded along with the concept of earnings
and profits. Any distribution from an S corporation that, absent
new section 1368, would be taxable as a dividend to the extent
of corporate earnings .and profits, is treated in~tead as a return
of capital. 361 Thus, unless the amount of cash or the fair market
value of property distributed exceeds the shareholder's basis in
his S corporation stock, as increased under section 1367(a) (1) by
any net profits allocable to him but remaining undistributed, the
entire amount of the distribution will be free of tax. Any excess
358.
359.
that may
360.
361.

Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(a) (1968).
See text accompanying notes 406-19 infra, for an analysis of the tax
be accelerated by a property distribution.
See text accompanying notes 183-85 supra.
I.R.C. § 1368(b)(l).
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is to be treated as gain from the sale or exchange of property,
thus generally producing a capital gain. 362 To the extent of the
distribution, the shareholder's basis for his S corporation stock
is reduced. 363 For example, on a distribution of property, the basis
of the S corporation stock will be reduced by the fair market value
of the property distributed and the shareholder will have a basis
for the property equal to its fair market value.
If the S corporation does have accumulated earnings and profits,
the taxation of corporate distributions can become substantially
more complex. Moreover, in some instances, the pattern of taxation
prescribed by the Revision Act seems improper. This added
complexity stems from the legitimate desire of Congress to prevent
the use of Subchapter S to avoid a tax at the shareholder level
on distributions of earnings and profits accumulated prior to the
Subchapter S election. If the simplified rules described above were
applicable to such corporations, a corporation could elect S
corporation status and commence tax free capital distributions even
though the corporation had substantial accumulated earnings and
profits that were the actual source of the distributions. To prevent
that result, the Revision Act, like prior law, creates a somewhat
awkward synthesis of the Subchapter C rules and the Subchapter
S rules governing corporate distributions. These two very different
patterns of taxation are coordinated by rules that establish a
priority of distributions. The priority that Congress apparently
intended to establish under the Revision Act is identical to the
priority of distributions under prior law. 364 However, under the
Revision Act, that objective will not always be achieved.
In general, section 1368 apparently contemplates that
distributions from an S corporation are first governed by the
concepts of Subchapter S and are free of tax to the recipient. Only
if the amount of the distribution exceeds the accumulated net
income earned by the corporation subsequent to the effective date
of the Revision Act are distributions taxed as dividends to the
extent of accumulated earnings and profits under the normal rules
of Subchapter C. Distributions in excess of both accumulated
Subchapter S income and earnings and profits are treated as
returns of capital and thereafter as gain from the sale or exchange
of the S corporation stock.
Under prior law, the distinction between tax free distributions
and distributions taxed as ordinary dividends was drawn by the
computation of a shareholder's personal PTI account which
362.
363.
364.
at 20.

I.R.C. § 1368(b)(2).
I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(A).
HOUSE REPORT,

supra note 22, at

19; SENATE REPORT,

supra note 22,
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measured the net income that had been taxed to that shareholder
while a Subchapter S election was in effect. The Revision Act
discards the concept of a personal account and creates inst"ead an
"accumulated adjustments account," defined in section 1368(e) (1)
(A) as the- aggregate net post-1982 increase in the tax bases of
all shareholders' stock prescribed by section 1367. The accumulated
adjustments account roughly corresponds to the sum of the PTI
accounts of all shareholders under prior law except that the account
.is a single corporate account, not personal to any shareholder. The
account is similar to the earnings and profits account that must
be maintained by corporations subject to the corporate income tax.
Thus, the accumulated adjustments account is increased by the
total amount of income allocated to all shareholders (with one
exception, noted below)365 and reduced by all losses and tax free
distributions to shareholders (that is, distributions from the
accumulated adjustments account).
To the extent distributions from a corporation that has earnings
and profits do not exceed the amount of the accumulated
adjustments account (and do not exceed the shareholder's basis),
the distributions are free of tax just as are distributions from a
corporation that does not have earnings and profits.366 Distributions
in excess of that amount are treated in the same manner as dividend
distributions from corporations subject to the regular corporate
tax. 367 Thus, to the extent of the corporation's accumulated earnings
and profits, such distributions are taxable as ordinary income to
the S corporation. shareholders. Once the earnings and profits
account has been exhausted, distributions are regarded as returns
of capital; and, once the shareholder's basis is exhausted, .the
distributions are regarded as capital gains. 368
This new method for distinguishing between tax free
distributions and distributions of accumulated earnings and profits
appears to operate properly only in the very simplest of
circumstances. For example, assume that an S corporation has an
accumulated adjustments account of $500 and accumulated earnings
and profits of $600. The stock of the corporation is owned equally
by two shareholders, A and B, each of whom has a basis of $350
for his stock. Assume further that the corporation makes a pro
rata distribution; not in exchange for its stock, in the amount of
$700 each to A and B. To the extent of the $500, the amount of
the accumulated adjustments account, the distribution is free of
tax and reduces the shareholder's basis in hisS corporation stock.
Although the statute does not specifically address the question,
365.
366.
367.
368.

See text accompanying notes 386-89 infra.
I.R.C. § 1368(c)(l).
I.R.C. § 1368(c)(2).
I.R.C. § 1368(c)(3).
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presumably this tax free portion of the distribution is to be allocated
ratably between A and B-at least in the case of a simultaneous
distribution. Thus, the basis of the stock held by each of them is
reduced to $100. In addition, A and B are treated as if they had
each received a dividend distribution in the amount of -$300, their
allocable share of the earnings and profits account, which would
be subject to tax at ordinary income rates. To the extent that the
distribution is so treated, it does not reduce the basis of stock
in the S corporation. 369 Further, A and B would receive a $100 tax
free return of capital which would exhaust the basis of their stock,
and $50 of capital gain.
By converting the personal PTI account to a corporate
accumulated adjustments account, Congress has simplified
somewhat Subchapter S and has provided the mechanism for
avoiding certain of the harsh results that prevailed under prior
law, such as the nontransferability of the PTI account. In several
common situations, however, the use of the corporate level account
causes a reversal of the normal priority of distributions from S
corporations. As a result, S corporation shareholders may become
subject to unanticipated tax liabilities. It is not clear that all of
these results were anticipated or desired by Congress and, at least
in certain circumstances, those results are highly questionable.
The accumulated adjustments account approach does not take
into account the differences in the amount of the corporation's
taxable income that has been previously taxed to a particular
shareholder. That amount could be substantially less or greater
than the shareholder's current pro rata share of the accumulated
adjustments accounts. Thus, on the facts of the foregoing example,
the tax consequences would not be altered if B had become a
shareholder in the S corporation subsequent to the time that the
accumulated adjustments account had been created.
At least with respect to pro rata distributions, Congress
intended this result. The Committee Reports explicitly state that
the rules governing distributions will apply to the transferee of
stock in an S corporation regardless of how he acquired his stock. 370
When S corporation stock is transferred by an existing shareholder,
either by gift or in a transaction that produces a tax basis to the
transferee in excess of the amount of the accumulated adjustments
account, the result reached under section 1368 seems to be proper.
The remaining shareholders are not prejudiced by the stock
transfers because the accumulated adjustments account is
369. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(A) provides that only distributions not includible in
income reduce basis.
370. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 19; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22,
at 20.
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unaffected by the stock transfer and the existing shareholders
retain an unaltered interest in that account. If, however, by issuing
stock to new investors, the corporation increases the number of
shares of stock outstanding, each shareholder's proportionate
interest in the accumulated adjustments account will be diminished.
Accordingly, pro rata distributions to shareholders will exhaust
the accumulated adjustments account before an amount has been
distributed to the old shareholders equal to the net amount upon
which they have been subject to tax. If the aggregate of the distributions made to the shareholders exceeds the accumulated adjustments account, each of the shareholders will become subject
to tax on the distribution at ordinary income rates. The.
distributions will now be regarded as distributions of earnings and
profits, even though the old shareholders will not have received
distributions equal to the post-1982 increases in their basis for their
S corporation stock. At the corporate level, the distribution has
not been treated as a distribution out of earnings and profits until
the entire amount of the accumulated adjustments account has been
exhausted, but from the perspective of the old shareholders, their
distributions have become taxable before the full amount of S
corporation income upon which they have been taxed has been
distributed to them.
This effect of the corporate level accumulated adjustments
account can be illustrated by assuming that B was not an old
stockholder of the corporation but rather had purchased his stock
from the corporation for $1000 immediately prior to the distribution.
Prior to that purchase, A, as the sole shareholder, would have been
entitled to receive a tax free distribution of $500, the entire
accumulated adjustments account. Subsequent to the purchase, the
corporation still can distribute $500 free of tax to the distributee
shareholders but if the corporation makes a pro rata distribution,
A cannot receive more than $250 tax free. 371 Any further distributions will be subject to tax to both A and B at ordinary income
rates until the earnings and profits account of the corporation has
been exhausted. Consequently, A will not be able to obtain a tax
free distribution of the amount of S corporation income that has
been taxed to him until the corporation has eliminated its earnings and profits account. Because of this "spreading out" of the
accumulated adjustments account, S corporations may be inhibited
from raising new capital through the issuance of additional stock.
Should the Revision Act have that effect, 372 it would be an unfor371. Non pro rata distributions are discussed in the text accompanying notes
37 4-80 infra.
372. At least insofar as the tax consequences to the new shareholder (B
in our example) are concerned, the result may have been intended. One of the
reasons given in the early stages of revision for making the accumulated ad-
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tunate by-product of legislation that was designed to enhance the
flexibility and desirability of s corporations.
While new shareholders in an S corporation can produce areversal of the normal priority of distributions to the old shareholders
by accelerating the point at which a distribution of earnings and
profits is deemed to occur, the new shareholders themselves may
also be subject to a reversal of priorities. If the basis for a
shareholder's stock is lower than his allocable portion of the accumulated adjustments account, distributions can produce a capital
gains tax to the shareholder before the shareholder becomes subject to ordinary income treatment on a distribution of earnings
and profits- a conceptually dubious result. In the above example,
B might have purchased stock in the corporation for $100 if the
properties of the corporation had contained large unrealized losses.
Section 1368(b) and (c)(l) literally state that to the extent of the
accumulated adjustments account, a distribution is free of tax to
the extent of the shareholder's basis for his S corporation stock
and, thereafter, is subject to capital gains taxation. Only distributions in excess of the accumulated adjustments account are treated
as distributions of earnings and profits. Once the earnings and profits account is exhausted through further distributions, B again
would be subject to tax at capital gains rates because his basis
would have been exhausted.
There are several problems, both practical and conceptual, with
this pattern of taxation. Extending capital gains taxation to B to
the extent the accumulated adjustments account exceeds his basis
is arbitrary. That account is designed to discriminate between
distributions that are to be treated as tax free returns of previously
taxed Subchapter S income and distributions attributable to accumulated earnings and profits. Once B has received a return equal
to the basis of his stock, he is not receiving a tax free distribution
of accumulated S corporation income; he is harvesting the appreciation on his investment and, quite properly, he is being taxed on
the amount of that appreciation at capital gains rates. The proper
tax consequences to B in this circumstance are wholly unrelated
to the level of the accumulated adjustments account.
The irrelevance of the accumulated adjustments account to the
taxation of B is underscored by the adjustments that are made
to the account attributable to distributions to shareholders. Under
section 1368(e)(l)(A), the accumulated adjustments account is to be
adjusted in a manner similar to the adjustments to basis provided

justments account a corporate level account was the desire to treat distributions
to a new shareholder the same way whether the shareholder purchased the stock
from the corporation or from an old shareholder. STAFF REPORT, supra note 6
at 18.
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by section 1367. Under section 1367(a)(2)(A), the basis of a
shareholder's stock is to be reduced by distributions that are not
includible in the income of the shareholder by virtue of section
1368. Thus, and quite properly, the basis of S corporation stock
is reduced by tax free distributions but is not reduced by distributions in excess of basis. The accumulated adjustments account
should be computed similarly. Thus, to the extent that distributions to B exceed his basis, the accumulated adjustments account
should not be reduced. Indeed, it plainly would be erroneous to
reduce the account by virtue of such distributions. Because B will
be taxed on distributions in excess of his basis, the account has
not supported tax free distributions of accumulated S corporation
income. Furthermore, since B is not regarded as receiving distributions from the accumulated adjustments account, the level of the
accumulated adjustments account should be irrelevant to the tax
consequences to B of distributions.
In this and other situations, the level of the accumulated adjustments account will rationally identify the point at which
distributions are to be regarded as distributions of earnings and
profits. Because distributions in excess of basis do not reduce the
accumulated adjustments account, the account will never be exhausted so long as distributions in excess of basis are made only
to a single shareholder. On the other hand, if distributions were
made ratably between a high basis A and a low basis B, the full
amount of the distributions to A would reduce the level of the
accumulated adjustments account although the distributions to B
would not. Thus, the account would not be exhausted until the
aggregate of distributions to A and B totalled twice the amount
in the account when the distributions commenced. Plainly, the use
of the accumulated adjustments account to identify distributions
of earnings and profits in this circumstance is totally arbitrary
and, indeed, irrational. These irrational tax consequences could be
ameliorated somewhat if section 1368 provided that distributions
would be free of tax to the extent of the lesser of the accumulated
adjustments account or a shareholder's basis for his stock. Further
distributions might then be regarded as distributions of accumulated earnings and profits. However, that solution also could
be subject to criticism. B would be regarded as receiving a distribution of earnings and profits while A was continuing to receive a
tax free distribution from the accumulated adjustments account;
therefore, B would be subject to tax at ordinary income rates on
a greater proportion of the distribution than would A. Such a result
would seem particularly inappropriate if the earnings and profits
were accumulated before B became a shareholder in the S
corporation.
It may be that there is no ideal solution to the problem of synthesizing the Subchapter S and Subchapter C rules governing
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distributions; however, Subchapter S would be much improved if
persons becoming shareholders in S corporations after 1982 were
never regarded as receiving distributions of earnings and profits.
Since by definition an S corporation cannot accumulate earnings
and profits after 1982, there is no reason why a shareholder who
has purchased his interest in an S corporation after that date should
be subject to tax at ordinary income rates upon the distribution
of accumulated earnings and profits. Of course, such a rule would
require that those individuals who were shareholders on the effective date of the Revision Act must be taxed on their allocable
share of corporate earnings and profits upon any disposition of
their stock. While that approach would be highly radical from the
perspective of the corporate income tax, it would be entirely consistent with the partnership model upon which Subchapter S is
presently based. 373
2.

Non Pro Rata Distributions

Since the accumulated adjustments account is a corporate rather
than a personal account, the amount of that account quite commonly will exceed the basis of any shareholder's stock. Thus, the
unsatisfactory pattern of taxing distributions when the amount of
the accumulated adjustments account exceeds the basis of the
distributee shareholder's stock frequently will arise in the context
of a non pro rata distribution, such as a redemption that is treated
as an ordinary section 301 dividend. However, through the use
of non pro rata distributions, the shareholders of S corporations
can use that pattern of taxing distributions to their advantage.
Section 1368 is applicable to all distributions that, in the absence
of Subchapter S, would be taxable as dividends under section
301(c). 374 Section 301(c), however, applies to all distributions by a
corporation that are not governed by more specific Code sections,
such as sections 302 and 303, which treat certain distributions in
exchange for stock as sales or exchanges. Those sections, however,
are not applicable to all purported redemptions of stock. Under
section 302, for example, a redemption is entitled to sales treatment, and thus is removed from the scope of section 30l(c) only
if the redemption results in a meaningful reduction in the redeeming shareholder's continuing proportionate interest in the corporation, or it meets one of the alternative tests for sales treatment
provided by that provision. 375 Accordingly, many redemptions of
373.
374.
375.
a closely

See text accompanying notes 344-47 supra.
LR.C. § 1368(a).
These tests often are particularly difficult to meet in the context of
held corporation because of the applicability of the I.R.C. § 318 attribu-

1983]

SUBCHAPTER S REVISION ACT

687

stock by closely held corporations fall within the scope of section
301(c) and if the redeeming corporation is an S corporation, the
redemptions are governed by section 1368.
Section 1368 provides that if the S corporation has accumulated
a sufficient amount of post-1982 income so that the accumulated
adjustments account exceeds the entire amount of the non pro rata
distribution, then the entire amount of the distribution will be free
of tax to the extent of the shareholder's basis and, thereafter, will
be subject to tax only as gain· from the sale or exchange of the
S corporation stock, presumably a capital gain. Although it is not
entirely clear whether the tax free recovery will be limited by
the basis of the stock redeemed or by the aggregate basis of all
the shareholder's stock, it is clear that the shareholder will be subject to a very favorable pattern of taxation. Only if the amount
of the distribution exceeds the entire balance in the accumulated
adjustments account will the taxpayer be exposed to a tax at ordinary income rates.
While this pattern of taxation produces favorable results to
the first shareholder to redeem from an S corporation under section 1368, the procedure can produce quite severe consequences
to the remaining shareholders in the corporation. Returning to our
illustrative S corporation, the corporation had an accumulated adjustments account of $500 and accumulated earnings .and profits
of $600. The corporation had two equal shareholders, A and B, each
of whom had a basis for his stock of $350. Assume that the corporation redeems one-half of A's stock for $500 in a transaction
that is not treated as a sale or exchange under section 302. Pursuant to section 1368(c)(1) and (b)(1), the distribution is free of tax
to the extent that it does not exceed "the adjusted basis of the
stock." Since the transaction as to A is treated as a section 301
dividend, presumably the basis referred to in that provision is A's
entire basis of $350 and not merely the basis of the stock purportedly redeemed, $175. In any event, A will have a tax free
distribution to the extent of his basis Oet us assume that the proper
figure is $350) and a capital gain in the amount of the rest of the
distribution, $150. Under sections 1368(e)(1)(A) and 1367(a)(2)(A), the
accumulated adjustments account will be reduced by this transaction by the amount of the tax free distribution, $350, and thus
will have a remaining balance of $150.
Assume that in a subsequent year in which there has been no
change in the level of the accumulated adjustments account, the
corporation redeems the same amount of stock from shareholder
B. Again, in a transaction that does not qualify for exchange treattion rules, which treat the shareholder as owning stock actually owned by members
of his family or other entities in which he has an interest.
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ment under sections 302 or 303, the consequences to B will be very
different. B will be entitled to a tax free distribution only to the
extent of the remaining accumulated adjustments account, $150.
The balance of the distribution will be treated under section
1368(c)(2) as a distribution of accumulated earnings and profits and
be subject to tax at ordinary income rates.
Quite plainly, shareholder A will have benefited enormously
at the expense of shareholder B. A will have been able to avoid
dividend treatment by using the portion of the accumulated adjustments account that was created by virtue of income allocated and
taxed to B. As a result, A will be able to obtain capital gains taxation with respect to the distribution and will be able to shift the
burden of ordinary income taxation to B. Even if A does not wish
so to benefit at the expense of B, he cannot avoid that consequence.
The rules of sections 1367 and 1368 are mandatory. As illustrated
below, B can be protected from this result if the redemption can
be brought within the scope of section 302. In many family owned
corporations, however, qualifying a redemption under that section
can be a difficult and uncertain matter. 376 Alternatively, the
shareholders can attempt to negotiate a price for the redemption
that reflects the tax consequences to the remaining shareholders.
That process, however, will be difficult and imprecise even where
the parties are acting in good faith. Accordingly, this aspect of
the corporate level account may seriously impede the redemption
of stock by S corporations when the transaction cannot be brought
within the scope of sections 302 or 303.
On the other hand, well-advised taxpayers may be able to use
this pattern of taxation to their advantage. The planning
possibilities of non pro rata distributions are discussed below. 377
No provision in the Revision Act addresses the point in time
at which additions or subtractions are to be made to or from the
accumulated adjustments account. Under prior law governing Subchapter S corporations, the computations of earnings and profits
and undistributed taxable income occurred on an annual basis as
of the end of the corporation's fiscal year. 378 Thus, the extent to
which a distribution constituted a distribution of current earnings
and profits could not be ascertained accurately until the end of
the year. That approach conformed to the rules governing the corporate income tax under which the computation of earnings and
profits occurs as of the end of the corporation's year. 379 By contrast, a partner's basis in his partnership interest is calculated on
376.
377.
378.
379.

See note 375 supra.
See text accompanying notes 392-98 infra.
Former I.R.C. §§ 1373(c) and 1377(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1373-l(b)-(e) (1968).
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.316-l(a)(1) (1963) and 1.1377-2(b) (1960).
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a daily basis. Pursuant to section 731, distributions from the partnership are compared with a partner's basis of his partnership interest "immediately before the distribution." 380 While the Treasury
Department in all likelihood will seek to conform to the greatest
possible extent the taxation of S corporations to the taxation of
partnerships, in this circumstance it appears clear that the annual
computation of the corporation tax is better suited to the S corporation than is the approach of section 731. The controlling consideration is that, unlike partnership taxation, the accumulated adjustments account is a corporate level account. As illustrated above,
to the extent that account is exhausted by distributions to one
shareholder, the account cannot support tax free distributions to
the remaining shareholders. Accordingly, some mechanism must
be established for allocating the amount of the accumulated adjustments account among shareholders receiving distributions from
the corporation at different times throughout the taxable year.
While it might be technically possible to devise a rule strictly
allocating the accumulated adjustments account in accordance with
the chronological order of distributions, such a rule would be
unavoidably unsatisfactory. Thus, because it would seem necessary
in the event of simultaneous redemptions to allocate the account
ratably, it would become necessary to create an arbitrary and difficult to administer definition of simultaneity. In addition, because
non-simultaneous distributions might be taxed quite differently,
contrary to the probable expectations of the parties, a major trap
for less well-advised shareholders would be created. Accordingly,
it would be vastly preferable if the accumulated adjustments account were adjusted annually at the end of the corporation's taxable year, at least with respect to reductions for distributions. If
such a rule were adopted, there would be little reason to make
more frequent adjustments to the account for any other purpose.
3.

Distributions of Pre-1983 Subchapter S Income

The computation of the accumulated adjustments account is
not retroactive; the account only includes income accumulated after
1982.381 Accordingly, the general mechanism established by the Revision Act for defining tax free distributions does not permit the
tax free distribution of previously taxed income accumulated prior
to 1983 by a corporation having earnings and profits. While it seems
reasonably clear that Congress did not intend to cause the retroactive forfeiture of the benefits of PTI accounts existing on December

380.
381.

I.R.C. § 731(a)(l).
I.R.C. §§ 1368(e)(l)(A) and (2).
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31, 1982, the Revision Act contains relatively little to indicate how
those accounts will be treated under present law. Section 1379(c)
provides that the rules of prior law governing the distribution of
previously taxed income "shall continue to apply with respect to
distributions of undistributed taxable income for any taxable year
beginning before January 1, 1983." While that provision could be
read as applying only to fiscal year corporations and only for the
taxable year including January 1, 1983, the Committee Reports
contain the more general statement that pre-1983 previously taxed
income "can be distributed" under the provisions of present law. 382
The ability to distribute pre-1983 previously taxed income prior
to a distribution of earnings and profits seems to have been
preserved in principle, but the Revision Act contains no guidance
whatsoever as to how such distributions may be accomplished. Most
importantly, no provision in the Revision Act purports to coordinate distributions of PTI with the distribution priorities
established under section 1368.383 Under prior law, the regulations
stated that distributions were regarded as distributions of PTI
only after the corporation had distributed the entire amount o~
its current earnings and profits in cash. 384 Under present law,
however, there is no rational basis for requiring an actual distribution of current year additions to the accumulated adjustments account as a prerequisite to a PTI distribution. Accordingly, the
Treasury Department seems to have virtually unfettered discretion
in coordinating distributions of PTI with the provisions of existing
law. There seem to be three obvious choices for accomplishing this
coordination: (a) the earliest distributions could be regarded as
distributions of PTI, (b) the earliest distributions could be regarded
as distributions from the accumulated adjustments account followed
by distributions of PTI, or (c) distributions of PTI could be at the
election of the shareholder.
Distributions of PTI will not reduce the balance in the accumulated adjustment account. If under either a mandatory or elective provision PTI is distributed first, all shareholders would be
subject to the same tax on distributions from the S corporation
regardless of the size of their PTI accounts. That is, the initial
distributions to some shareholders would be regarded as tax free
distributions of PTI, not the reduction of the accumulated adjustments account, while the distributions to shareholders lacking
382. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22,
at 26.
383. Indeed, the legislative history of I.R.C. § 1368 contains no reference
to the treatment of pre-1983 PTI in taxable years beginning after 1982. HousE
REPORT, supra note 22, at 18-19; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 19-20.
384. Treas. Reg. 1.1375-4(b) (1968); and see text accompanying notes 348-50
supra.
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PTI accounts would be regarded as distributions from the accumulated adjustments account. Once the balance in any PTI account had been exhausted, further distributions would be free of
tax to all shareholders to the extent of the remaining balance in
the accumulated adjustments account. The difficulty with that approach is that it deprives shareholders having PTI accounts of a
portion of the benefit to which they should be entitled from the
accumulated adjustments accounts. Because a shareholder having
a PTI account would have been previously subject to tax on both
pre-1983 income and an allocable portion of post-1982 income, such
a shareholder should be entitled to a larger tax free distribution.
On the other hand, if the earlier distributions were regarded
as attributable to the accumulated adjustments account, all
shareholders would receive tax free distributions until the account
was exhausted. Thereafter, shareholders having PTI accounts would
receive further tax free distributions and other shareholders would
be regarded as receiving distributions of earnings and profits. While
such a ru1e would protect shareholders having PTI accounts, it
could also produce an inequity because the shareholder having a
PTI account may, in effect, shift the tax on the distribution of earnings and profits to other shareholders. That result would seem
particularly inequitable where the old shareholder owned his stock
in the corporation at the time the accumulated earnings and profits
accounts were generated but the shareholder lacking a PTI account invested in the corporation only after 1982.
Neither priority of distributions will produce an equitable result
in all circumstances; therefore, the Treasury Department should
permit distributions to be regarded as distributions of PTI at the
election of the corporation and, perhaps, upon the consent of all
shareholders. The flexibility that such a provision would create
would permit the shareholders in the S corporation to minimize
the potential inequities produced by the amendments to Subchapter
S and, through negotiation, to arrange for the compensation of prejudiced shareholders.
The only statutory basis for permitting distributions of PTI
appears in the transitional provisions of section 1379(c), which state
that subsections (f) and (d) of prior law section 1375 will continue
to apply. Therefore, at least certain of the restrictive and technical
constructions of sections 1375(d) and (f) presumably continue to
apply. Thus, the PTI account will remain a personal and nontransferable account. On the other hand, the Treasury should not
continue to insist that distributions of PTI be made in cash. The
reason for that requirement has been eliminated under the Revision Act by the imposition of the section 1363(d) tax on the distribution of appreciated property. Since there is no basis for exempting distributions of PTI from the application of that tax, there is
no reason to insist that the distribution of PTI be in cash.
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Tax-Exempt Income

The computation of the accumulated adjustments account varies
in two respects from the computation of the adjustments to basis
under section 1367. The reduction in the account produced by a
section 302 or 303 redemption is explained below. 385 In addition,
the account is not to be increased by tax-exempt income or
decreased by expenses that are neither deductible nor properly
capitalizable. 386 Surprisingly, this provision effectively bars tax free
distributions to shareholders of amounts attributable to tax-exempt
income. Should the amount of any distribution exceed the accumulated adjustments account as so computed, the excess will
be treated as a distribution of accumulated earnings and profits
rather than a distribution of non-taxable S corporation income.
Thus, the character of tax-exempt interest passes through to the
shareholder under the new income allocation rules, and shareholders
are not subject to tax by virtue of the receipt of such amounts
by the S corporation (regardless of whether the corporation had
earnings and profits) but upon the distribution of tax-exempt income, the shareholders of a corporation which has earnings and
profits become subject to tax. On the other hand, if the S corporation lacks earnings and profits, distributions are not subject to
tax regardless of their origin. In such a case, the distribution of
tax-exempt income, like any other distribution, will simply reduce
the shareholder's basis for the stock. 387 This reduction produces
a wash because the basis will have been increased previously pursuant to section 1367(a) by the amount of the tax-exempt income. 388
The rule directing the exclusion of tax-exempt income and the
deductions attributable thereto from the accumulated adjustments
account merely accelerates the taxable event rather than creates
taxable income. Section 1367(a), governing increases in basis, makes
no distinction between corporations that have accumulated earnings and profits and those that do not. While the distribution of
tax-exempt income in excess of the accumulated adjustments account will be taxable currently to the shareholders, it will not
reduce the shareholders' basis for their stock. 389 Thus, on the
385. See text accompanying notes 397-98 infra.
386. I.R.C. § 1368(e)(l)(A). Under I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(D), expenses that are
neither deductible nor capitalizable reduce the basis of S corporation stock in
order to prevent shareholders from obtaining a tax benefit from the expense
on a disposition of stock. Thus, omitting that adjustment from the computation
of the accumulated adjustments account is favorable to shareholders.
387. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(A).
388. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(l)(A) refers to I.R.C. § 1366(a)(l) which in subparagraph
(A) specifically includes tax-exempt income.
389. Under I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(A), only tax free distributions reduce basis.
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ultimate disposition of the stock, the shareholders' basis still will
include an amount attributable to the tax exempt income and a
portion of the tax free return of capital enjoyed by the shareholder
on disposition of the stock will be attributable to the tax-exempt
income.
There is no explanation in the Committee Reports for the special
treatment of tax-exempt income in the computation of the accumulated adjustments account. Section 1367, however, seems to
be part of the general attack upon passive investment income of
an S corporation that has earnings and profits attributable to
periods when no Subchapter S election was in effect. Congress was
concerned that taxpayers would dispose of all of the business assets
of a corporation subject to the regular income tax but defer a
substantial portion of the tax on the disposition by failing to liquidate the corporation, electing under Subchapter S, and investing
the proceeds of the sale. Even in that context, however, this special
treatment of tax-exempt income seems unnecessary and
undesirable. For the purposes of both the tax on passive investment income and the termination of the S corporation election,
tax-exempt interest is treated in the same manner as taxable
interest. 300 Accordingly, the tax and termination penalties cannot
be avoided by investing in tax-exempt securities. Thus, the further penalty on tax-exempt income imposed by this definition of
the accumulated adjustments account does not serve a constructive purpose. For the reasons set forth above, the tax and termination provisions adequately, if not excessively, bar tax avoidance
attributable to the disposition of business assets followed by a Subchapter S election. 391 There is no reason to impose a further penalty
upon the investment of those assets in tax-exempt securities. Should
such an investment be undertaken, and neither the tax nor the
termination sections be applicable, there is. no reason why the
shareholders of the S corporation should not be entitled to an immediate tax free distribution of the tax-exempt interest their corporation earned.
Moreover, this penalty on deriving tax-exempt income is overbroad. Unlike the tax and termination penalties, this provision affects not only corporations that have earnings and profits attributable to years in which a Subchapter S election was not in
effect, but also corporations that have accumulated earnings and
profit's while under a Subchapter S election. In fact, no reason ap-

390. The definition of "passive investment income~· in I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(D),
the termination provision, merely refers to "interest." I.R.C. § 1375, which imposes the special tax on excess passive investment income, incorporates by
reference the definition in I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3). I.R.C. § 1375(b)(3).
391. See text accompanying notes 120-26 supra_

694

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

pears for so penalizing S corporations that have earnings and
profits, not attributable to the disposition of a business, derived
decades ago but prior to making a Subchapter S election. It is difficult to see why historical accumulation of earnings and profits
are relevant to whether distributions of current income should be
subject to tax. The provi~ion only inserts another point of distinction between S corporations having and lacking earnings and
profits, and between S corporations and partnerships; it does little to promote the integrity of the taxation of S corporations, and
therefore, should be deleted.
5.

Planning for Shareholder Retirements

A major aspect of the tax planning for closely held corporations has been to insure that shareholders withdrawing from the
corporation, whether upon their retirement from active involvement in the business or otherwise, obtain capital gains taxation
upon the redemption of their stock under section 302. If other
members of the shareholder's family also own stock in the corporation, capital gains treatment usually can be obtained only if
the withdrawing shareholder completely terminates his interest
in the corporation. However, the favorable rule provided by section 302(b)(3) is subject to a series of qualifications that cannot
always be met. 392 Furthermore, in a corporation subject to the corporate income tax, the retention of income in contemplation of the
redemption of stock can subject the corporation to the accumulated
earnings tax. 393 While the redemption of stock in an S corporation
392. Because of the applicability of the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318,
which treat the redeeming shareholder as owning stock owned by members of
his family, completely terminating the interest of a shareholder in a family corporation generally is virtually impossible without making use of the special waiver
provisions of I.R.C. § 302(c). Under that subsection, the family attribution rules
will not apply to a redemption under I.R.C. § 302(b)(3) if immediately after the
redemption the redeeming shareholder has no interest in the corporation other
than as a creditor and does not acquire such an interest other than by inheritance
for 10 years thereafter. The statute specifically lists the capacities of officer, director, cand employee as prohibited interests.
Compliance with this provision often will not comport with other family objectives. For example, the retiring shareholder cannot reduce his interest gradually
in a series of redemptions. Furthermore, the Treasury Department generally has
construed the word "interest" broadly against the taxpayer, and the courts usually
have upheld the government's construction. See generally BITTKER AND EUSTICE,
supra note 156, at , 9.23.
I.R.C. § 318 also requires attribution to the redeeming shareholder of stock
owned by entities in which the redeeming shareholder has an interest. These
attributions cannot be waived under I.R.C. § 302(c).
393. I.R.C. §§ 531-537. The accumulated earnings tax does not apply to S
corporations.
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is not entirely free of planning complexities, it will be far simpler
to obtain capital gains taxation for a withdrawing shareholder under
the Revision Act than it will be under the corporate income tax.
Accordingly, when the current income tax consequences of a Subchapter S election are not unfavorable and the qualification of a
redemption under section 302 might be difficult, a Subchapter S
election may provide an attractive solution.
If the redemption of stock qualifies for capital gains treatment .
under either section 302 or section 303, the consequences to the
withdrawing shareholder in an S corporation are identical to the
consequences to a shareholder withdrawing from a corporation subject to the corporate income tax. The shareholder will be subject
to tax at capital gains rates on the difference between the amount
distributed in exchange for his stock and his tax basis for the stock.
If the corporation is an S corporation, however, it may be possible
to achieve the same consequence even if the redemption does not
qualify under section 302 and thus would be treated as an ordinary
section 301 dividend if the corporation were subject to the corporate income tax.
The rules of section 1368 seem to be applicable to all section
301 distributions, even though they are non pro rata or are distributions in exchange for stock. Thus, all such distributions are free
of tax to the extent of the shareholder's basis and thereafter subject to capital gains taxation as long as the accumulated adjustments account exceeds the amount distributed to the
shareholder in exchange for his stock. Even though the redemption does not qualify under section 302, the shareholder will not
be subject to tax at ordinary income rates unless the amount
distributed exceeds the accumulated adjustments account.
Moreover, as noted above, the amount of the accumulated adjustments account is not reduced by distributions in excess of a
shareholder's basis that are subject to tax at capital gains rates. 394
While it cannot be entirely clear how the Treasury Department
will attempt to integrate the level of the accumulated adjustments
account with non pro rata distributions, it may thus be that if the
amount of the accumulated adjustments account exceeds by any
amount the basis of the stock being redeemed, no amount of the
distribution can be treated as a distribution of earnings and profits (provided that no other distributions are made by the corporation during the taxable year). In any event, the literal language
of section 1368 provides that even though the redemption does
not qualify under section 302, the shareholder can not be subject
to tax at ordinary income rates until the amount of the distribution exceeds the amount of the accumulated adjustments account.
394.

See text accompanying notes 372-73 supra.
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The prerequisite for this favorable treatment is that the accumulated adjustments account must exceed the shareholder's basis
(and perhaps the entire amount of the distribution). Since the accumulated adjustments account is defined generally as the net accumulated income earned after 1982 while under a Subchapter S
election, 395 few corporations will be able to redeem stock under
section 1368 at capital gains rates until they have operated as an
S corporation for a substantial period of time. Accordingly, taking
advantage of the S corporation provisions governing distributions
will require long range planning.
On the other hand, the amount that must be accumulated in
the accumulated adjustments account to avoid ordinary income taxation on any distribution under section 1368 can be minimized by
the making of periodic stock redemptions. In a corporation subject to the regular corporate income tax, periodic stock redemptions . almost invariably are treated as ordinary section 301
dividends. However, under section 1368, a partial redemption of
stock will always be treated as a capital transaction provided the
amount distributed does not exceed the accumulated adjustments
account. Accordingly, in a Subchapter S corporation there is no
need to limit redemptions to complete terminations of interest.
Periodic redemptions can obtain the same favorable treatment while
imposing a smaller cash drain on the corporation.
It was observed above that under the pattern of taxation
created by section 1368, the first shareholders redeemed by an
S corporation benefited at the expense of those remaining in the
corporation. 396 The initial redemption might exhaust the accumulated adjustments account and cause subsequent distributions
to be treated as distributions of accumulated earnings and profits
that are subject to ordinary income taxation. However, it is not
uncommon in closely held corporations for the first redemptions
by the corporation to be of stock held by older, and often higher
bracket, members of the family. The ability of the second generation of stockholders to permit the withdrawing shareholder to use
their portion of the accumulated adjustments account to produce
capital gain taxation can produce a quite favorable consequence
to the family as a whole. The transaction effectively shifts the incidence of tax on the accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation to the lower bracket members of the family. Moreover,
the second generation family members may not intend to cause
their stock to be redeemed for a substantial period of time. In the
interim, the accumulated adjustments account may be replenished
and can support capital gains taxation upon the next round of
395.
396.

I.R.C. § 1368(e)(l)(A) and (2).
See text accompanying notes 375-76 supra.
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redemptions. With careful planning, it may not be necessary to
subject any shareholder to taxation with respect to the earnings
and profits accumulated prior to the Subchapter S election.
To the retiring shareholder, the consequences of a non pro rata
distribution that does not exceed the amount of the accumulated
adjustments account are precisely the same as the consequences
of a redemption that qualifies as a sale or exchange under section
302 or 303; therefore, the shareholder may be indifferent whether
the transaction qualifies under those sections. Careful taxpayers,
however, generally will prefer to qualify their redemption under
section 302. If a miscalculation has occurred in the computation
of the accumulated adjustments account and a distribution in fact
exceeds the amount of that account, that excess will be taxable
at ordinary income rates to the redeeming shareholder to the extent of the accumulated earnings and profits account. Moreover,
the effect upon the remaining shareholders in the S corporation
of a redemption that qualifies under either section 302 or section
303 is far less severe than the consequences of a non pro rata
redemption governed by section 1368.
As noted above, if the distribution does not qualify as a redemption under section 302 the accumulated adjustments account is
reduced by an amount equal to the basis of the stock redeemed
or, perhaps, by an amount equal to the basis of all of the stock
owned by the withdrawing shareholder. 397 On the other hand, under
section 1368(e)(1)(B), if the redemption does qualify for sale or exchange treatment under either section 302 or 303, the accumulated
adjustments account is reduced only by a fraction equal to the proportion of the outstanding shares of stock in the corporation that
are redeemed. In most instances, this ratable portion of the accumulated adjustments account will be less than the basis of the
stock being redeemed. Indeed, if the redemption is of a substantial proportion of the outstanding stock of the corporation, the basis
of the stock redeemed may well equal the entire balance in the
accumulated adjustments account. Accordingly, if the redemption
qualifies under section 302 or 303, a far larger proportion of the
accumulated adjustments account will be preserved for the remaining shareholders without resulting in any prejudice to the withdrawing shareholder. For example, in the illustration used above, the
accumulated adjustments account of $500 would have been reduced
at the time of the first redemption of the stock of A by twentyfive percent or $125 if the redemption had qualified under section
302. If the redemption failed to qualify under that provision, the
accumulated adjustments account would have been reduced by $350
(or $175). Obviously, the importance of qualifying a redemption
397.

See text accompanying notes 372-73 supra.
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under section 302 or section 303 increases as the basis of the stock
increases relative to the value of the stock. Thus, it remains as
important as ever to qualify the redemption of stock of a deceased
shareholder under section 303 or section 302. Conversely, in the
relatively uncommon situation where the basis of a shareholder's
stock is less than his allocable portion of the accumulated adjustments account, a smaller reduction in the amount of the account
will be produced by a redemption that does not qualify under section 302 or 303. However, as long as the amount of the redemption
remains less than the entire amount of the accumulated adjustments
account, such a redeeming shareholder will avoid ordinary income
taxation.
The net result of the pattern of taxing non pro rata distributions from S corporations is that the normal planning assumptions
for small business corporations are not altered if the corporation
is an S corporation. In almost every instance, the tax· consequences,
for both withdrawing and remaining shareholders, of a redemption qualifying under section 302 or 303 will be superior to the
consequences of a redemption that does not so qualify. On the other
hand, the disparity in tax consequences between qualifying and
nonqualifying redemptions is not as great under Subchapter S as
in the case of a corporation subject to the corporate income tax.
Thus, the consequences of failing to qualify under section 302 are
not as severe if the corporation is an S corporation. Moreover, the
S corporation is permitted substantially greater flexibility in the
timing of redemptions than a regular corporation is permitted. In
a Subchapter S corporation, periodic redemptions can produce tax
consequences to the withdrawing shareholder that are at least as
favorable as complete terminations of interest. In addition, under
Subchapter S, income may be accumulated to fund a redemption
with no adverse tax consequences unless the limitations on passive
investment income imposed upon S corporations that have accumulated earnings and profits are exceeded. 398
6.

Critique

While the general congressional design in enacting the Revision Act was to bring the taxation of S corporations more closely
into line with the taxation of partnerships, the accumulated adjustments account represents a change from prior law towards the
corporate model. In shifting from the personal PTI account to the
corporate level accumulated adjustments account for the purpose
of establishing the priority of distributions from an S corporation,
the drafters of the Revision Act moved in a direction directly con398.

See text accompanying notes 114-26 supra.
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trary to the primary objective of the Act. That judgment may have
been faulty.
Evidently, the adoption of a corporate level account was
designed to eliminate some of the difficulties experienced with PTI
accounts under prior law. However, the difficulties under prior law
did not stem from the personal nature of the PTI account, rather,
they were attributable to the various characteristics, such as its
nontransferability, that the Treasury Department assigned to the
PTI account. Those difficulties could have been solved without
shifting to a corporate level account. There is no reason that a
personal PTI account could not be transferable even to a purchaser
of S corporation stock; upon the transfer of less than all of a shareholder's stock, a personal account could be allocated arbitrarily.
Had Congress continued the use of a personal account, many of
the problems described above would have been avoided and, in
general, the taxation of S corporations would have resembled more
closely the taxation of partnerships.

C. Eliminating Accumulated Earnings and Profits
The complexities, and potential tax liabilities, created by the
presence of an accumulated earnings and profits account in S corporations undoubtedly will cause the managers of many corporations to seek to eliminate that account. Unless the account is quite
small, however, its elimination may prove to be difficult. The most
straightforward procedure for eliminating an earnings and profits account is to make a distribution to shareholders in a sufficient
amount to exhaust accumulated earnings and profits. That distribution will be subject to tax at ordinary income rates and thus, in
many instances, would be prohibitively expensive. Even if the
shareholders were willing to bear the burden of an accelerated
income tax, many corporations will not have available sufficient
assets to fund an adequate distribution. The response to this circumstance will precipitate a replay of the difficulties posed under
prior law in attempting to distribute previously taxed income.
Under prior law, taxpayers were seriously disadvantaged by the
inability to distribute PTI pursuant to a property distribution.
However, there is no such limitation under present law upon the
ability to distribute accumulated earnings and profits. As a result,
there does not appear to be any reason why an S corporation may
not distribute its own obligation to its shareholders in an amount
sufficient to exhaust its accumulated earnings and profits account.
Such a distribution constitutes a dividend under generallaw 399 and
399. I.R.C. § 312(a)(2). Another possibility is the distribution of a taxable
stock dividend. A pro rata distribution would not suffice, but if each shareholder

700

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

no reason appears for a different rule under Subchapter S. Of
course, when making such a distribution the managers of an S corporation must carefully avoid the prohibition contained in section
1361(b)(l)(D) on two classes of stock.
As originally enacted, the Revision Act contained a further
obstacle to the voluntary elimination of accumulated earnings and
profits. Under the distribution priority rules of section 1368(c),
distributions by an S corporation that has accumulated earnings
and profits are treated first as distributions of accumulated Subchapter S income and only thereafter as distributions of accumulated earnings and profits. While that provision is favorable to taxpayers wishing to avoid tax on distributions from S corporations,
it substantially increases the amount that must be distributed by
a corporation wishing to eliminate its earnings and profits account.
In order to facilitate the elimination of accumulated earnings and
profits accounts, Congress added a new section 1368(e)(3) as part
of the Technical Corrections Act of 1982.400 This provision stipulates
that if all of the shareholders to whom a distribution is made by
an S corporation during a taxable year so elect, the distribution
will not be treated as a tax-free distribution of Subchapter S income; rather, it will be treated as an ordinary dividend to the extent of the accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation.
Section 1368(eX3) indicates that Congress recognized the value
of an elective elimination of earnings and profits; it is regrettable
that Congress did not go further and deal with the two greatest
deterrents to this elimination: the need to make an actual distribution and the risks of a subsequent determination on audit that the
corporation incorrectly calculated its earnings and profits. There
are great hazards in attempting to eliminate an accumulated earnings and profits account through actual distributions. The computation of earnings and profits is far from an exact science and even
with professional assistance, taxpayers may remain uncertain that
the account has been eliminated completely. During the congressional hearings on the Revision Act, the suggestion was made that
shareholders of S corporations be permitted to elect to treat an
amount equal to the corporation's entire accumulated earnings and
profits account as having been constructively distributed and
reinvested. 401 That suggestion, obviously, has great merit. On the
had a bona fide election between cash or stock, the stock dividend should be taxable and, thus, should accomplish a distribution of earnings and profits. I.R.C.
§ 305(b)(1).
400. Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365, 2399.
401. Hearings on S. 2350 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 109-10 (1982) (statement of David G. Glickman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury). A similar approach was recommended by the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association; see testimony
of M. Bernard Aidinoff, id., at 161.
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one hand it would eliminate the need to deplete the liquid assets
of. the corporation, while on the other, it could be drafted to
eliminate computational uncertainties. If, as a result of a subsequent audit, it was determined that the amount taken into income
did not equal the entire amount of accumulated earnings and profits, a deficiency inclusion could be made available. Regrettably,
this provision was not contained in the Revision Act; it should be
added.
For some purposes merely substantially eliminating the accumulated earnings and profits account will be sufficient. For example, the concern that distributions will exceed the amount that
may be distributed tax free will be sufficiently eliminated even
if some small amount remains in the account. The shareholders'
exposure to further tax, by definition, is limited to the amount
that they were willing to include in income as an actual dividend
distribution. On the other hand, the restrictions and tax on passive
investment income in excess of twenty-five percent of gross receipts
are applicable if the S corporation has any amount of accumulated
earnings and profits. Apparently, the tax is applicable even though
it is determined subsequently that the corporation retained as little as one dollar of earnings and profits- a result of doubtful rationality. Accordingly, in eliminating the accumulated earnings and
profits account, it may be advisible to select a technique that
automatically eliminates the entire account.
The elimination of an accumulated earnings and profits account
through any means that will subject the S corporation shareholders
to an immediate ordinary income tax on the full amount of the
account will be prohibitively expensive for many S corporations.
Thus, if a corporation wishes to attempt the elimination of its earnings and profits, it should consider one of the devices employed
by corporations subject to the regular tax for accomplishing that
objective. One common technique for eliminating earnings and profits is the liquidation of the corporation, followed by the reincorporation of a portion of its assets in a newly formed corporation. 402
While the liquidation-reincorporation device subjects the
shareholders of the corporation to tax on the entire amount of the
appreciation in their stock and not merely the amount of the corporate earnings and profits, the tax is imposed at capital gains
rates. Moreover, the transferee corporation obtains a step-up in
basis for the corporate assets equal to their fair market value and
the entire earnings and profits account of the predecessor corporation is eliminated. The advantages sought by such a transaction
will fail if the overall transaction can be reconstructed by the Com402. For a recent treatment see Robinson, Tax Interpretation: Lessans From
the Reincorporation Cases, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1981). See also BITTKER AND
EUSTICE. supra note 156, at 1 14.54.
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missioner as a reorganization within the meaning of section 368
and will largely fail if the transaction can be reconstructed as falling within section 351. However, the Commissioner has not had
much success in recharacterizing carefully planned liquidationreincorporations as reorganizations. In fact, where twenty percent
of the stock of the new corporation is owned by individuals who
neither owned any stock in the old corporation nor are related
to shareholders of the old corporation, no case has held that the
transaction constituted a reorganization.4°3 While there is some indication in the case law that the Commissioner's chances of successfully attacking such a transaction may be improving, 404 the
managers of an S corporation in which accumulated earnings and
profits constitute a substantial handicap might seriously consider
such a device.
For someS corporations, particularly those that have an uncertain but not substantial amount of accumulated earnings and profits,
the tax imposed on a complete liquidation would substantially exceed the tax that would be imposed upon a distribution of accumulated earnings and profits. If that corporation also does not
have a substantial investment portfolio, it might be desirable for
the shareholders to liquidate the corporation under the provisions
of section 333 of the Code. The relationship between section 333
and the Subchapter S provisions is considered below.405

D. Distributions of Appreciated Property
The reason that the Treasury Department insisted that
previously taxed income could be distributed under prior law only
by a cash distribution, and not by a property distribution, was that
a property distribution of previously taxed income could result
in the avoidance of tax at both the corporate and the shareholder
level on any element of appreciation in the property. 406 Under the
rule attributed to the Supreme Court in General Utilities, 407 a
distribution of property with respect to stock does not constitute
a taxable event to the corporation. While that rule has come under
403. See Coven, The Relevance of Fresh Investment to Corporate Distributions and Adjustments, 38 TAx L. REV. 419, 456-72 (1983), in which one of the
authors has argued that these results are wrong and that the transaction suggested in the text should be treated as a reorganization.
404. Id. at 470-72.
405. See text accompanying notes 446-49 infra.
406. See De Treville v. United States, 445 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1971). See also
Oberst, Reform of the Subchapter S Distribution Rules: Repudiation of Section 311(a},
38 TAX L. REV. 79, 90-94 (1982).
407. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
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increasing attack 408 and has been modified widely for redemptions, 409
it has not been altered for distributions in complete liquidations 410
or dividend distributions. Thus, under prior law, the distribution
of property by a Subchapter S corporation did not produce a tax
to the corporation. If such a property distribution had been permitted to qualify as a distribution of PTI, the shareholder would
not be subject to tax upon the receipt of the property although
the property would obtain a tax basis in the shareholders' hands
equal to its fair market value. 411 Accordingly, in lieu of selling
property at the corporate level and incurring an immediate tax
that must be borne by the S corporation shareholders, the corporation would be inclined to distribute the property in kind to
the shareholders because a sale at that level would a void any tax
on the disposition. The benefit of such a device would be a deferral of taxation, not a permanent exemption. The shareholder's basis
in his stock would be reduced by the fair market value of the
property distributed. 412 Accordingly, on a subsequent disposition
of the stock, the shareholder would be subject to tax with respect
to the element of appreciation that had escaped tax at the time
the property was distributed to him and sold. However, that deferral could be indefinite, or even permanent, should the shareholder
die without previously disposing of his stock. 413 In general effect,
the Subchapter S corporation and its shareholders, as a group, could
obtain a step-up in basis to fair market value of any corporate asset
at any time merely by distributing the asset.
The obvious solution to this unwarranted result is the one
adopted in the taxation of partnerships. A distribution of property
from a partnership to a partner is, in effect, a nonrecognition transaction providing for a carryover basis. The partner takes a basis
in the distributed asset equal to the basis that the asset had in
the hands of the partnership 414 and the basis in his partnership
interest is reduced by the same amount. 415 Thus, should the partner dispose of the distributed asset, he would be subject to tax
on exactly the same amount as the partnership would have been
had it sold the asset. This rule prevents the unnecessary acceleration of tax and prohibits an unwarranted deferral of tax.
In practice, however, the taxation of partnership distributions
408.
Draft No.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

See, e.g., ALI. FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C (Tent.
1, 1977), and Oberst, supra note 406.
See I.R.C. §§ 3ll(b)-(d).
I.R.C. § 336(b) does contain an exception concerning certain inventory.
I.R.C. § 30l(d)(l).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(a) (1968).
I.R.C. § 1014.
I.R.C. § 732(a)(1).
I.R.C. § 733.
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is not as simple as this generalization suggests. In order to prevent the conversion of ordinary income that would otherwise be
received at the partnership level into capital gains at the partner
level, Congress enacted the "collapsible partnership" provisions
of section 751, which override all of the rules of partnership taxation. In the case of distributions to partners, the provisions of section 751(b), which one commentator has described as "awesomely
complex," 416 are brought into play. When the Treasury Department
began its study of the revision of Subchapter S, the carryover basis
rule of partnership taxation was considered but rejected because
of the complexity of adapting the collapsible partnership rules to
S corporations. 417 In addition, the Treasury Department was concerned that providing for tax-free distributions and a carryover
basis would create too large a contrast between the rules applicable
to S corporations and those applicable to corporations subject to
the regular tax. 418 It was feared that such a pattern of taxation
would create too great an incentive to abuse the purposes of Subchapter S by electing S corporation status for brief periods of time
in order to execute tax-free distributions.
The General Utilities rule, as applied to corporations subject
to the regular tax, also has come under increasing attack. In
TEFRA, enacted only weeks before the Revision Act, Congress
again reduced the scope of that rule by expanding section 311(d)
and imposing a tax at the corporate level on the element of appreciation contained in distributed property in an expanded class
of redemptions. 419 In addressing the distribution of appreciated property under the Subchapter S rules, Congress adopted the same
approach. Thus, section 1363(d) provides that upon the distribution of appreciated property by an S corporation, gain shall be
recognized as if the property had been sold to the distributee at
its fair market value "notwithstanding any other provision of this
subtitle." While the Subchapter S rule appears far stricter than
the rule applicable under section 3ll(d) to corporations subject to
the regular tax, its effect is very different. If a corporation is subject to the corporate income tax, the reversal of the General Utilities
rule produces two levels of taxation and the desirability of that
reversal is a function of the propriety of that double taxation on
particular corporate transactions. Under Subchapter S, however,
normally no issue of double taxation is presented. Taxing the gain
on distributed property merely affects the timing of the realization of that gain and its allocation among the S corporation
shareholders.
416.
417.
418.
419.

MCKEE, supra note 73, at , 20.01.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 17.

Id.
TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 222, 223, 96 Stat. 324, 478, 483 (1982).
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Because of this reversal of the General Utilities rule for S
corporations, the gain in appreciated property of the S corporation
cannot escape tax upon the distribution of the property.
Accordingly, in a sharp and favorable contrast to prior law, the
Revision Act does not distinguish between the distribution of cash
and the distribution of property.
This new aspect of S corporation taxation, however, creates
an unfavorable difference between the pattern of taxing
partnerships and the pattern of taxing S corporations. While both
patterns of taxation produce the same ultimate burden of tax, under
the Subchapter S rules a distribution of appreciated property
accelerates the tax on the gain in the property to the time of the
distribution rather than permitting the deferral of the tax until
the distributed property is disposed of by the shareholders. Such
lack of conformity between these two forms of business organization
generally is undesirable. In this instance, however, Congress seems
to have achieved the correct result. Whether properly or not, the
Revision Act did not adopt the partnership approach of permitting
the special allocation of items of corporate income and expense
to particular shareholders. If the partnership basis rule had been
adopted for distributions of property by S corporations, such a
rule would permit the corporation to shift the burden of tax on
the element of appreciation in the distributed property away from
the other shareholders in the corporation and to the distributee
shareholder. Such special allocations generally are not permitted;
therefore, it would have been inappropriate to permit the same
result to be achieved through the device of distributing appreciated
property. Section 1363(d) provides that the gain attributable to
the distributed appreciated property is allocated to all of the S
corporation shareholders under the usual rules allocating S corporation income.
This new aspect of S corporation taxation seems appropriate
where the property distribution to the shareholder is free of tax
because it represents a distribution of S corporation income;
however, the application of the new provision is not limited to such
distributions. Thus, even though the property distribution is
regarded as a distribution of accumulated earnings and profits and,
thus, will be fully subject to tax at ordinary income rates to the
distributee shareholder, gain on the distributed property remains
includible in the income of the S corporation. As a result, the S
corporation and its shareholders become subject to a form of double
taxation in a circumstance in which a regular corporation is subject to only a single level of taxation. The appreciation in distributed
property is taxed twice, once as a capital gain allocated to all of
the shareholders and again as ordinary income to the distributee
shareholder. That result is plainly erroneous. Since Congress deliberately has perpetuated the General Utilities rule with respect to
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ordinary dividends from corporations subject to the regular tax,
it is inappropriate to subject the shareholders of an S corporation
to double taxation on distributions out of accumulated earnings
and profits. It is not at all clear that Congress appreciated this
interrelationship between new sections 1363(d) and 1368(c). Section 1363(d) was designed to accomplish a different objective entirely: preventing the complete avoidance of tax on the appreciation in distributed property. Accordingly, the provision should be
amended to prevent this double taxation.
As originally enacted section 1363(d) was also applicable to
distributions in complete liquidation, although that result did not
appear to have been intended by Congress. Under the TCB, gain
is not to be recognized upon such distributions. 420 The proper application of section 1363(d) to complete liquidations, and the relationship of that provision to the Subchapter C rules governing liquidations, is considered below. 421

E. The "Post-Termination Transition Period"
The harshness of the inability to withdraw amounts of
previously taxed income following the voluntary or involuntary
termination of a Subchapter S election has been softened greatly
by new section 1371(e). Under that provision, any distribution of
cash during the post-termination transition period (PTTP) by a corporation that was previously an S corporation, rather than being
treated as a taxable dividend, is treated as a return of capital which
reduces the basis of the shareholder's stock in the corporation.
The adoption of such a grace period is highly desirable and the
relief it extends is a welcome addition to the S corporation rules.
However, at present the provisions contain serious ambiguities.
The PTTP suffers from the attempt to make one concept
accomplish too much. This grace period is used to accomplish two
very different functions: to fix the date upon which losses unused
upon the termination of a Subchapter Selection may be claimed,422
and to provide a period of time within which tax-free distributions
may be made from a corporation following the expiration of its
election. The definition of the PTTP that may be most rational
for one of these purposes may not be rational for the other. Section
1377(b) defines the PTTP as (a) the period beginning the day
following the termination of the S corporation election and
continuing for the longer of one year or until the due date for the
filing of the final S corporation tax return, including any extensions
420.
421.
422.

TCB § 201(a). See note 9 supra.
See text accompanying notes 439-447.
I.R.C. § 1366(d)(3).
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thereof, and as (b) the 120-day period beginning on the date of a
determination that the corporation's election has terminated. For
this purpose, a determination means a final court decision, a closing
agreement, or an agreement between the corporation and the
Commissioner that the corporation has failed to qualify as an S
corporation. 423
Thus, the PTTP seems to consist of two discrete periods of
time, the one-year period immediately following termination and
a 120-day period that may occur years later. Obviously, the two
separate periods are addressed to two different types of termination
of S elections. The one-year period following termination will be
useful to corporations when the termination, whether intentional
or inadvertent, is at least known to the managers of the corporation
when it occurs. The alternative 120-day period will be beneficial
when the termination of the S election is not known to the managers
of the corporation at the time it occurred, or at least is not conceded.
Because the possible loss of S corporation status often is raised
on an audit that occurs more than one year after the alleged
termination, the one-year period of time will provide no relief for
inadvertent terminations. Nevertheless, the availability of the
PTTP is not so limited. The alternative definitions are connected
by the word "and;" therefore, regardless of the nature of the
termination of the S corporation election, the corporation apparently
is entitled to both such periods. In addition, the proper definition
of the PTTP is confused further because the description of the
PTTP in the legislative history does not correspond to the statutory
language. Both the House and Senate Reports state that the PTTP
is to extend from the actual termination of the S corporation
election until the expiration of the tatter of the two described
periods. 424 That language seems to indicate that the grace period
constitutes a single continuous period expiring after one year in
the event the termination does not precipitate a "determination"
or, if a determination occurs, 120 days after it is rendered.
When the grace period is used to identify the time at which
unused losses may be claimed, the preferable construction of the
PTTP would be that it consisted of two discrete periods. In that
situation, the Code must specify the date upon which the loss is
deemed to be sustained. Indeed, section 1366(d)(3)(A) provides
that the loss may be claimed on the last day of "any" PTTP, thus
suggesting that more than one PTTP may be available. If the termination is inadvertent, the corporation may pass through the first
one-year period before the shareholders are aware of the
423. I.R.C. § 1377(b)(2).
424. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 16-17; SENATE REPORT, supra note
22, at 18.

708

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

termination. Congress, therefore, provided the alternative postdetermination PTTP. In the case of an inadvertent termination,
however, a corporation m·ay sustain losses that some of its
shareholders cannot claim because of an absence of basis at the
end of its actual final year as an S corporation, yet the shareholders
may obtain an increase in their stock basis during the following
year attributable to contributions to capital or the discharge of
obligations as the guarantor of corporate indebtedness. In that
event, the shareholders will have claimed the carried over losses
under the normal Subchapter S rules. If the S corporation status
is contested subsequently and a determination rendered that a
termination in fact occurred, the shareholders should be entitled,
under PTTP rules, to retain that loss in the year following the
termination. Requiring the deferral of losses would be far less
favorable, not only because of the extended deferral of the tax
benefit, but also because of the complexity introduced by potential
changes in stock ownership. No useful purpose would be served
by requiring the shareholders to suffer the deferral of their loss
until, after many years, a final determination is issued. However,
that deferral can be avoided only if the PTTP includes two discrete
periods, both of which have a last day upon which losses can be
claimed pursuant to section 1366(d)(3)(A).
If this more favorable rule is not adopted, the managers of S
corporations will be faced with a difficult choice when it is possible
that a termination has occurred. If the termination is conceded,
the carried over losses may be claimed at once- under the one
year PTTP. However, if the termination is contested, the
· shareholders will face the possibility that the tax benefit of those
losses must be deferred until an adverse determination is rendered.
That pressure to concede debatable terminations is improper.
Rather, as long as a sufficient basis for the stock has been created,
the shareholders should be permitted to claim losses at the end
of either the one-year or the 120-day period and losses claimed
erroneously under the normal Subchapter S rules should be treated
as losses claimed on the last day of one-year PTTP.
When the PTTP concept is employed to permit tax-free
distributions from corporations that have terminated their
Subchapter S status, regardless of how the PTTP is defined the
relief seems to be somewhat less than rational. Under section
1371(e), the relief extended is mandatory. Thus, any distribution
during the PTTP is treated as a return of capital. There seems
to be no purpose whatsoever for this "relief' in the event of a
deliberate and known termination of a Subchapter S election. In
that event, no relief is warranted and the normal pattern for taxing
corporations subject to the regular income tax should have been
left undisturbed. In fact, it is doubtful that Congress intended a
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one-year moratorium on taxable dividends distributed by
corporations subject to the corporate income tax simply because
the corporation was subject to Subchapter S during the preceeding
year. Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any basis in the
statute for excluding distributions by such corporations from the
mandatory grace period.
Where the termination of the S election is inadvertent, the
corporation may have made actual distributions to its shareholders
in several years following the inadvertent termination but before
it was aware that the termination had occurred. If the PTTP
consists of two discrete periods of time, distributions during the
first year following the inadvertent termination will constitute taxfree returns of capital while distributions thereafter will be subject
to tax as normal dividends to the extent of the corporation's
earnings and profits. Because corporations rarely are subject to
audit within one year following the conclusion of their taxable year,
the relief extended by the one-year period seems incomplete and
relatively arbitrary.
Furthermore, the creation of a 120-day window through which
additional tax-free distributions may be made seems excessively
restrictive. Before a final determination is made that a Subchapter
S election has been terminated inadvertently, a substantial
inhibition against making dividend distributions will exist. If the
Subchapter S status of the corporation has terminated, the
distributions will be taxable as ordinary dividends. However, if
the corporation defers making distributions until a final
determination is rendered, the distribution will be tax-free. One
hopes that the shareholders of such a corporation have other means
of support. Regardless of whether the corporation remains subject
to a Subchapter S election, a tax-free distribution will be permissible
at some point; therefore, it seems unduly restrictive to require
that distribution only during a brief period of time many years
later. Thus, from both these perspectives, a more rational
construction of the PTTP is a single continuous period ending 120
days following a determination that the Subchapter S election has
terminated.
In addition to granting relief to known voluntary terminations
of S elections, the application of the PTTP concept to corporate
distributions seems overbroad in a second respect. The relief
extended by section 1371(e) apparently is available without regard
to the ownership of the stock of the corporation during the PTTP.
Thus, a corporate distribution during the grace period to a
shareholder who acquires his stock after the Subchapter S election
has in fact terminated will be free of tax even though the
shareholder, at the time of purchase, was fully aware that the
corporation was subject to the regular income tax. By virtue of
the increased basis that he is able to offset against the proceeds
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of the sale, the seller of the stock already will have received a
tax-free recovery of the amount of S corporation income that
previously had been taxed to him; therefore, there is no justification
for granting relief to the purchaser of that stock. Indeed, section
1371(e) effectively converts what otherwise is a dividend subject
to ordinary income taxation into a deferred capital gain. Providing
grace period relief to a transferee of S corporation stock who
acquires that stock by gift or in another transaction producing a
carryover basis is appropriate, but the statute should be amended
to bar such relief to a purchaser of stock.
Two further aspects of distributions during the PTTP should
be observed. First, the relief provision of section 1371(e) applies
only to distributions of cash. Presumably, Congress so limited the
grace period relief to prevent the avoidance of tax on any gain
in appreciated property distributed during the grace period. At
the time of the distribution, the corporation does not in fact
constitute an S corporation; therefore, the new rule of section
1363(d) imposing a tax on the element of appreciation in distributed
property will not be applicable. For a corporation subject to the
regular corporate income tax, the exemption from tax on the
appreciation in distributed property continues to apply to ordinary
dividend distributions. As a result of this limitation, property
distributions following an unknown termination cannot be regarded
as tax free under the grace period relief provision. Moreover,
corporations short of cash and unwilling or unable to borrow will
have difficulty taking advantage of a PTTP distribution, even if
the property that they wish to distribute has not appreciated in
value. An alternative would have been to apply the rule of section
1363(d) to all property distributions treated as returns of capital
under section 1371(e). That approach would have prevented the
avoidance of tax and substantially increased the flexibility of PTTP
distributions. It is regrettable that Congress did not pursue that
alternative.
Secondly, the amount that may be distributed by a corporation
tax free pursuant to this provision may not exceed the amount
of its accumulated adjustments account. That account, it will be
recalled, generally corresponds to the net accumulated income of
the S corporation since January 1, 1983.425 This limitation effectively
prevents the tax-free distribution during the PTTP of earnings
and profits accumulated after the termination of the Subchapter
S election (as well as of pre-election or pre-1983 earnings and
profits). The objective is entirely reasonable but it illustrates a
minor flaw in the Revision Act. The only reason S corporations
that do not have any earnings and profits are required to maintain
425.

I.R.C. §§ 1368(e)(l)(A) and (e)(2).
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an accumulated adjustments account is that they may obtain
earnings and profits. However, such corporations can acquire
earnings and profits in only two ways, neither of which is likely
to occur: by the acquisition of another corporation in a transaction
in which earnings and profits carry over, and during the PTTP. 426
It is highly unfortunate that all S corporations will be subjected
to the burden of currently maintaining such accounts when that
expense will have significance for only a very few. Requiring this
largely wasted effort is inconsistent with the objective of
simplifying Subchapter S. Congress should seek an alternative
solution. 427
VIII.

RELATIONSHIP OF SUBCHAPTER S TO SUBCHAPTER

C

The integration of the new S corporation with the rules of
general application governing corporate distributions and
adjustments, contained in Subchapter C of the Code, was one of
the most complicated aspects of revising Subchapter S.
Unfortunately, few of the complex issues raised are addressed
directly by the Revision Act and the legislative history offers only
the slimmest guidance as to how this integration was intended to
be accomplished. In addition, while the TCB would remove some
doubts, it seems probable that other aspects of the application of
Subchapter C to S corporations will require legislative revision.
As a result, the relationship between Subchapter S and Subchapter
C remains quite uncertain and the following observations must be
regarded as highly tentative.
The relationship between Subchapter S and Subchapter C is
governed largely by three rules: (a) an S corporation is a corporation
and, except to the extent inconsistent with Subchapter S,
Subchapter C applies to an S corporation, 428 (b) for the purposes
of Subchapter C, an S corporation "in its capacity as a shareholder
of another corporation" is treated as an individual,429 and (c) the
income of an S corporation is computed in the same manner as
an individual computes income.430 The problem, t_hen, is determining
when the deemed-individual rule and, to a lesser extent, the income
computation requirement should be regarded as inconsistent with

426. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 19.
427. There are many other uncertainties concerning the PTTP that the
regulations, or Congress, must address. For example, if any PTTP is available
when a deliberate termination occurs, it is unclear whether the corporation by
subsequently agreeing with the Commissioner that the termination in fact occurred may create an additional PTTP for claiming losses or making distributions.
428. I.R.C. § 1371(al(l).
429. I.R.C. § 1371(a)(2).
430. I.R.C. § 1363(b).
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the general rules of Subchapter C. The only illustration of the
relationship among these three rules contained in the Committee
Reports concerns the receipt of dividends of property by S
corporations. 431 However, the breadth of the deemed-individual rule
clearly indicates that Congress intended the scope of that provision
to encompass far more than merely subjecting S corporation
shareholders to tax on the full fair market value of property
dividends received by their corporation.

A. Dividend Equivalence and Stock Attribution
It seems relatively clear that whenever an S corporation
receives a distribution with respect to stock from another
corporation, the deemed-individual rule should prevail. Therefore,
the consequences of the distribution to the S corporation and its
shareholders should be determined in the same manner as if the
distributions were received by an individual. Accordingly, it seems
safe to assume that in applying section 302 for the purpose of
determining the character of a distribution received by an S
corporation, the S corporation should be regarded as an individual.
The treatment of an S corporation in this context will be primarily
of significance under section 302(b)(4). Pursuant to that provision,
redemptions incident to the partial liquidation of a corporation are
entitled to capital gains taxation but only when the stock is
redeemed from a shareholder other than a corporation. Evidently,
S corporations are entitled to the benefits of section 302(b)(4) by
virtue of the deemed-individual rule.
In many circumstances, the characterization of a purported
redemption under section 302 requires the application of the stock
attribution rules of section 318. Section 318 contains rules governing
the attribution of stock ownership to and from individuals, corporations, and other entities. Under the Revision Act, it was not
entirely clear whether an S corporation was to be regarded as an
individual for the purpose of section 318 which would have produced absurd results, or as a corporation. The TCB would resolve
this doubt by treating an S corporation as a partnership, and its
shareholders as partners, for the purpose of attributing stock ownership in another corporation between the S corporation and its
shareholders.432 Under section 318, stock ownership in a second cor431. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 14; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22,
at 15.
432. TCB § 201(i). See note 9 supra. Technically, the amendment would treat
an S corporation as a partnership for all purposes of attributing the stock of
another corporation. However, for the purpose of attributing stock between the
S corporation and another entity in which it holds an interst, it is irrelevant
whether the S corporation is treated as a corporation or as a partnership. New
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poration is attributed between a corporation and a shareholder
only if the shareholder actually or constructively owns fifty percent or more of the stock in the corporation;433 attribution between
a partnership and its partners is not so limited by a threshold
ownership requirement. Thus the effect of the proposed amendment is to expand materially the potential for attributing the ownership of stock in a second corporation between an S corporation
and its stockholders for the purposes of those sections of the Code
that employ the attribution rules of section 318.434 The TCB amendment would not alter the treatment of an S corporation for the
purpose of attributing the ownership of the stock in the S corporation itself.
·
Similar confusion surrounds the proper construction of section
304. That provision, among other things, requires that certain sales
of stock in a corporation to a second corporation controlled by the
same persons be reconstructed and treated as if the purchasing
corporation had redeemed its own stock from the controlling
shareholders. The constructive redemption is tested for dividend
equivalence under section 302. A Subchapter S election will be
terminated if another corporation acquires stock in the S
corporation; therefore, a section 304 transaction involving an S
corporation can occur only when the S corporation acquires stock
in a sister corporation (or a subsidiary). If the S corporation is
regarded as an individual for the purposes of section 304, the
provision would not be applicable. While the S corporation, as a
result of its purchase of stock, will become a shareholder in another
corporation, the purpose of reconstructing the sale as a redemption
by section 304 does not concern the S corporation in its capacity
as a shareholder. The basic transaction addressed by section 304
is the attempt by the controlling shareholders to extract funds
from a controlled corporation at capital gains rates by purporting
to enter into a sale of stock. The section does not address the
participant corporations in their capacity as shareholders; rather,
it addresses them in their corporate capacity. Thus, the Treasury
I.R.C. § 1373(a) also provides that an S corporation will be treated as a partnership for purposes of the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 958 dealing with controlled
foreign corporations.
433. I.R.C. §§ 318(a)(2)(C) and (3)(C).
434. The pattern of the attribution rules spread throughout the Code is
so chaotic that it is not possible rationally to critize the TCB amendment. Treating
an S corporation in the same manner as a partnership for this purpose makes
more sense than treating it as a corporation. However, the 50% threshold requirement for back attribution, i.e., attribution from an owner to an entity, is
a desirable limitation that probably should be extended to partnerships, rather
than withdrawn from S corporations. See Coven, Affinity Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code: A Case Study in Nonsimplification, 45 TENN L. REV. 557, 695-97
(1978).
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Department probably will take the position that an S corporation
is to be regarded as a corporation for the purposes of section 304.
If section 304 does apply to the purchase of stock in a sister
corporation by an S corporation, the consequences of that
application of section 304 often will be very different from the
consequences of its application to corporations subject to the
corporate income tax. In the latter context, the application of section
304 is almost invariably unfavorable to the taxpayer. The section
reconstructs a purported sale at capital gains rates into a
redemption that may fail the test of section 302 and thus be subject
to ordinary income tax to the full extent of the proceeds received
by the controlling shareholder. When the purchasing corporation
is an S corporation, however, the taxable sale instead may be
converted into a tax-free distribution from the accumulated
adjustments account. The consequences of such non pro rata
distributions from S corporations are treated above. 435

B. Redemptions Subject to Section 311(d)
Under section 311(d) the distribution of appreciated property
by a corporation in redemption of its stock is treated as a realization of the gain in the distributed property, thus subjecting the
distributing corporation to tax on the element of appreciation. That
general rule, however, is subject to a series of exceptions including
a redemption incident to a partial liquidation of "qualified stock."
Under section 311(e)(l), qualified stock is defined as stock held by
a person other than a corporation, who for the five year period
preceding the redemption (or the lesser period of corporate existence), owned at least ten percent of the value of the stock of
the distributing corporation. Under the Revision Act as enacted
and the deemed-individual rule of section 1371(aX2), stock redeemed
from an S corporation would be eligible for this exemption from
the tax imposed under section 311(d).
Congress evidently became concerned that the scope of this
exemption could be unduly broadened through the use of conduit
entities. Several stockholders, each of whom owned less than ten
percent of the stock of a corporation, could combine their holdings
through the formation of an S corporation, a partnership or a trust.
If the ten percent test of section 311(e) were applied at the entity
level, an exemption from tax beyond that intended by Congress
could be achieved. To bar that result, the TCB would amend section 311(e)(l) to provide that the definition of qualified stock shall

435.

See text accompanying notes 37 4-80 supra.
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be applied at the shareholder, partner or beneficiary level. 436 The
provision apparently contemplates that the ownership of the stock
of the distributing corporation be attributed to the S corporation
shareholders (or partners or beneficiaries) for the five year period
in accordance with their interests in the S corporation, which, of
course, will have varied over time. If that attributed ownership
meets both the ten percent and the five year tests, the exemption
will be available. Presumably this attribution of ownership should
be made even though during a portion of the five year period, the
S corporation was not an electing corporation. Similarly, an S corporation shareholder should be entitled to tack onto this period
of attributed ownership any prior period of his actual ownership
of the stock in the distributing corporation. However, the amendment is silent on all such questions.
In addition, the proposed amendment provides that the distribution is to be treated as made directly to the shareholders, partners or beneficiaries in proportion to their interests in the entity.
Presumably this language is not to be read literally. It seems most
unlikely that Congress intended that the S shareholders be taxed
directly on the gain attributable to the distributed property or
treated as if they had received a constructive distribution from
the S corporations. Rather, this second provision appears intended to confirm that the distributing corporation will be subject to
tax with respect to stock deemed owned by less than ten percent
shareholders and will not be subject to tax with respect to stock
deemed owned by shareholders that are treated as meeting the
test of section 311(e)(l)(A).

C. Liquidation of S Corporations
The provisions of the Code governing the consequences of a
liquidation do not address the liquidating corporation in its capacity
as a shareholder. Accordingly, the deemed-individual rule should
not be applicable. On the other hand, it does not necessarily follow
that the general rules of Subchapter C are therefore applicable
to the liquidation. The provisions of Subchapter C that govern the
consequences to a corporation of its liquidation address the
computation of the income of the liquidating corporation. In
particular, section 336 provides that, generally, no gain or loss shall
be recognized to the liquidating corporation on the distribution
of property in complete liquidation, and related section 337 provides
that no gain or loss will be recognized by the corporation on a
sale of property pursuant to a plan of liquidation if the corporation
436.

TCB § 102(f)..
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is, in fact, liquidated within one year following the adoption of the
plan. Under prior law, both of these non-recognition provisions applied to Subchapter S corporations. However, as the Revision Act
was originally adopted, it was not fully clear whether either continued to apply. S corporations are required to compute their income in the same manner as an individual and individuals, of course,
are not entitled to the benefits of either section 336 or 337.
Moreover, although the result appeared contrary to the legislative
history, 437 section 1363(d) literally required the recognition of gain
on any distribution of appreciated property by an S corporation,
even in complete liquidation. That specific provision appeared to
supplant section 336 and, since section 336 and 337 are related
provisions, suggested that section 337 also might not be applicable
to the liquidation of an S corporation.
Under the TCB, section 1363(d)438 would not apply to distributions in complete liquidation. While that exemption from the tax
imposed on other distributions of appreciated property falls short
of a specification that section 336 does apply to S corporations notwithstanding that they are to compute their income as individuals,
the congressional intent seems reasonably clear. And, if section
336 is to apply, it might be surmised that Congress also intended
that section 337 apply to the liquidation of S corporations. However,
that conclusion is far from certain.
1.

Section 337

Under prior law, one of the specialized uses for Subchapter
S corporations was to minimize the tax consequences of a disposition
of the property of a corporation before its complete liquidation.
Although section 337 eliminates a tax at the corporate level on
most of the gain inherent in business property, the list of exceptions
to that rule is lengthy and expanding.439 In addition, the ordinary
business income of the corporation remains subject to tax for its
final year of operation even though the profits derived will be
distributed immediately to the shareholders and again subject to
tax. Accordingly, many closely held corporations engaged in a
complete liquidation have elected under Subchapter S for their
final year. 440 The Commissioner endorsed this use of Subchapter
437. Both the House and Senate Reports state that I.R.C. § 1363(d) was
not applicable to distributions in complete liquidations. HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 22, at 19; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 20.
438. TCB § 201(a). See note 9 supra.
439. See Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973);
and Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
440. In addition, I.R.C. § 337 is not available to collapsible corporations as
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Sunder prior law and ruled that the tax imposed on capital gains
derived by a Subchapter S corporation in certain circumstances
is not applicable to gain protected from tax by section 337. 441 A
corporation so proceeding could avoid double taxation on items
of income not sheltered by section 337 without incurring any
unfavorable consequences. Although this technique was well known,
there is no indication in the legislative history to the Revision Act
that Congress intended to alter the availability of this tax reduction
technique and the TCB seems to confirm that conclusion. However,
the new Subchapter S rules were not integrated properly with
section 337 and as a result, if that section is applicable on the liquidation of an S corporation, the gain in the corporation's properties will be relieved of tax at both the corporate and shareholder
levels. Such a result could not possibly have been intended by
Congress.
If section 337 does apply to a disposition of properties by an
S corporation, the S corporation shareholders would not be subject
to tax. However, the basis of their stock in the S corporation would
be increased by the amount of gain realized but not recognized
on the disposition. Under section 1367(a)(1), the basis of a
shareholder's stock in an S corporation is increased by his allocable
share of items of income attributed to him under section 1366(a)
(1). Under that provision, the allocation includes all items of income
"including tax-exempt income." Because section 337 clearly exempts
gain from tax, sections 1366 and 1367 apparently require an increase
in the shareholder's basis for that amount of gain. As a result,
when the proceeds of that corporate sale are distributed to the
shareholders in liquidation, the gain in the shareholder's stock that
corresponds to the gain exempted from tax under section 337 will
again be free of tax. Thus, gain attributable to the disposition of
the property of the corporation in preparation for a liquidation
will be exempt from tax at both the corporate and the shareholder
level. Such a result is plainly wrong because the purpose of section 337, like the purpose of Subchapter S, is to eliminate double
taxation and not to eliminate all taxation upon the appreciation
in value of corporate property.
There apparently are two possible solutions to this problem.
Either by a most aggressive regulation or through further corrective legislation, it could be provided that the basis of a shareholder's
stock shall not be increased by the amount of any gain unrecognized
under section 337. Alternatively, S corporations could be barred
from obtaining nonrecognition under section 337. Somewhat surprisdefined in I.R.C. § 341(b). I.R.C. § 337(c)(1). Thus, electing under Subchapter S
in the year a collapsible corporation is to be liquidated frequently will be desirable.
441. Rev. Rul. 78-89, 1978-1 C.B. 272.
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ingly, perhaps, a superior tax result would be achieved if section
337 were not applicable to the liquidation of an S corporation. In
contrast to the consequence of failing to apply section 337 to a
corporation subject to the corporate income tax, withdrawing the
availability of that section from S corporations would not produce
double taxation. The income recognized on a disposition of the corporate properties would cause an increase in the basis of the stock
in the corporation which would shelter the distribution of the proceeds of the corporate level sale from further tax. 442 Rather, the
application of section 337 to S corporations merely affects the
characterization of that gain. If section 337 is not applicable gain
on the appreciation in the corporate properties will be characterized
at the corporate level and thus will yield ordinary income to the
extent that properties are not eligible for capital gains treatment.
Conversely, if section 337 is applicable but no adjustment to the
basis of the corporate stock results from the income excused from
tax, the gain in the corporate properties will be converted into
a capital gain under section 331 upon the distribution in complete
liquidation. 443 There is no obvious reason why the gain on the final
disposition of the property of a corporation should be converted
into a capital gain. On the contrary, entity level characterization
would be more consistent with the pattern of taxing partnerships 444
and would retard the use of S corporations to avoid the collapsible corporation provisions of section 341.
It would seem, therefore, that the preferable approach would
be to resolve the ambiguity concerning the application of section
337 in favor of its unavailability. However, if section 337 were not
applicable to S corporations, it would be intolerable for section
336 to apply when the shareholders will be subject to tax under
section 331. The application of section 336 to an S corporation produces precisely the same result as would the application of section 337. Thus if section 336 were to apply but section 337 did
not, S corporation shareholders would be subject to different tax
consequences depending upon whether the corporation assets were
sold at the corporate level or distributed and, likely, sold at the
shareholder level- the very inconsistency that section 337 was
enacted to eliminate. As a result, if Congress wishes to bar S corporations from the benefits of section 337, the TCB must be
amended to limit the scope of the exclusion of distributions in
complete liquidation from section 1363(d). If the shareholders will

442. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(l)(A).
443. Of course, even if I.R.C. § 337 is applicable, some ordinary income may
be generated on a disposition of the properties of the corporation. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§§ 337(b)(l) and 1245. See note 439 supra.
444. See I.R.C. §§ 735 and 751.
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be subject to tax under section 331, section 336 should not apply
and gain should be recognized under section 1363(d).445 On the other
hand, even if section 337 is not available to S corporations, section
336 must apply if the shareholders are subject to tax under section 333. In any event, prompt further amendment of the Revision
Act to coordinate section 337 with the new provisions seems required regardless of the approach taken.
2.

Section 333

Under prior law, one of the relatively few circumstances in
which it was desirable to liquidate a corporation pursuant to the
provisions of section 333 was when the corporation was a
Subchapter S corporation. If the shareholders of a liquidating
corporation elect to be subject to tax pursuant to section 333, they
are not subject to tax with respect to the entire amount of gain
inherent in their stock in the corporation. Rather, individual
shareholders are subject to tax at ordinary income rates on an
amount equal to their allocable portion of the earnings and profits
of the liquidating corporation (but not on an amount in excess of
the gain realized on the liquidation). 446 The liquidating distribution
is not subject to any further tax except to the extent that the
properties distributed consist of cash and certain investment
securities. Thus, if a corporation having a relatively small amount
of earnings and profits, such as an S corporation, distributes its
assets in kind to its shareholders, the liquidation may be virtually
free of tax consequences. The shareholders will obtain a basis for
the distributed assets equal to the basis that they had in their
stock in the corporation. 447 Thus, s.ection 333 is a form of
nonrecognition provision that roughly mirrors a tax free
incorporation under section 351. There are strong policy reasons
for desiring to retain the application of section 333 to the liquidation
of S corporations. The pattern of taxation produced by the provision
more nearly resembles the consequences of dissolving a partnership
than it resembles the normal consequences of liquidating a
corporation. In operation, the provision permits the shareholders
of an S corporation to revert to partnership form without immediate
tax consequences. Thus, the provision is entirely consistent with
the underlying philosophy of the Revision Act.
445. If the gain so recognized was large enough, it might attract the corporate level capital gains tax imposed by I.R.C. § 1374. The resulting double taxation plainly would be erroneous. Accordingly, if I.R.C. § 1363(d) was to be made
applicable to distributions in complete liquidation, the gain so recognized should
be exempt from tax under I.R.C. § 1374.
446. I.R.C. § 333(e). A slightly different rule, discussed in the text below,
is applicable to corporations.
447. I.R.C. § 334(c).
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If the liquidating S corporation were subject to tax on the
appreciation inherent in properties distributed to its shareholders,
the benefits of section 333 would be eliminated substantially. While
the shareholders technically would remain free to elect section 333
treatment, in fact they would be subject to tax on the entire amount
of the appreciation in the corporate properties distributed to them.
While in many instances the appreciation in the shareholder's stock
would be greater than the appreciation in the corporation
properties, and thus some amount of gain may remain deferred,
in most situations little advantage would remain to electing under
section 333. Although under the Revision Act it appeared that
distributions in complete liquidation might be subject to tax under
section 1363(d), the TCB would bar that result. Accordingly, electing under section 333 upon the liquidation of an S corporation remains as desirable as under prior law. Indeed, since S corporations
will not accumulate any earnings and profits after 1982, the attractiveness of section 333 has been enhanced.

D. S Corporations as Stockholders in Liquidating Corporations
When the S corporation is a shareholder in the corporation that
is being liquidated, the deemed-individual rule clearly controls the
tax consequences to the S corporation and its shareholders. While
the consequences of such liquidations seem relatively unambiguous,
those consequences nevertheless can be somewhat surprising.
Under the relatively complex scheme of Subchapter C, the
shareholders of liquidating corporations may be subject to tax under
one of three separate provisions. Under the general rule of section 331, shareholders, whether corporate or individual, are subject to tax in the same manner as if they had sold their stock in
the liquidating corporation. Thus, the shareholders are subject to
tax on the amount by which the value of the cash or property
distributed exceeds the basis in the S corporation stock. As a result,
the shareholders obtain a basis in any property distributed equal
to its fair market valu~.
The alternative elective treatment under section 333 is available
to both corporations and individuals although with slightly differing tax consequences. While the amount subject to tax does not
depend upon the nature of the shareholder, corporate shareholders
are subject to tax at capital .gains rates on the entire amount
recognized. 449 Furthermore, under section 333(b), a corporation that
at any time after January 1, 1954 owned fifty percent of the voting
stock of the corporation to be liquidated is excluded from section
448

448.
449.

I.R.C. § 334(a).
I.R.C. § 333(£).
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333 treatment. Since an S corporation is treated as an individual
for the purposes of section 333, neither of these rules applicable
to corporations should be applicable to S corporations -at least
those formed after 1982. On the other hand, it is not entirely clear
that an S corporation will be regarded as eligible to elect section
333 treatment if it owned over fifty percent of the stock of the
corporation being liquidated either prior to the making of an S
election or while it was a Subchapter S corporation prior to 1983.
In such instances, the corporation might be treated as one that
owned over fifty percent of the stock of the corporation being liquidated even though it is treated as an individual today.
Finally, under section 332, no gain or loss is recognized to a
corporation upon the liquidation of another corporation in which
it owns eighty percent or more of the stock. Under the deemedindividual rule, section 332 apparently will not be available to S
corporations.
One context in which an S corporation will be a stockholder
in a liquidating corporation is where the S corporation has pur:
chased all or substantially all of the stock of another corporation
with a view to the immediate liquidation of that corporation and
the acquisition of all of its assets. Technically, an S corporation
is prohibited from acquiring eighty percent or more of the stock
of another corporation. 450 However, under prior law the Treasury
Department recognized that an overly literal application of that
prohibition would serve no useful purpose but would interfere with
the conduct of legitimate business transactions. One common
technique for acquiring the assets of another corporation is to purchase the stock of that corporation and to liquidate it immediately.
Between the time of purchase and the time of liquidation, the S
corporation momentarily would violate the prohibition against the
ownership of over eighty percent of the stock in another corporation. If that prohibition had been enforced literally, Subchapter
S corporations would have been barred from acquiring assets in
this manner. Recognizing that this technique was not inconsistent
with Subchapter S, the Commissioner ruled that the momentary
ownership of more than eighty percent of the stock of another corporation would not cause a termination of the Subchapter S
election. 451 None of the amendments to Subchapter S produced by
the Revision Act have any bearing on the desirability of waiving
literal compliance with this aspect of the definition of an S corporation. Presumably, therefore, the flexibility shown by the
Treasury Department in this respect will be continued under present law.
450.
451.
270.

I.R.C. § 1361(b)(2)(A).
Rev. Rul. 73-496, 1973-2 C.B. 312. See also Rev. Rul. 72-320, 1972-1 C.B.
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When a corporation subject to the regular income tax acquires
eighty percent or more of the stock of another corporation during
a one-year period, it is entitled under section 338 to elect to increase the basis of the assets of its newly acquired subsidiary to
their fair market value on the date of the stock acquisition. It is
not entirely clear whether an S corporation is entitled to make
this section 338 election. Technically, the election does not affect
the acquiring corporation, rather, it alters the basis of the assets
of the subsidiary. However, because of its position as a stockholder
in the newly acquired subsidiary, the acquiring corporation makes
the election. Thus, the deemed-individual rule might be regarded
as barring S corporations from making this election. That disability,
however, apparently is not significant. Since an S corporation can
own eighty percent or more of the stock of another corporation
only momentarily, at best, any such acquired subsidiary must be
liquidated promptly. The liquidation will be subject to section 331;
thus, the acquiring S corporation will obtain a basis for any assets
distributed in the liquidation equal to the fair market value of the
assets on the date of liquidation. This value should not vary
materially from the amount paid for the S corporation stock.
IX.

OIL AND GAS AND OTHER NATURAL
RESOURCE ACTIVITIES

Under prior law, a Subchapter S corporation was not a particularly attractive vehicle for conducting extensive oil and gas
exploration or development. 452 The depletable character of the corporation's income would not pass through to its shareholders and
if losses attributable to intangible drilling or percentage depletion
exceeded the basis of the shareholders' stock, the tax benefit of
those deductions was lost forever. 453 More importantly, because
earnings and profits are reduced only by cost and not by percentage
depletion, 454 the corporation normally would have current earnings
and profits in excess of taxable income and, thus, would tend to
accumulate a substantial earnings and profits account. As a result,
distributions of previously taxed income could not be made without
completely sacrificing the benefits of percentage depletion for that
year. In addition, the income from some types of mineral exploitation constituted passive investment income. 455 For these and other
452.

See generally MILLER'S OIL AND GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

1 27-2

(J. Houghton 21st ed. 1983).

453. Former I.R.C. § 137 4(c).
454. I.R.C. § 312(k) and Treas. Regs. §§ 1.312-15 (1972). Earnings and profits
of a Subchapter S corporation were computed in essentially the same manner
as those of a non-electing corporation. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1377-2(b) (1960).
455. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(v) (1976).
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reasons, the use of a Subchapter S corporation was rarely desirable
when a substantial portion of the corporation's activities consisted
of oil and gas investments.
The Revision Act has eliminated many of these prior law provisions that made oil and gas activity unattractive for Subchapter
S corporations. For new corporations, there is no restriction on
passive investment income. 456 The depletable character of the corporate income passes through to its shareholders 457 and the distinction between income and earnings and profits is no longer relevant.
When a corporation without pre-1983 earnings and profits makes
distributions in excess of accumulated S corporation income, they
are treated as a return of capital. 458 Such treatment preserves the
benefit of the special tax allowances for this industry. While the
ability of a shareholder to claim losses remains limited to the basis
for his stock and that basis is not increased by any indebtedness
incurred at the corporate level, unused losses at least may be carried over and deducted in future years.459 However, as noted below,
under current law, it is far less likely that losses will exceed the
shareholders' bases.
In addition, Congress has made the use of an S corporation
more attractive to taxpayers engaged in oil and gas activities in
ways that go beyond changes in prior law of general application.
The Revision Act has adopted many of the features of partnership taxation that are designed specifically to favor the extractive
industries in general and oil and gas operations in particular. In
several respects, these special rules are inconsistent with the
general structure of the revised Subchapter S and will increase
materially the complexity of the taxation of S corporations for taxpayers taking advantage for these special provisions. While those
incongruities are regrettable, it was entirely proper for Congress
to have conformed the taxation of S corporations to the pattern
of taxing partnerships in these respects.
In general, the computation of depletion occurs at the partnership or S corporation level and the amount so computed is allocated
to the owners as a separately stated item. For both entities,
however, a markedly different rule is applicable to the computation of percentage depletion on oil or gas properties under the
independent producers exemption to the general denial of that tax
preference. Under section 613A(c)(13), the S corporation is required
456. I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3), the new provision dealing with termination of the
election because of excess passive investment income is applicable only to those
S corporations that have accumulated earnings and profits remaining from a year
in which they were non-electing corporations.
457. I.R.C. § 1366(b).
458. I.R.C. § 1368(b).
459. I.R.C. § 1366(d).
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to allocate to each shareholder a pro rata share of the corporation's adjusted basis in each oil or gas property. The shareholders
are then required to compute their own depletion allowance with
respect to the oil or gas property just as they would for individually
owned properties. As a result of this provision, oil and gas depletion does not enter the computation of S corporation income; thus,
it is not a separate item allocable to its shareholders. In order
to prevent a double deduction for these losses, section 1367(a)(2)(E)
provides that the basis of a shareholder's stock in an S corporation is to be reduced by the amount of the depletion deduction
claimed with respect to oil and gas wells.
Since the Revision Act continues the limitation on S corporation losses to the shareholders' bases for theirS corporation stock,
the benefit of percentage depletion still could be lost by S corporation shareholders because the amount of such depletion is not
limited to the basis for the depletable property. In order to prevent that result, section 1367(a)(1)(C) provides that the basis for
a shareholder's stock is to be increased by the amount by which
deductions for depletion exceed the basis of the depletable property.
As a result, shareholders in S corporations normally will be able
to obtain a current benefit with respect to the entire amount of
percentage depletion even though the depletion allowance has exceeded the shareholder's investment in the corporation.
For the purpose of computing eligibility for the independent
producer exemption, production is attributed to the shareholders
ratably and the limitation is applied at the shareholder and not
at the corporate level. Similar treatment is extended to an S corporation for the purposes of the windfall profits tax. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether oil production constitutes independent producer oil for the purposes of the lower rate of tax imposed by section 4987(b)(2) upon such oil, section 4942(f) provides
that an S corporation shall be treated as a partnership and its
shareholders as partners. As a result, the independent producer
amount is calculated for each shareholder separately.
On a disposition of property subject to section 613A(c)(13), each
shareholder is required to compute his gain or loss separately.
Under section 1254, deducted intangible drilling expenses are subject to recapture and, thus, on a disposition of property with respect
to which such deductions have been claimed, the proceeds of sale
are subject to tax at ordinary income rates to the extent of the
prior deduction. Under partnership taxation, all such recapture provisions are brought within the scope of the collapsible partnership provisions of section 751. Thus, if a partner disposes of his
interest in the partnership and the underlying partnership properties include an element of section 1254 recapture, some portion
of the gain on the disposition of the partnership interest similarly
would be subject to tax at ordinary income rates. In general, S
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corporations, like corporations subject to the regular tax, are not
subject to the bifurcation approach of section 751; rather, they are
subject to the collapsible corporation provisions of section 341.
Under the collapsible corporation approach, ordinary income treatment is imposed only, as a general proposition, when the corporate
assets viewed as a whole consist, in substantial part, of ordinary
income assets and, even then, ordinary income taxation is imposed
only if the corporation or its shareholders attempt to dispose of
those assets before having realized a substantial part of the income to be derived from those properties. 460 However, if section
341 is applicable, the entire amount of gain from the disposition
of stock in the corporation is subject to tax at ordinary income
rates. 461 Presumably because S corporation shareholders are treated
as if they individually owned oil and gas properties, in the one
instance of section 1254, the Code applies the partnership collapsible provision of section 751 rather than the collapsible provisions
of section 341. Thus, under section 1254(b)(2), upon a disposition
of S corporation stock where the corporation holds oil and gas properties with respect to which an intangible drilling deduction has
been claimed, an allocable portion of the gain on the sale is subject to tax at ordinary income rates.
For the purpose of the anti-transfer rules under the independent
production exemption, either the making or the termination of a
Subchapter S election is treated as a transfer. Thus, shifting
between electing and non-electing status causes a loss of the ability
to claim percentage depletion on oil or gas properties owned at
the time of the shift. Moreover, under section 613A(c)(13)(C)(i), an
S corporation- is treated as a partnership, and its shareholders as
partners, for the purpose of the anti-transfer provisions. Under
section 613A(c)(9)(A), the transfer of an interest in a partnership
is treated as a transfer of the oil or gas property and such a transfer
bars percentage depletion to the transferee. Apparently a similar
rule is intended to be applicable to transfers of stock in an S
corporation.
Although the election to deduct intangible drilling expenses
must be made at the partnership level, the somewhat similar election to deduct the cost of exploring for hard minerals is made at
the partner level. 462 Under section 1363(c)(2)(C), this pattern has
been extended to S corporations. That pattern is relatively complex. Because that election will affect the basis of the property
with respect to which the election was made, the proportion of
the basis in such property attributable to the S corporation
shareholders should vary from their general ownership interest
460.
461.
462.

I.R.C. § 341(e).
I.R.C. § 341(a).
I.R.C. § 703(b)(4).
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in the S corporation. In addition, section 617 contains elaborate
and complex recapture provisions which, to some extent, are elective and those elections are also made at the shareholder level.
Thus, on an event producing recapture, different S corporation
shareholders should be subject to different amounts of recapture.
It is not entirely clear, however, that this individualized treatment
of S corporation shareholders can be achieved under section 617.
In contrast to the more elaborate provisions of section 613A, which
were designed expressly to achieve such a complete aggregate approach for partnerships and S corporations, section 617 does not
treat property subject to the election as if it were owned by the
S corporation shareholders individually. If this individualized treatment of S corporation shareholders cannot be achieved under section 617, providing for a shareholder level election under that section is inappropriate. Either all shareholders will make the election
or the non-electing shareholders will bear an increased tax burden
attributable to the election by others. Congress should either conform section 617 to section 613A or should require the section 617
election to be made at the corporate level.
X.

OTHER CHANGES AFFECTING S CORPORATION STATUS

The desirability of electing to be taxed under Subchapter S
has been altered both by the Revision Act and by other recent
legislation in ways unrelated to the definition or taxation of such
corporations. The nature and availability of fringe benefits to the
shareholders of an S corporation have been revised and the continuing reductions in the rates of tax applicable to individuals, and
thus S corporations, have affected the attractiveness of the S corporation. As under prior law, the extent to which these changes
favor the making of an S election remains complex and will vary
in individual cases.
Under prior law, qualified plans providing deferred compensation benefits to employees of Subchapter S corporations were subject to special restrictions, the general design of which was to extend the relatively severe limitations imposed on partnership plans
to Subchapter S corporations. 463 Thus, the limitation on contributions to plans benefiting employees of Subchapter S corporations
were far lower than the ceilings applicable to plans adopted by
corporations subject to the regular income tax. On the other hand,
Subchapter S corporations were treated as corporations under prior
law. Accordingly, employee-shareholders of such corporations were
entitled to the broad range of fringe benefits that corporations
traditionally have been able to provide their employees. The treat463.

Former I.R.C. § 1379.
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ment of many of these ancillary benefits of incorporation has been
changed radically by the combined effect of the Revision Act and
TEFRA.

A. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
-

TEFRA eliminated the special limitations imposed by former
sections 1379(a) and (b) upon qualified deferred compensation arrangements adopted by S corporations for years beginning after
December 31, 1983. 464 Moreover, TEFRA completely revised the
treatment of various categories of employers. As a result, partnerships, regular corporations and Subchapter S corporations are
all entitled to adopt qualified deferred compensation arrangements
that generally are subject to the same ceilings and other restrictions on benefits. However, Congress did not produce this conformity by simply eliminating all restrictions which previously applied
only to certain employers. Rather, the amendments added by
TEFRA are a mixed bag, some of which entirely eliminate former
restrictions while others extend to all employers restrictions which
previously applied only to certain entities and still others add entirely new restrictions. A number of these provisions likely will
have greater impact on the deferred compensation plans of closely held businesses than on those of more widely owned
enterprises. 465 In general, these new rules will increase the costs
and reduce the benefits of qualified plans relative to the effect
of the former rules applicable to non-electing closely held corporations. Thus, while the shareholders of S corporations no longer
are prejudiced by their S election and generally will benefit from
the conformity of treatment among entities, they will have to deal
with these new restrictions.
Among the limitations imposed by TEFRA that particularly
will affect closely held businesses are the restrictions upon "topheavy" plans. New section 416(g) defines a top-heavy plan as one
in which more than sixty percent of the present value of the accrued
benefits, if the plan is a defined benefit plan, or of the account
balances, if the plan is a defined contribution plan, have been accumulated for the benefit of key employees. A "key employee" is
an officer of the employer, 466 one of the ten employees with the
greatest ownership, an owner of five percent of the employer, or
464. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 238(c), 96 Stat. 324, 513 (1982).
465. For a more detailed description and analysis of these provisions, see
Sirkin and Sirkin, The Effect of the TEFRA Pension Provisions on Closely Held
and Professional Businesses, 7 REV. TAX'N INDIVIDUALS 99 (1983).
466. However, in no event will more than 50 employees, or if less, the greater
of three employees or 10% of all employees, be treated as officers. I.R.C. §
416(i)(1)(A) (flush language).
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a one percent owner of the employer whose annual compensation
from the employer is in excess of $150,000. 467 A five percent owner
and a one percent owner of a corporation are defined as one who
owns five percent and one percent, respectively, of the corporation's outstanding stock or of the total combined voting power of
all of its stock. The attribution rules of section 318 apply for purposes of determining who is a five percent owner and who is a
one percent owner.
If the plan is "top-heavy" it must provide certain special benefits
to non-key employees and meet additional vesting requirements
not generally imposed upon non-top-heavy plans. 468 These provisions apply to plan years beginning on or after January 1, 1984.469
Among the other provisions of TEFRA which will be of particular interest to the owners of closely held businesses are the
new general limits upon the maximum annual benefit payable per
participant in a defined benefit plan and the maximum annual contribution per participant in a defined contribution plan, 470 new special
limitations for defined benefit plans upon benefits that commence
before the participant reaches the age of sixty-two, 471 and the
restrictions the new provisions place upon the amounts that can
be loaned to plan participants from plan funds. 472 The loan limitation provisions apply to any loan made after August 13, 1982.473
In addition to these provisions dealing with administration of
qualified plans, TEFRA adds new section 2039(g) to the estate tax
provisions of the Code, which limits to $100,000 the amount of plan
proceeds payable to a deceased participant's beneficiaries that is
excluded from the participant's gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes.

B. Other Employee Benefits
Consistent with the general treatment of S corporations under
the Revision Act, section 1372 provides that the S corporation shall
be treated as a partnership for the purpose of applying the provi467. I.R.C. § 416(i).
468. I.R.C. §§ 416(a)-(d).
469. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 241(a), 96 Stat- 324, 520 (1982). Although
the statute uses the word "years" without modification, Prop. Reg. 1.416-1, , G-2
[1983] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH), 8972 states that amendments necessary
to bring existing plans into compliance with the top heavy provisions must be
effective on the first day of the first plan year that begins after 1983.
470. I.R.C. §§ 415(b) and (c).
471. I.R.C. § 415(b)(2)(C).
472. I.R.C. § 72(p). For a discussion of the relationship of this new provision
to other provisions of the Code dealing with qualified deferred compensation plans,
see Sirkin and Sirkin, supra note 465, at 113-17.
473. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 236(c), 96 Stat. 324, 513 (1982). While
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sions of the Code which "relate to employee fringe benefits." While
the result Congress attempted to achieve with this section appears
correct, the imprecise drafting of this provision creates needless
ambiguity. The term "fringe benefits" is colloquial; it is not a defined
term under the Code. As a result, it is not clear what provisions
are intended to be affected by new section 1372. The Committee
Reports enumerate five examples of benefits that Congress
intended the new provision to curtail: 474 the$5,000 death benefit
exclusion provided by section 101(b); the exclusions from income
of amounts paid for accident and health plans provided by sections
105 and 106; the exclusion of the cost of up to $50,000 of group
term life insurance provided by section 79; and the exclusion of
meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer
provided by section 119.
Unfortunately, the list does not entirely clarify the intended
scope of the provision. On the one hand, it scarcely exhausts all
of the items commonly referred to as fringe benefits available under
current law to employees. On the other hand, the enumeration extends to items that do not fall within the traditional notion of a
fringe benefit. Apparently, the purpose of this provision is to prevent the shareholder-employees of an S corporation from receiving
tax-free certain employment-related benefits that are excluded from
the income of shareholder-employees when received from a nonelecting corporation, but are taxable to partners when received
from the partnership. By using the imprecise term "fringe benefit,"
Congress has left to the Treasury Department the task of implementing the legislative purpose by regulation. Regrettably, section 1372 contains neither a definition of the term fringe benefit
nor a list of all of the provisions intended to be affected.
The application of new section 1372 is made somewhat more
complex by the further provision that in applying the section, only
a shareholder owning two percent of the stock of the corporation,
after the application of the stock attribution rules of section 318,
. is to be regarded as a partner. 475 Presumably, lesser shareholders
are to be regarded as nonpartner employees. Thus, to the extent
that partnerships are able to provide fringe benefits to their
non partner-employees under these and other provisions of the Code,
those benefits will continue to be available to minor S corporation
shareholder-employees.
this provision does not require repayment of loans outstanding on that date in
excess of the limitations, it does apply to any outstanding loan that is renegotiated,
extended, renewed, or revised after August 13, 1982; furthermore, it requires
aggregation of pre-August 13, 1982 loans with later loans for purposes of applying the limitations to the new loans.
474. SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 22; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22,
at 21.
475. I.R.C. § 1372(b).
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Congress, undoubtedly, was justified in treating an S corporation as a partnership for these purposes. The effect of permitting
the S corporation a deduction for a section 105(b) medical expense
reimbursement plan, for example, would be to permit the
shareholders of the corporation to deduct directly the entire costs
of their medical care without regard to the ceilings imposed by
section 213. On the other hand, it must be recognized that Congress
merely has replaced one disparity in treatment for another. While
S corporations now are treated similarly to partnerships, they are
treated quite differently from corporations not subject to an S election. Moreover, the special treatment of fringe benefits injects a
further consideration into the already complicated question of
whether Subchapter S should be elected. Shareholders contemplating such an election now will have to calculate the costs
of the loss of such forms of nontaxable income that the Treasury
may determine are included within the scope of new section 1372.
Section 1372 generally is effective for the years beginning after
December 31, 1982, but if the corporation was a Subchapter S corporation on September 28, 1982, then section 1372 is not effective
until after December 31, 1987 with respect to "existing fringe
benefits."476 An "existing fringe benefit" is defined as any employee
fringe benefit "of a type" provided by the corporation to its
employees on September 28, 1982. The phrase "of a type" will require some regulatory clarification; it may mean that the benefit
must merely be similar to one provided on that date. The
availability of this grandfather provision ceases on the date that
the corporation's S election is terminated; the date the corporation fails to meet the passive investment income percentage test
under former section 1372(e)(5); or more than fifty percent of the
corporation's stock becomes newly owned within the meaning of
section 1378(c)(2), the special provision dealing with noncalendar
fiscal years, discussed earlier.
This grandfather provision seems unduly complex. While Congress quite justifiably might have wished to avoid imposing a new.
income tax liability on previously existing benefits which previously
were not subject to tax, it should have accomplished this goal with
a simpler provision. Moreover, the five year grace period is excessive. It would have been preferable for Congress to have provided that the fringe benefits enjoyed by shareholder-employees
of S corporations in existence when the Revision Act was passed
were to continue to be tax free for a relatively short statutory
grace period, for example, one year, and that thereafter all such
benefits would be subject to tax.

476.

Revision Act§ 6(d), Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 6(d), 96 Stat. 166a, 169a (1982).
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C. Tax Rates
While not a part of the 1982 legislation, the continuing reduction in the rates of tax applicable to upper income individuals has
affected materially the desirability of electing to be taxed pursuant
to Subchapter S. Indeed, while the reduction of the individual tax
rates relative to the corporate tax rate has reduced the desirability
of incorporating businesses in the first instance, it has enhanced
the desirability of electing Subchapter S treatment for those
businesses that are incorporated.
Of course, no simple test exists for determining whether it
would be advantageous for a corporation to be taxed under Subchapter S. Whether the business is projected to be profitable or
unprofitable, individual comparisons of the consequences under the
regular tax and under Subchapter S must be made in every case.
Nevertheless, some general principles are apparent. If the corporation has earnings and profits and if, for any reason, the corporation must distribute a substantial part of its earnings currently
to its shareholders, the overall burden of taxation on the business
enterprise almost always will be less if the corporation elects to
be taxed under Subchapter S. Regardless of the relationship between individual and corporate rates, incurring a current double
taxation on a material portion of the corporate profits will almost
always be more expensive than incurring the single level tax under
Subchapter S. The relative unattractiveness of the regular tax can
be diminished through a variety of techniques. If the corporate
profits subject to tax at the corporate level can be reduced through
expensing techniques, the burden of double taxation is correspondingly reduced. Methods for accomplishing such a reduction of the
double tax include using shareholder debt, high (but reasonable)
compensation packages including qualified plans, and leasing of
property from a shareholder to the corporation. If, after the application of these techniques, substantial profits remain to be
distributed, Subchapter S must be examined as an alternative.
If the corporation is either unable to distribute profits because
of the expanding needs of the business, or is not required to do
so because sufficient profits can be expensed, the equation becomes
more complex. While the ultimate extraction of those accumulated
corporate profits ultimately may be subject to double taxation, the
potential for infinite deferral of that tax and the possibility that
it may be avoided by death or otherwise, often justified ignoring
that feature of the regular corporate tax structure. Accordingly,
a comparison may be made between the regular corporate tax
payable and the tax payable by shareholders if Subchapter S is
elected. That comparison is influenced by two factors; the number
of shareholders of the corporation and their average income tax
brackets. Obviously, the more shareholders an S corporation has,
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the greater the income splitting advantage provided by a Subchapter S election. Assuming that at least some of the shareholders
are not in the highest individual tax brackets, the aggregate tax
payable will be reduced by distributing the corporate income over
the number of such shareholders. By contrast, all income derived
by a corporation subject to the regular tax is taxable to a single
entity.
It is in connection with the second branch of the comparison
that the recent changes in individual rate structure significantly
have affected the desirability of a Subchapter Selection. Although
the maximum corporate tax rate has remained relatively stable,
currently at forty-six percent, 477 the maximum individual rates have
dropped from a maximum of seventy percent to a maximum of
fifty percent on all sources of income.478 At the same time, the level
of income at which the maximum bracket becomes effective has
been increased materially. As a result, the amount of tax to be
saved by causing the business to be subject to the regular corporate income tax rather than the individual tax has been
diminished greatly. For this reason, it may be anticipated that many
more businesses will find it desirable to elect to be taxed under
Subchapter S.
The interrelationship of these taxes can best be understood
through an illustration. Although such an illustration has no application beyond the facts assumed, it can establish a framework
for evaluating the desirability of a Subchapter S election. Under
the rates in effect for 1983, a corporation having taxable income
of $500,000 will be subject to a corporate tax of $209,750. Assume
that the corporation is owned by one married individual who files
a joint income tax return with his spouse, and who has taxable
income other than corporate profits, in excess of all deductions,
in the amount of $30,000. That income is subject to a tax of $5,064.
If the corporation elected to be taxed under Subchapter S, and
that election did not affect the manner in which it computed its
income, the individual would become subject to an additional tax
payable in the amount of $243,938, producing a total tax to the
shareholder of $259,002. As a result, the business would be subject to an additional income tax liability of $34,188 because it made
the Subchapter S election. On the other hand, if the corporation
were owned by ten equal shareholders, all of whom had the same
noncorporate income and the same tax return filing status as the
individual in our first example, dividing the corporate income of
$500,000 among them would produce an additional tax liability to
each of $19,750, for an aggregate increase in tax liability of $197,500.
477.
478.

I.R.C. § ll(b).
I.R.C. § 1.
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As a result of the splitting of income among the shareholders, the
overall tax liability to which the business is subject would be reduced by over $12,000.
Apparently, in a closely held corporation that is retaining all
of its income, Subchapter S status frequently will produce an increase in tax liability, but the reverse quickly becomes true if the
corporation is required to distribute a material amount of its profits.
Thus, if the corporation described above was subject to the corporate tax, was owned by a single shareholder, and distributed
a dividend equal to fifteen percent of its earnings, $75,000, the
tax liability of the shareholder would increase to $36,590. When
this liability is added to the amount of corporate tax, $209,750,
the total tax on the business, $246,340, approximates the tax burden
under a Subchapter S election. Thus, if larger dividends are required, the aggregate tax burden can be reduced by electing Subchapter S status.
XI.

ENTITY AUDITS

The Revision Act extended the "entity audit" procedure
previously applicable to partnerships to S corporations. New sections 6241 through 6245 provide for binding determination in an
audit of the S corporation's return of the tax treatment at the
shareholder level of all "subchapter S items," defined by section
6245 as any item the tax treatment of which is determined by the
Commissioner to be more appropriately determined at the corporate
level than at the shareholder level. New section 6244 states that
all provisions of subtitle F of the Code (sections 6001 through 7852)
dealing with partnership items 479 shall be applicable to Subchapter
S items unless modified or made inapplicable by regulations. Thus,
sections 6221 through 6232, the new partnership entity audit procedures added to the Code by TEFRA, generally will apply to S
corporations.

A. Prior Law
Under prior law, a Subchapter S corporation was exempt from
the income tax; nevertheless, it was required to file an information return similar in form to the ordinary corporate income tax
return!80 The Subchapter S corporation return also included items
of income and loss allocated to the shareholders. However, prior
law lacked any provision requiring a shareholder to treat any item
479. A "partnership item" is defined by I.R.C. § 6231(a)(3) as any item the
tax treatment of which is determined by the Commissioner to be determined
more appropriately at the partnership level.
480. IR.C. § 6037 prior to amendment by the Revision Act.
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on his personal income tax return consistently with this schedule.
Thus, even though the proper characterization of an item could
be determined only at the corporate level, the shareholders were
free to disregard the characterization determined by the corporation's tax advisors and to make their own determinations in preparing their individual returns. Furthermore, since the individual
shareholders, not the corporation, were the taxpayers, the Internal Revenue Service could not collect any deficiency due to adjustments on the corporation's income tax return without also
auditing returns of the individual shareholders and assessing a deficiency against them. Moreover, there was no procedure by which
the IRS could make such deficiencies binding upon all shareholders
of the corporation without auditing each one individually before
the statute of limitations ran for the audit of the individual return.
Not surprisingly, as the series of amendments to Subchapter S
increased the permissible number of shareholders, the Treasury
Department began to consider ways to decrease the administrative
burden of these shareholder-by-shareholder audit and assessment
procedures. 481
A similar problem arose under the prior law governing partnership income tax returns. Partnerships also were exempt from
income tax at the entity level, but were required to file an information return, including a schedule of items of income and loss
allocated to each partner. 482 However, since the partners, rather
than the partnership, were the taxpayers, matters affecting the
partners' tax liabilities could be determined definitively only by
audit of the return of each individual partner. The administrative
burden with respect to partnerships was even greater than that
of Subchapter S corporations for two reasons: first, there has never
been any limit upon the number of partners a partnership may
have, and second, partnerships are permitted to make special allocations of certain items of income and loss to particular partners.

B. The New Entity Audit Provisions
The new provisions appear to ameliorate substantially the administrative procedures for audit of S corporation income tax
returns. New section 6241 states that the tax treatment of any
Subchapter S item shall be determined at the corporate level, and
section 6037 has been amended to require that the S corporation's
information income tax return must include each shareholder's pro
rata share of each item. 483 Furthermore, new section 6242 now re481.
482.
483.

STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 25.
I.R.C. § 6031 prior to amendment by TEFRA.
I.R.C. § 6031, dealing with partnership information income tax returns,
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quires that each shareholder treat each Subchapter S item on his
or her personal income tax return in a manner consistent with
the treatment of that item on the corporate return unless the
shareholder notifies the Commissioner of an inconsistent treatment.
The provisions dealing with audit of partnership income tax
returns, made applicable to S corporations by section 6244, set out
in considerable detail the procedures to be followed. 484 In summary,
the partnership is required to furnish on the partnership tax return
the names, addresses, and share of taxable income of all persons
entitled to a distributable share.485 In addition, the partnership may
designate a "tax matters partner" (TMP) whose role is to act as
representative of the partnership in all audit proceedings should
the partnership return be selected for audit. If the partnership
fails to designate such a person, the statute provides that the Commissioner will treat the general partner who is entitled to the
largest share of partnership profits as the TMP, or if there is more
than one such partner, the one whose name appears first
alphabetically. 486
Upon receiving notice from the Service that the partnership's
return has been selected for audit, the TMP must then provide
the Service with the name, address, profits interest and taxpayer
identification number of everyone who was a partner during the
year to be audited. 487 Section 6223 sets out in considerable detail
the time, manner and extent to which the Service must notify all
other partners, both of the fact of the commencement of the audit
and of its final result (called the "final partnership administrative
adjustment" or FPAA). Generally, all partners are entitled to notice,
except those who own less than one percent of a partnership having more than one hundred partners and those who fail to provide
the Commissioner with their name, address and profits interest
to enable him to determine that they are entitled to notice. Since
a partner of a partnership can be another entity, such as another
partnership or ·a trust, the owners or beneficiaries of any such
entity-partner also are entitled to notice, if, because of the conduit nature of the entity, the income tax liability of its owners
or beneficiaries may be affected by the determination of a partnership item.'88 Section 6223(g) also requires the TMP to keep all
as amended by TEFRA, requires that every person who was a partner at any
time during the tax year be provided with a copy of the return. Curiously, I.R.C.
§ 6037 contains no such provision.
484. For a thorough analysis of the partnership entity audit provisions, see
Caplin and Brown, Partnership Tax Audits and Litigation After TEFRA, 61
TAXES 75 (1983).
485. I.R.C. § 6031.
486. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(7).
487. I.R.C. § 6230(e).
488. I.R.C. §§ 6223(c)(3) and (h).
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partners informed of all administrative and judicial proceedings
affecting partnership level adjustment of partnership items. While
the TMP represents the partnership in its dealings with the Service, any partner may participate in any administrative or judicial
proceeding in which his tax liability could be affected. 489 If settlement is reached, a partner who is entitled to notice under section
6231 will be bound by the settlement only if he consents to it, but
the TMP may bind all non-notice partners without their consent. 490
When the administrative audit proceeding has terminated, the
IRS must send notice of the FP AA to all partners entitled to
notice. 491 During the 90-day period following issuance of the FPAA,
only the TMP may commence a proceeding for judicial redetermination; thereafter, any partner entitled to notice may commence
such a proceeding if the TMP has not. 492 The TMP or any partner
who is entitled to notice may appeal an adverse judicial decision. 493
A deficiency with respect to any partnership item cannot be
assessed against any partner until 150 days after notice of the
FPAA was sent to the TMP, if it is not contested, or until a court
decision becomes final, if the FPAA is contested judicially.494 In
addition, new section 6229 sets the statute of limitations for assessing such a deficiency against a partner with respect to a partnership item at three years after the later of the date the partnership return was filed, or the last day on which it could have been
filed timely without regard to extensions. The new provisions also
contain a procedure by which the partnership may amend its return
(filing of a request for administrative adjustment) and procedures
for judicial review of the denial of such a request. 495
A partner who is entitled to notice of administrative proceedings pursuant to section 6223 and fails to receive it may, if
the proceeding is still pending, elect to have the partnership items
for the taxable year which is the subject of the proceeding become
nonpartnership items as to him. 496 The result of such an election
is that the tax consequences to the partner of the partnership items
will be unaffected by the determination made at the entity level;
the tax consequences to him will have to be determined, as under
prior law, in a separate audit of his personal income tax return.
Moreover, if the period for applying for judicial review of the FP AA
already has expired when he receives notice, the partnership items
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.

I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

§§ 6224(a) and 6226(c).
§ 6224(c).
§ 6223(a).

§ 6224.
§ 6226(g).

§ 6225.
§§ 6227 and 6228.
§ 6223(e)(3).

1983]

SUBCHAPTER S REVISION ACT

737

will be treated as nonpartnership items with respect to him unless
he elects to have the final outcome of the audit apply to him. 497
The Commissioner is granted general authority under section
6244 to modify these rules for audit of S corporation returns. The
committee reports indicate that this authority is intended to be
quite broad in order to allow modification of the procedures to
take into consideration all differences between the two entities
whether or not the differences are tax related.
In general, it appears that the entity audit procedures for S
corporations can be simpler than those for partnerships. For example, new section 6243 provides that each shareholder shall be
given notice of and opportunity to participate in any administrative
or judicial proceeding for the corporate level determination of any
Subchapter S item. This provision, and the restriction of eligible
shareholders to individuals except in very limited circumstances,
renders unnecessary for S corporation entity audits many of the
technical rules governing who must receive notice of partnership
entity audits.
This requirement of section 6243 also should render relatively
simple the solution to a problem the committee reports specifically
direct the Commissioner to address. In a somewhat confused statement, the committee reports indicate that Congress believed the
procedures for selecting a person to act for the S corporation as
the TMP acts for the partnership would have to be different
because, unlike general partners, shareholders are not agents for
each other or the corporation under state law. 498 Since every
shareholder must receive actual notice of all proceedings and be
given the opportunity to participate, it would seem the problem
of appointing a spokesperson can be solved fairly easily by requiring the shareholders to designate one of their number to serve
in that capacity according to rules similar to those by which S
corporation status is elected. Indeed, such a designation could be
required as part of the consent form for new elections. Should the
shareholders fail to designate a spokesperson, the regulations could
provide that the shareholder with the largest percentage of stockand therefore the largest stake in the tax proceeding- was to be
the spokesperson until the shareholders filed a designation.
The regulations under section 6243 will have to supply rules
for the effect of final determination in an entity audit as to which
a shareholder failed to receive notice. There seems to be no reason
why the statutory provisions applicable to a partner who fails to
receive notice should not apply.
497.
498.
at 24.

I.R.C. § 6223(e)(2). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22,
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One area which will require considerable clarification through
regulations is the scope of the term "subchapter S item." As noted
above, this term is defined by section 6245 as any item "to the
extent regulations ... provide that, for purposes of this subtitle,
such item is more appropriately determined at the corporate level."
The legislative history of the Revision Act contains no guidance
as to Congress' intent in drafting this section, nor does the
legislative history of TEFRA elaborate upon section 6231(a)(3),
which contains an analogous definition of "partnership item."
Clearly, Congress intended to give the Commissioner broad discretion in defining these terms, in light of the general purposes of
these provisions to treat items derived from the entity consistently
as to all owners of the entity and to increase administrative
efficiency by determining as much as possible in one audit proceeding. It would be "more appropriate" to determine any item
at the entity level if it must be determined by resort to the books
and records of the entity, or if determination of its amount or
character with respect to one partner or shareholder will affect
the tax liability of another partner or shareholder as to that item
or any other item. In other words, most tax determinations will
be made at the entity level. In accordance with this analysis, proposed regulations issued under the partnership audit provisions
define "partnership item" quite broadly. 499 First, they contain a
list of items which will be considered partnership items. This list
is quite extensive, and includes, in addition to each partner's share
of each item of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit of the partnership, such other items as guaranteed payments and amounts
necessary to enable the partners to compute their amounts at risk
under section 465, and their depletion allowances under section
613A. In addition, it includes a group of items that will be considered partnership items for purposes of some determinations but
not others. For example, a partner's contribution to the partnership will be a partnership item for purposes of determining its
character as a contribution to capital or a loan or a loan repayment, its basis, its amount, if it is money, and the applicability
of the investment company rules of section 721(b), but it will not
be considered a partnership item for purposes of determining
whether the contribution causes recapture under the investment
tax credit provisions of section 38 to the extent that the recapture is irrelevant to the partnership. The Commissioner clearly,
and quite properly, interprets the language of the statute broadly
to favor determination at the entity level. Similar regulations likely
will be forthcoming for S corporations under section 6245.
499.

Prop. Reg. § 1.6231(a)(3)-l [1983] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)

1 8956.
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The regulations under section 6245 must be drafted consistently
with those under sections 1363(b) and 1366, the sections dealing
with computation of an S corporation's taxable income and the consequences thereof to the shareholders. Thus, the ambiguities in
the language of those sections discussed earlier in this paper, 500
such as the scope of the word "could" in section 1366(aX1)(A) and
the relationship to other sections of the Code of the statement
that an S corporation must be treated as an individual for purposes of computation of its taxable income, must be resolved before
the task of drafting regulations under section 6245 can be
completed.
An item may become a nonpartnership item as to a particular
partner, and, therefore, its tax consequences for that partner will
not be determined in the entity audit, if a partner notifies the Commissioner that he will treat the item differently on his personal
return; or if he files a request for administrative adjustment under
section 6227 which, if favorably acted upon by the Commissioner,
would result in treatment of an item on the partner's return inconsistently with its treatment on the partnership return; or if
a partner fails to receive notice of a proceeding under the entity
audit provisions as described earlier, or in a series of five "special
enforcement areas" enumerated in section 6231(c) to the extent
the regulations so provide.501
The S corporation audit provisions contain no such explicit
statutory rules. The legislative history authorizes regulations
prescribing treatment of the corporate items "as other than corporate items, . . . where special enforcement problems arise;" 502
however, this seems to refer only to the last of the categories
enumerated in the partnership provisions. Thus, it is not clear
whether Congress intended to give the Commissioner authority
to create by regulation a class of "nonsubchapter S items" analogous
to the statutory nonpartnership items. However, because the situations where items are classified nonpartnership items are all situations in which deviation from the entity's return is anticipated and
the situations can arise in the course of proceedings dealing with
the audit of an S corporation's income tax return it seems likely
that the Commissioner does have such authority under the general
language of section 6245; such items simply are not more appropriately determined at the corporate level.
Section 6231(a)(i)(B) of the partnership audit provisions contains
an exception from the definition of "partnership" for partnerships

500.
501.
502.
at 24.

See text accompanying notes 219-33 supra.
I.R.C. § 6231(b).
SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25; HOUSE

REPORT,

supra note 22,
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with ten or fewer partners as long as no partner's share of any
partnership item is different from his share of any other partnership item. This exception exempts such partnerships from the entity audit provisions, but the partnership may elect to have these
provisions apply. This exception is intriguing because it excepts
from the partnership entity audit provisions those partnerships
that most closely resemble S corporations. However, there is no
similar exception to the S corporation provisions. This disparity
injects another difference in the treatment of S corporations and
partnerships.
No reason for this exception appears in the legislative history
of TEFRA. Apparently, it is simply an exemption from the new
entity audit procedures of those partnerships which pose the least
administrative burden to the Internal Revenue Service. The owners
of most small entities that do not make use of special allocations
are likely to elect to have the entity audit provisions apply because
they will find the procedure more efficient and less expensive than
multiple individual audits. Occasionally, however, the owners will
disagree among themselves about how to treat a particular item
and might find it more advantageous to treat the item differently
on their personal returns rather than to notify the Commissioner
of their inconsistent treatment pursuant to the new entity audit
requirements. Because the procedure for notifying the Commissioner of inconsistent treatment is available for both partnerships
and S corporations, the additional exemption seems unnecessary
for both entities. Furthermore, if such an exemption were extended
to small S corporations, the entity audit procedures would be elective for the vast majority of S corporations. 503
Clearly, the provision dealing with S corporations is preferable
for both entities and, if any change is to be made, it ought to be
the elimination of the exemption for small partnerships rather than
the extension of the exemption to small S corporations.
XII.

CONCLUSION

The Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982 represents the culmination of a substantial effort by Congress to rationalize one area of
the Code that had not achieved its promise. The results of that
effort are mixed. In revising those aspects of prior law that relate
to corporations that are solely subject to Subchapter S taxation,
the Revision Act has accomplished major and praiseworthy improvements. While the restrictions on eligibility to elect Subchapter
503. The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation reported in 1980 that
recent statistics showed 97% of all S corporations had seven or fewer shareholders.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.

1983]

SUBCHAPTER S REVISION ACT

741

S remain more restrictive than necessary, particularly with respect
to the number and character of S corporation shareholders, the
definition of an eligible corporation has been liberalized substantially in several significant respects. The creation of a safe harbor
indebtedness should defuse substantially the nonproductive one
class of stock controversy, and the elimination of passive investment income restriction on newly formed Subchapter S corporations will increase materially the flexibility of an S corporation
without creating an unfair advantage for S corporation
shareholders. In addition, the rules governing the election and termination of Subchapter S status have been rationalized and
liberalized and represent a substantial improvement over prior law.
Similarly, in the computation of S corporation income and the
allocation of that income to shareholders, the Revision Act largely
was successful in disconnecting the pattern of taxing S corporations from corporate tax concepts and then conforming the taxation of S corporations to the taxation of partnerships. While the
computation of income of a Subchapter S corporation may not have
become more simple, substantial simplification has been achieved
by eliminating a third system for the tax~tion of business entities.
On the other hand, the congressional unwillingness to conform completely the taxation of S corporations to the taxation of partnerships was an unfortunate retreat from the broader objectives of
the Revision Act. The tax avoidance potential in Subchapter S corporations is no greater than that in partnerships; thus, the more
restrictive approach taken in the Revision Act than is permitted
in the taxation of partnerships cannot be justified. A rational approach to the tax avoidance potential inherent in special allocations and basis adjustments attributable to entity level borrowing
should be applied uniformly to all conduit taxation entities. By arbitrarily failing to provide for S corporation shareholders the special
allocations and basis adjustments that are available to partners,
Congress simply refused to confront several significant issues in
the conduit pattern of taxation.
The provisions of the Revision Act that integrate the taxation
of S corporations with the taxation of corporations subject to the
regular income tax are far less successful than provisions that solely
affect Subchapter S corporations. The treatment of corporations
that had accumulated earnings and profits prior to electing to be
taxed under Subchapter Sis particularly unsatisfactory. While some
mechanism must be established to prevent the improper avoidance
of tax on distributions by imposing different rules on S corporations depending on whether the corporation has accumulated earnings and profits, Congress has effectively created two classes of
Subchapter S corporations, and has needlessly complicated the task
of managing S corporations. This undesirable disparity in treatment is particularly unsatisfactory because the penalties imposed
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upon corporations that have accumulated earnings and profits is
an overbroad, second-best solution. The Revision Act would have
been much improved if Congress had addressed more directly the
tax avoidance potential of the making of a Subchapter S election
for a corporation that has recently accumulated a substantial
amount of earnings and profits, for example, by the sale of its
business assets.
Given the policy decision made in 1958 and continued in 1982
to permit corporations having accumulated earnings and profits
to elect Subchapter S status, the need to identify distributions attributable to those accumulated earnings and profits becomes
unavoidable. Under prior law, the PTI account mechanism was one
of the least satisfactory aspects of Subchapter S. Under the Revision Act, the mechanism has been revised radically but not improved. The adoption of an entity level accumulated adjustments
account was inconsistent with the general movement towards conformity to partnership taxation and can produce serious inequities
in the taxation of S corporation shareholders. The shareholder level
account of prior law, stripped of the needless restrictions imposed
under prior law, would IJ.ave been a preferable solution.
In summary, the Revision Act could have been better and it
should be improved. The substantial improvement in the conduit
taxation of S corporations brought about by the Revision Act
represents only a major first step towards fulfilling the objectives
of the drafters of the original 1958 legislation and of the Revision
Act. It can only be hoped that an additional quarter of a century
will not pass before Subchapter S again becomes the object of congressional scrutiny.

